Philosophers and practical men: Charles Babbage, Irish merchants and the economics of information

Before the emergence of coordination of production by firms, manufacturers and merchants traded in markets with asymmetric information. Evidence suggests that the practical knowledge thus gained by these agents was well in advance of contemporary political economists and anticipates twentieth-century developments in the economics of information. Charles Babbage, who regarded merchants and manufacturers as the chief sources of reliable economic data, drew on this knowledge as revealed in the evidence of manufacturers and merchants presented to House of Commons select committees to make an important pioneering contribution to the theory of production and exchange with information asymmetries.

Historians and their duties

We need to specify what ethical responsibility historians, as historians, owe, and to whom. We should distinguish between natural duties and (non-natural) obligations, and recognize that historians' ethical responsibility is of the latter kind. We can discover this responsibility by using the concept of “accountability”. Historical knowledge is central. Historians' central ethical responsibility is that they ought to tell the objective truth. This is not a duty shared with everybody, for the right to truth varies with the audience. Being a historian is essentially a matter of searching for historical knowledge as part of an obligation voluntarily undertaken to give truth to those who have a right to it. On a democratic understanding, people need and are entitled to an objective understanding of the historical processes in which they live. Factual knowledge and judgments of value are both required, whatever philosophical view we might have of the possibility of a principled distinction between them. Historians owe historical truth not only to the living but to the dead. Historians should judge when that is called for, but they should not distort historical facts. The rejection of postmodernism's moralism does not free historians from moral duties. Historians and moral philosophers alike are able to make dispassionate moral judgments, but those who feel untrained should be educated in moral understanding. We must ensure the moral and social responsibility of historical knowledge. As philosophers of history, we need a rational reconstruction of moral judgments in history to help with this.

The good, the bad and the 'not so bad': reflecting on moral appraisal in practice

The aim of this paper is to facilitate reflection on the moral merit of practitioners in various contexts. Insight is gained from Aristotelian and Kantian accounts of moral character and an original framework for reflection is presented as an adjunct to ethical theory and principles considered when appraising others. In relation to states of character there is an irreconcilable difference between Kantian (deontic) and Aristotelian (aretaic) conceptions of the nature of full virtue (excellence of character), but at the same time it can be argued that in relation to practice their approaches complement each other. It is also argued that in relation to caring for the vulnerable, Aristotle’s conception of full virtue is more compelling than Kant’s. On the other hand, Kant’s notion of self - serving action is important in nursing and it therefore needs to be considered when reflecting on professional conduct. The conclusion reached is that Aristotelian and Kantian accounts of character appraisal should be used in a combined approach to moral appraisal. This approach draws on the accounts of both philosophers and offers valuable insight into moral character, professional conduct and, in a more formal setting, fitness to practise.

Bach

For nearly two centuries Johann Sebastian Bach has been regarded as a cornerstone of Western musical culture. His music inspired subsequent generations of composers and philosophers alike, and continues to capture our imaginations in many ways. Bach studies is part of this picture, often seen as providing excellent examples of musicological scholarship. The editor has chosen 31 published articles which, in his view, not only represent a broad spectrum of the scholarly discussions on Bach's life and works, but will also facilitate the on-going study of Bach's creative genius. The articles have been selected to ensure that this volume will be considered useful for not only those students who are currently engaging in Bach studies at universities but also for more seasoned Bach scholars as they consider the future direction of Bach studies. The editor contextualises the significance of each article in the introduction.

Just how controversial is evidential holism?

This paper is an examination of evidential holism, a prominent position in epistemology and the philosophy of science which claims that experiments only ever confirm or refute entire theories. The position is historically associated with W.V. Quine, and it is at once both popular and notorious, as well as being largely under-described. But even though there’s no univocal statement of what holism is or what it does, philosophers have nevertheless made substantial assumptions about its content and its truth. Moreover they have drawn controversial and important conclusions from these assumptions. In this paper I distinguish three types of evidential holism and argue that the most oft-cited and controversial thesis is entirely unmotivated. The other two theses are much overlooked, but are well-motivated and free from controversial implications.

ARE ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETS AS SMART AS A RAT

The origins of artificial neural networks are related to animal conditioning theory: both are forms of connectionist theory, which in turn derives from the empiricist philosophers' principle of association. The parallel between animal learning and neural nets suggests that interaction between them should benefit both sides.

Luce Irigaray: Back to the Beginning

In 2014 it will be 40 years since Luce Irigaray’s (second) doctoral thesis Speculum de l'autre femme was first published. That book, widely recognized as the most important text in feminist philosophy, was to introduce Irigaray’s critique of western philosophy and psychoanalysis and her ethics of sexual difference for which she was to become so well known. Irigaray, well into her eighties now, has published continuously since Speculum, despite her exclusion from French academic life after her expulsion in 1974 from the Université de Paris VIII Vincennes. That her latest book In the Beginning, She Was, released on the eve of Speculum’s anniversary, is perhaps the most personally revelatory of her works and revisits many of the same themes and issues that concerned her in Speculum cannot be coincidental. In this critical notice we examine Irigaray’s latest offering arguing that her contribution is twofold as she combines with new clarity her longstanding critique of phallocratic culture and her transformative vision of humanity as a culture of sexuate difference. There are a number of important themes addressed in the six chapters of the book, but for the purposes of this discussion our analysis will focus mostly on elaborating her critique of Western culture, on the usefulness of her work for rethinking masculine subject formation and on the figure of Antigone, as a feminine subject on her own terms, as a way of imagining a possible relation between two subjects within a culture of sexuate difference. We argue that this book continues to illustrate Irigaray’s importance as one of the most radical and prophetic philosophers of our time.

Empowering the Shamed Self: Recognition and Critical Social Work

Summary: This article provides a review of the contribution of Axel Honneth’s model of recognition for critical social work. While Honneth’s tripartite conceptualisation of optimal identity-formation is positively appraised, his analysis of the link between misrecognition, the experience of shame and eventual sense of moral outrage, is contested. Drawing on a range of sources, including the sociology of shame, Honneth’s ideas about the emotional antecedents of emancipatory action are revised to guide critical social work with misrecognised service users.

Findings: The intellectual background to Honneth’s recognition model, emanating from leading German philosophers, is described and its application to social work set out. Even so, Honneth’s model is found to be deficient in one primary regard: its assumption about the emotional antecedents to quests for withheld recognition is misapprehended. In particular, the argument in this article is that the ubiquitous emotion of shame, which Honneth argues flows from misrecognition, must be carefully addressed through the medium of relationship, otherwise it might lead to repressed shame and frustrated attempts at social struggle. To this end, a social work process is delineated for dealing with shame, following episodes of misrecognition.

Applications: Honneth’s model of recognition, along with revised ideas about how to recognise and manage shame, is incorporated into a conceptual framework for critical social work practice. With this renewed understanding of the impact of shame, following misrecognition, social workers should be better equipped conceptually to enable service users to take action for empowerment.

From Francis Hutcheson to James McCosh: Irish Presbyterians and Defining the Scottish Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century

This article examines the disputes amongst Irish Presbyterians about the teaching of moral philosophy by Professor John Ferrie in the college department of the Royal Belfast Academical Institution in the early nineteenth century and the substantive philosophical and theological issues that were raised. These issues have largely been ignored by Irish historians, but a discussion of them is of general relevance to historians of ideas as they illuminate a series of broader questions about the definition and development of Scottish philosophy. These are represented in the move from two philosophers who had strong connections with Irish Presbyterianism—Francis Hutcheson, the early eighteenth-century moral sense philosopher and theological moderate from County Down, and James McCosh, nineteenth-century exponent of modified Common Sense philosophy at Queen's College Belfast and a committed evangelical. In particular, this article addresses three important themes—the definition and character of ‘the Scottish philosophy’, the relationship between evangelicalism and Common Sense philosophy, and the process of development and adaptation that occurred in eighteenth-century Scottish thought during the first half of the nineteenth century.