Shared Photography: (Photo)journalism and political mobilisation in Rio de Janeiro's favelas

One of the most important civic phenomena emerging from favelas in Rio de Janeiro today is “community (photo)journalism”, which is practised by favela residents who are trained in journalistic and artistic techniques to raise critical awareness and promote political mobilisation in- and outside favelas. This paper looks at some of the work produced at one training place for community photographers, the agency-school Imagens do Povo (“Images of the People”) in Nova Holanda, a favela located in Rio’s North Zone. Using an ethnographic approach, this article first provides an account of the working practices of the School and its photographers. This is followed by a discussion of a small sample of their photographic work, for which we employ a social semiotic paradigm of image analysis. This methodological synergy provides insights into how these journalists document long-term structural as well as “spectacular” violence in favelas, while at the same time striving to capture some of the “beauty” of these communities. The paper concludes that this form of photographic work constitutes an important step towards a more analytical brand of journalism with different news values that encourage a more context-sensitive approach to covering urban violence and favela life.

KEYWORDS: alternative media, Imagens do Povo, multimodality, news values, photojournalism.

Feasibility, normative heuristics and the proper place of historical responsibility – a reply to Ohndorf et al.

In this comment, we pick up three points raised by Ohndorf et al. (2015) in their reply to our ethical assessment of the German Advisory Council’s Budget Approach (WBGUBA). First, we discuss and clarify the relationship between ethics and political feasibility, highlighting that the way Ohndorf et el. use feasibility creates an unwarranted status quo bias. Second, we explain the proper place historical responsibility should have within the WBGUBA, stressing the fact that the reasons why we choose one policy proposal over another matter. Third, we analyze the limited extent to which a normative heuristic should motivate an ethically ambitious policy proposal like the WBGUBA.

Social Equality: On what it means to be equals

The first collected volume on social and relational equality.
Addresses a gap in the literature - while many philosophers have pointed to the importance of social equality, it requires much more theoretical development, which this volume aims to provide.
Offers a unique answer to the debate about whether or not equality is valuable.
Features a foreword by eminent political theorist David Miller
Includes new contributions by some of the most well-known contemporary moral and political philosophers, such as Samuel Scheffler and Jonathan Wolff.
Is equality valuable? This question dominates many discussions of social justice, which tend to center on whether certain forms of distributive equality are valuable, such as the equal distribution of primary social goods. But these discussions often neglect what is known as social or relational equality. Social equality suggests that equality is foremost about relationships and interactions between people, rather than being primarily about distribution.

A number of philosophers have written about the significance of social equality, and it has also played an important role in real-life egalitarian movements, such as feminism and civil rights movements. However, as it has been relatively neglected in comparison to the debates about distributive equality, it requires much more theoretical attention. This volume brings together a collection of ten original essays which present new analyses of social and relational equality in philosophy and political theory. The essays analyze the nature of social equality, as well as its relationship to justice and politics.

Readership: The book is primarily aimed at professionals in the field - philosophers (especially in moral, social and political philosophy) and political theorists. It is also aimed at the academic library market. Moreover, the book should be of interest to advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students attending courses on theories of equality and/or social justice.

Freedom as non-domination: radicalisation or retreat?

Key challenges for contemporary neorepublicans are identified and explored. Firstly, the attempt to maintain a sharp line between neorepublicanism and the wider family of liberal–egalitarian political theories is questioned. Secondly, in response to challenges from democratic theorists, it is argued that republicanism needs to effect an appropriate rapprochement with the ideal of collective political autonomy, on which it appears to rely. Thirdly, it is argued that freedom as non-domination draws so heavily on the idea of equal respect that it is hard to maintain that freedom is the sole value grounding the theory. Finally, it is suggested that the consequentialist framework of Pettit’s theory imposes significant limitations on republican social justice. How republican political theorists respond to these challenges will determine whether the neorepublican revival will be seen as enriching contemporary debates about democracy and social justice or as a retreat from more ambitious accounts of freedom and justice.

On Suffering and Sympathy: Jude the Obscure, Evolution and Ethics

This article links Thomas Hardy’s exploration of sympathy in Jude the Obscure to contemporary scientific debates over moral evolution. Tracing the relationship between pessimism, progressivism, and determinism in Hardy’s understanding of sympathy, it also considers Hardy’s conception of the author as enlarger of “social sympathies”--a position, I argue, that was shaped by Leslie Stephen’s advocacy of novel writing as moral art. Considering Hardy’s engagement with writings by Charles Darwin, T. H. Huxley, Herbert Spencer, and others, I explore the novel’s participation in a debate about the evolutionary significance of sympathy and its implications for Hardy’s understanding of moral agency. Hardy, I suggest, offered a stronger defence of morality based on biological determinism than Darwin, but this determinism was linked to an unexpected evolutionary optimism.