Bank Failures of the 1990s::An Exploratory Analysis

Past research has frequently attributed the incidence of bank failures to macroeconomic cycles and/or downturns in the regional economy. More recent analyses have suggested that the incidence and severity of bank failures can be linked to governance failures, which may be preventable through more stringent disclosure and auditing requirements. Using data on bank failures during the years 1991 to 1997, for the US, Canada, the UK and Germany, this study examines the relationship between institutional characteristics of national legal and auditing systems and the incidence of bank failures. In the second part of our analysis we then examined the relationship between the same institutional variables and the severity of bank failures.
The first part of our study notes a significant correlation between the law and order tradition (‘rule of law’) of a national legal system and the incidence of bank failures. Nations which were assigned high 'rule of law’ scores by country risk guides appear to have been less likely to experience bank failures. Another variable which appears to impact on bank failure rates is the ‘risk of contract repudiation’. Countries with a greater ‘risk of contract repudiation’ appear to be more likely to experience bank failures. We suggest that this may be due to a greater ex ante protection of stakeholders in countries where contract enforcement is more stringent.
The results of the second part of our study are less clear cut. However, there appears to be a significant correlation between the amount paid out by national deposit insurers (our proxy for the severity of bank failures) and the macroeconomic variable 'GDP change'. Here our findings follow the conventional wisdom; with greater amounts of deposit insurance funds being paid during economic downturns (i.e. low or negative GDP 'growth' correlates with high amounts of deposit insurance being paid out). A less pronounced relationship with the severity of bank failures can also be established for the institutional variables ' accounting standards' as well as 'risk of contract repudiation'. Countries with more stringent ‘accounting standards’ and a low ‘risk of contract repudiation’ appear to have been less prone to severe bank failures.

Rejection of the second allogeneic graft in a patient with severe aplastic anemia reversed by antilymphocyte globulin and donor lymphocyte infusions

Rejection after allogeneic BMT for aplastic anemia is a complication with a high risk of mortality. We describe a patient who, following a second episode of rejection after a second BMT entered a third durable remission subsequent to treatment with ALG, donor lymphocyte infusions, GM-CSF, and erythropoietin. Therapy was well tolerated. At 5 years after rejection treatment, his hematopoiesis is of complete donor origin as determined by analyses of short tandem repeats. Thus, donor lymphocyte infusions can be considered as a therapy option for marrow rejection after allogeneic BMT for aplastic anemia.

Analysis of the Second Harmonic Effect on Power Amplifier Intermodulation Products

A theoretical analysis is reported in this paper to investigate the effect that a second harmonic signal which might be present at an amplifier’s input has on generating additional intermodulation products, particularly the third-order intermodulation (IM3) products. The analysis shows that the amplitude of an extra generated IM3 component is equal to the product of the fundamental amplitude, the second harmonic amplitude, and the second order Taylor series coefficient. The effect of the second order harmonic on the IM3 is examined through a simulated example of a 2.22-GHz 10-W Class-EF amplifier whereby the IM3 levels have been reduced by 2-3 dB after employing a second harmonic termination stub at the input.

The Dark Side of Nudging: The Ethics, Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism

Libertarian paternalism, as advanced by Cass Sunstein, is seriously flawed, but not primarily for the reasons that most commentators suggest. Libertarian paternalism and its attendant regulatory implications are too libertarian, not too paternalistic, and as a result are in considerable tension with ‘thick’ conceptions of human dignity. We make four arguments. The first is that there is no justification for a presumption in favor of nudging as a default regulatory strategy, as Sunstein asserts. It is ordinarily less effective than mandates; such mandates rarely offend personal autonomy; and the central reliance on cognitive failures in the nudging program is more likely to offend human dignity than the mandates it seeks to replace. Secondly, we argue that nudging as a regulatory strategy fits both overtly and covertly, often insidiously, into a more general libertarian program of political economy. Thirdly, while we are on the whole more concerned to reject the libertarian than the paternalistic elements of this philosophy, Sunstein’s work, both in Why Nudge?, and earlier, fails to appreciate how nudging may be manipulative if not designed with more care than he acknowledges. Lastly, because of these characteristics, nudging might even be subject to legal challenges that would give us the worst of all possible regulatory worlds: a weak regulatory intervention that is liable to be challenged in the courts by well-resourced interest groups. In such a scenario, and contrary to the ‘common sense’ ethos contended for in Why Nudge?, nudges might not even clear the excessively low bar of doing something rather than nothing. Those seeking to pursue progressive politics, under law, should reject nudging in favor of regulation that is more congruent with principles of legality, more transparent, more effective, more democratic, and allows us more fully to act as moral agents. Such a system may have a place for (some) nudging, but not one that departs significantly from how labeling, warnings and the like already function, and nothing that compares with Sunstein’s apparent ambitions for his new movement.

The Extra-territorial Obligations of European States regarding Human Rights in the Context of Terrorism

This chapter focuses on the growing tendency of international human rights law to require states to protect the rights of non-nationals who are in the state unlawfully and of nationals and non-nationals who are outside the state, especially when any of these people are involved in terrorist or counter-terrorist activity. It reviews these additional obligations within a European context, focusing on EU law and the law of the European Convention on Human Rights and drawing on the case law of UK courts. Part 1 considers when a European state must grant asylum to alleged terrorists on the basis that otherwise they would suffer human rights abuses in the state from which they are fleeing. Part 2 examines whether, outside of asylum claims, a European state must not deport or extradite an alleged terrorist because he or she might suffer an abuse of human rights in the receiving state. Part 3 looks at whether a European state whose security forces are engaged in counter-terrorism activities abroad is obliged to protect the human rights of the individuals serving in those forces and/or the human rights of the alleged terrorists they are confronting. While welcoming the extension of state responsibility, the chapter notes that it is occurring in a way which introduces three aspects of relativity into the protection of human rights. First, European law protects only some human rights extra-territorially. Second, it protects those rights only when there is ‘a real risk’ of their being violated. Third, sometimes it protects those rights only when there is a real risk of their being violated ‘flagrantly’.