Information disclosure and depositor discipline in the Chinese banking sector

We investigate the relationship between information disclosure and depositor behaviour in the Chinese banking sector. Specifically, we enquire whether enhanced information disclosure enables investors to more effectively infer a banking institution's risk profile, thereby influencing their deposit decisions. Utilising an unbalanced panel, incorporating financial data from 169 Chinese banks over the 1998–2009 period, we employ generalised-method-of-moments (GMM) estimation procedures to control for potential endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and persistence in the dependent variable. We uncover evidence that: (i) the growth rate of deposits is sensitive to bank fundamentals after controlling for macroeconomic factors, diversity in ownership structure, and government intervention; (ii) a bank publicly disclosing more transparent information in its financial reports, is more likely to experience growth in its deposit base; and (iii) banks characterised by high information transparency, well-capitalised and adopted international accounting standards, are more able to attract funds by offering higher interest rates.

Asset Liquidity and Stock Liquidity: International Evidence

This study examines the relationship between asset liquidity and stock liquidity across 47 countries. In support of the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, we find that firms with greater asset liquidity on average have higher stock liquidity. More importantly, our study shows that asset liquidity plays amore significant role in resolving valuation uncertainty in countries with poor information environment. For example, we find that the asset–stock liquidity relationship is stronger in countries with poor accounting standards. We further find evidence that after the adoption of IFRS, the improved accounting information environment results in a weaker asset–stock liquidity relation, but only in countries with a strong legal regime. Finally, our study shows that the positive asset–stock liquidity relationship may be attributed to transparency and/or liquidity reasons.

Bank Failures of the 1990s::An Exploratory Analysis

Past research has frequently attributed the incidence of bank failures to macroeconomic cycles and/or downturns in the regional economy. More recent analyses have suggested that the incidence and severity of bank failures can be linked to governance failures, which may be preventable through more stringent disclosure and auditing requirements. Using data on bank failures during the years 1991 to 1997, for the US, Canada, the UK and Germany, this study examines the relationship between institutional characteristics of national legal and auditing systems and the incidence of bank failures. In the second part of our analysis we then examined the relationship between the same institutional variables and the severity of bank failures.
The first part of our study notes a significant correlation between the law and order tradition (‘rule of law’) of a national legal system and the incidence of bank failures. Nations which were assigned high 'rule of law’ scores by country risk guides appear to have been less likely to experience bank failures. Another variable which appears to impact on bank failure rates is the ‘risk of contract repudiation’. Countries with a greater ‘risk of contract repudiation’ appear to be more likely to experience bank failures. We suggest that this may be due to a greater ex ante protection of stakeholders in countries where contract enforcement is more stringent.
The results of the second part of our study are less clear cut. However, there appears to be a significant correlation between the amount paid out by national deposit insurers (our proxy for the severity of bank failures) and the macroeconomic variable 'GDP change'. Here our findings follow the conventional wisdom; with greater amounts of deposit insurance funds being paid during economic downturns (i.e. low or negative GDP 'growth' correlates with high amounts of deposit insurance being paid out). A less pronounced relationship with the severity of bank failures can also be established for the institutional variables ' accounting standards' as well as 'risk of contract repudiation'. Countries with more stringent ‘accounting standards’ and a low ‘risk of contract repudiation’ appear to have been less prone to severe bank failures.

University Competition, Grading Standards, and Grade Inflation

We develop a model of strategic grade determination by universities distinguished by their distributions of student academic abilities. Universities choose grading standards to maximize the total wages of graduates, taking into account how the grading standards affect firms' productivity assessment and job placement. We identify conditions under which better universities set lower grading standards, exploiting the fact that firms cannot distinguish between good and badA''s. In contrast, a social planner sets stricter standards at better universities. We show how increases in skilled jobs drive grade inflation, and determine when grading standards fall faster at better schools. (JEL I21)