Is the General Public Licence a Rational Choice?

Open source projects are networks of developers, distributors and end-users of non-proprietary created knowledge goods. It has been argued that this form of organization has some advantages over the firm or market coordination. I show that for sufficiently convex and modular projects proprietary licences are not able to sustain sequential knowledge production which, however, can be carried out if the project is run on the open source basis.

Why do people non-demand reveal in hypothetical double referenda for public goods?

Hypothetical contingent valuation surveys used to elicit values for environmental and other public goods often employ variants of the referendum mechanism due to the cognitive simplicity and familiarity of respondents with this voting format. One variant, the double referendum mechanism, requires respondents to state twice how they would vote for a given policy proposal given their cost of the good. Data from these surveys often exhibit anomalies inconsistent with standard economic models of consumer preferences. There are a number of published explanations for these anomalies, mostly focusing on problems with the second vote. This article investigates which aspects of the hypothetical task affect the degree of nondemand revelation and takes an individual-based approach to identifying people most likely to non-demand reveal. A clear profile emerges from our model of a person who faces a negative surplus i.e. a net loss in the second vote and invokes non self-interested, non financial motivations during the decision process.

The ‘Public Interest’ Agency of International Organizations? The case of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

This article seeks to outline and explore some of the conditions necessary for International Organizations (IOs) to perform in a public interest fashion through a case study of the Principles of corporate governance formulated by the OECD. Rather than the more commonly documented pathological and dysfunctional behavioural forms of IOs, the case of the Principles, both in their formulation by the OECD, and in their assessment by the World Bank through the ROSC process, represent an episode of IO agency protecting and promoting a wider public interest. In exercising their agency, IO staff, have made the Principles more agreeable to a wider range of interested parties, giving them a general interest orientation, in accordance with a proceduralist definition of public interest. This case should therefore encourage IPE scholars to consider carefully and systematically the sets of circumstances and conditions, which might be required for IO agency to take more socially useful forms. In the final section, three indicators are identified which might be evaluated in future research into the positive public interest agency of IOs across a range of cases.

Discharging not-for-profit accountability: UK charities and public discourse

Purpose: This paper aims to examine the accountability practices of large United Kingdom (UK) charities through public discourse.
Design/methodology/approach: Based on the ethical model of stakeholder theory, the paper develops a framework for classifying not-for-profit (NFP) accountability and analyzes the content of the annual reports and annual reviews of a sample of large UK charities using this framework.
Findings: The results suggest that contrary to the ethical model of stakeholder theory, the sample charities’ accountability practices are motivated by a desire to legitimize their activities and present their organizations’ activities in a positive light. These results contradict the raison d’eˆ tre of NFP organizations (NFPOs) and the values that they espouse. Research limitations/implications: Understanding the nature of accountability reporting in NFPOs has important implications for preparers and policy makers involved in furthering the NFP agenda. New research needs to examine shifts in accountability practices over time and assess the impact of the recent self-regulation developed to enhance sector accountability.
Originality/value: This paper contributes to the NFP accountability literature by: first, developing a framework of NFP accountability through public discourse using the ethical model of stakeholder theory; and second, advancing the understanding of the accountability practices of large UK charities.

Road traffic congestion and public information - An experimental investigation

This paper reports laboratory experiments designed to study the impact of public information about past departure rates on congestion levels and travel costs. Our design is based on a discrete version of Arnott et al.'s (1990) bottleneck model. In all treatments, congestion occurs and the observed travel costs are quite similar to the predicted ones. Subjects' capacity to coordinate is not affected by the availability of public information on past departure rates, by the number of drivers or by the relative cost of delay. This seemingly absence of treatment effects is confirmed by our finding that a parameter-free reinforcement learning model best characterises individual behaviour.

Crisis Cartels:Non-Economic Values, the Public Interest and Institutional Considerations

This paper considers the use of non-economic considerations in Article 101(3) analysis of industrial restructuring agreements, using the Commission's Decisions in Synthetic Fibres, Stichting Baksteen, and the recent UK Dairy Initiative as examples. I argue that contra to the Commission's recent economics-based approach; there is room for non-economic considerations to be taken into account within the framework of the European Treaties. The competition law issue is whether the provisions of Article 101(3) can save such agreements.
I further argue that there is legal room for non-economic considerations to be considered in evaluating these restructuring agreements, it is not clear who the appropriate arbiter of these considerations should be given the institutional limitations of courts (which have no democratic mandate), specialised competition agencies (which may be too technocratic in focus) and legislatures (which are susceptible to capture by rent-seeking interest groups).