Design of granular pavements

The use of high-quality quarried crushed rock aggregates is generally required to comply with current specifications for unbound granular materials (UGMs) in pavements. The source of these high-quality materials can be a long distance from the site, resulting in high transportation costs. The use of more local sources of marginal materials or the use of secondary aggregates is not allowed if they do not fully comply with existing specifications. These materials can, however, be assessed for their suitability for use in a pavement by considering performance criteria such as resistance to permanent deformation and degradation instead of relying on compliance with inflexible specifications. The final thickness of the asphalt cover and the pavement depth are governed by conventional pavement design methods, which consider the number of vehicle passes, subgrade strength, and some material property, commonly the California bearing ratio or resilient modulus. A pavement design method that includes as a design criterion an assessment of the resistance to deformation of a UGM in a pavement structure at a particular stress state is proposed. The particular stress state at which the aggregate is to perform in an acceptable way is related to the in situ stress, that is, the stress that the aggregate is anticipated to experience at a particular depth in the pavement. Because the stresses are more severe closer to the pavement surface, the aggregates should be better able to resist these stresses the closer they are laid to the surface in the pavement. This method was applied to two Northern Ireland aggregates of different quality (NI Good and NI Poor). The results showed that the NI Poor aggregate performed at an acceptable level with respect to permanent deformation, provided that a minimum of 70 mm of asphalt cover was provided. It was predicted that the NI Good material would require 60 mm of asphalt cover.

A decentralized model of information pricing in networks

We propose a recursive method of pricing an information good in a network of holders and demanders of this good. The prices are determined via a unique equilibrium outcome in a sequence of bilateral bargaining games that are played by connected agents. If the information is an homogenous, non-depreciating good without network effects we derive explicit formulae which elucidate the role of the link pattern among the players. Particularly, we find out that the equilibrium price is intimately related to the existence of cycles in the network: It is zero if a cycle covers the trading pair and it is proportional to the direct and indirect utility that the good generates otherwise.

Bilateral Bargaining in Networks

Each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus. A maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus, according to the protocol proposed by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150). All pairs, that reach an agreement, obtain the (discounted) payoffs and are removed from the network. This bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the Dulmage-Mendelsohn decomposition (partition) of the bipartite network (of the set of nodes in this network).

Is the General Public Licence a Rational Choice?

Open source projects are networks of developers, distributors and end-users of non-proprietary created knowledge goods. It has been argued that this form of organization has some advantages over the firm or market coordination. I show that for sufficiently convex and modular projects proprietary licences are not able to sustain sequential knowledge production which, however, can be carried out if the project is run on the open source basis.