In my ‘Mind’s Eye’: introspectionism, detectivism, and the basis of authoritative self-knowledge

It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I argue that there is a fundamental class of cases of authoritative self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are consciously thinking about their current, conscious intentional states, that is best accounted for in terms of a theory that is,
broadly speaking, introspectionist and detectivist. The position developed has an intuitive plausibility that has inspired many who work in the Cartesian tradition, and the potential to yield a single treatment of the basis of authoritative self-knowledge for both intentional states and sensation states.

In My 'Mind's Eye': Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge

It is widely accepted that knowledge of certain of one’s own mental states is authoritative in being epistemically more secure than knowledge of the mental states of others, and theories of self-knowledge have largely appealed to one or the other of two sources to explain this special epistemic status. The first, ‘detectivist’, position, appeals to an inner perception-like basis, whereas the second, ‘constitutivist’, one, appeals to the view that the special security awarded to certain self-knowledge is a conceptual matter. I argue that there is a fundamental class of cases of authoritative self-knowledge, ones in which subjects are consciously thinking about their current, conscious intentional states, that is best accounted for in terms of a theory that is, broadly speaking, introspectionist and detectivist. The position developed has an intuitive plausibility that has inspired many who work in the Cartesian tradition, and the potential to yield a single treatment of the basis of authoritative self-knowledge for both intentional states and sensation states.

Self-generated expressions of residual complaints following brain injury

Following brain injury there is often a prolonged period of deteriorating psychological condition, despite neurological stability or improvement. This is presumably consequent to the remission of anosognosia and the realisation of permanently worsened status. This change is hypothesised to be directed partially by the socially mediated processes which play a role in generating self-awareness and which here direct the reconstruction of the self as a permanently injured person. However, before we can understand this process of redevelopment, we need an unbiassed technique to monitor self-awareness. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 30 individuals with long-standing brain injuries to capture their spontaneous complaints and their level of insight into the implications of their difficulties. The focus was on what the participants said in their own words, and the extent to which self-knowledge of difficulties was spontaneously salient to the participants. Their responses were subjected to content analysis. Most participants were able to say that they had brain injuries and physical difficulties, many mentioned memory and attentional problems and a few made references to a variety of emotional disturbances. Content analysis of data from unbiassed interviews can reveal the extent to which people with brain injuries know about their difficulties. Social constructionist accounts of self-awareness and recovery are supported.

Thought insertion: Abnormal sense of thought agency or thought endorsement?

The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich the topic, his proposal cannot rival the version of the standard approach we shall defend.

Irony as discipline: Self-help and gender in the knowledge economy:Self-help and gender in the knowledge economy

In this article, we explore the role of self-help literature within the knowledge economy. We point to the recent growth of ironic humour within such texts, and examine how this operates to construct gendered and embodied subjectivities that position women according to a masculine gaze. Drawing on empirical data from self-help books for career women published between 1997 and 2007, we analyse the styles of embodiment that these texts promote. We find that career women are encouraged to maintain a stance of constant attention to themselves and their bodily presentations, a position that is in line with wider cultural features of contemporary knowledge economy working. We note that ironic humour is deployed in ways that subtly reinforce existing gender relations within contemporary organizations. Our article contributes to debates on subjectivity within the knowledge economy; while scholars have pointed to an increasing normative emphasis on embodied performances, we provide insights into the mechanisms by which this occurs, with a specific focus upon the growing genre of self-help literature and its recent shift to ironic humour.

A split-combination approach to merging knowledge bases in possibilistic logic

In this paper, we propose an adaptive approach to merging possibilistic knowledge bases that deploys multiple operators instead of a single operator in the merging process. The merging approach consists of two steps: one is called the splitting step and the other is called the combination step. The splitting step splits each knowledge base into two subbases and then in the second step, different classes of subbases are combined using different operators. Our approach is applied to knowledge bases which are self-consistent and the result of merging is also a consistent knowledge base. Two operators are proposed based on two different splitting methods. Both operators result in a possibilistic knowledge base which contains more information than that obtained by the t-conorm (such as the maximum) based merging methods. In the flat case, one of the operators provides a good alternative to syntax-based merging operators in classical logic.

The Self-conscious Researcher – Post-modern Perspectives of Participatory Research with Young People

Research in young people by young people is a growing trend and considered a democratic approach to exploring their lives. Qualitative research is also seen as a way of redistributing power; with participatory research positioned by many as a democratic paradigm of qualitative inquiry. Although participatory research may grant a view on another world, it is fraught with a range of relationships that require negotiation and which necessitate constant self-reflection. Drawing on experiential accounts of participatory research with young people, this paper will explore the power relationship from the perspective of the adult researcher, the young peer researcher and also that of the researched. It will explore the self-conscious exchange of power; and describe how it is relinquished and reclaimed with increasing degrees of compliance as confidence and security develops. Co-authored by a peer researcher and adult researchers, this paper will illustrate a range of practical examples of participatory research with young people, decode the power struggle and consider the implications. It will argue that although the initial stages of the research process are artificial, self-conscious and undemocratic it concludes that the end may justify the means with the creation of social agency knowledge, experience and reality.