Evaluation of the Q-method as a method of public participation in the selection of sustainable development indicators

The complexity of sustainable development means that it is often difficult to evaluate and communicate the concept effectively. One standard method to reduce complexity and improve Communication, while maintaining scientific objectivity, is to use selected indicators. The aim of this paper is to describe and evaluate a process Of public participation in the selection of sustainable development indicators that utilised the Q-method for discourse analysis. The Q-method was Utilised to combine public opinion with technical expertise to create a list of technically robust indicators that would be relevant to the public, The method comprises statement collection, statement analysis, Q-sorts and Q-sort analysis. The results of the Q-method generated a list of statements for which a preliminary list of indicators was then developed by a team of experts from the fields of environmental science, sustainable development and Psychology. Subsequently members of the public evaluated the preliminary list of indicators, to select a final list of indicators that were both technically sound and incorporated the views of the public. The Utilisation of the Q-method in this process was evaluated using previously published criteria. The application of the Q-method in this context needs to be considered not only by the quality of the indicators developed, but also from the perspective of the benefit of the process to the participants. it was concluded that the Q-method provided an effective framework for public participation in the selection of indicators as it allowed the public to discuss Sustainable development in familiar language and in the context of their daily lives. By combining this information with expert input, a list of technically robust indicators that resonate with the public was developed. The results demonstrated that many citizens are not aware Of Sustainable development, and if it is to be successfully communicated to them, then indicators and policy need to be couched in terms familiar and relevant to citizen and communities. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Hiring Incentives and Labour Force Participation in Italy

A long-standing economic tradition maintains that labour supply reacts to market tightness; its sensitivity to job quality has received less attention. If firms hire workers with both temporary and open-ended contracts, does participation increase when more permanent jobs are available? We investigate this relationship within a policy evaluation framework; in particular, we examine how labour supply reacted in Italy to a recent subsidy in favour of open-ended contracts. This subsidy increased labour force participation by 1.4% in 2001 and 2.1% in 2002. This increase was concentrated on males aged 35-54, with a low or at most a secondary schooling level.

Probing aggressive motivation in a cichlid fish

The duration of startles provides an inverse measure of motivation to resume the previous activity. Here, we use a novel method in which one convict cichlid fish (Amatitlania nigrofasciata) of a competing pair was startled independently of the opponent. Fish were given various opponents and the mean startle duration determined. This mean was negatively correlated with the mean use of highly escalated 'frontal activities' such as biting and frontal display, but not the less escalated lateral displays or tail beating. Thus the startle duration was a reliable surrogate measure of the most escalated components of aggressive interactions. That is, it provided a motivational probe for aggressiveness of individual fish. Fight motivation is often determined in terms of fight duration or physiological costs for losers, who reveal the costs they are prepared to pay. We discuss various potential advantages of the motivational probe over previous measures, particularly with respect to winners and losers and different times during the interactions.

Motivation matters: cheliped extension displays in the hermit crab, Pagurus bernhardus, are honest signals of hunger

Whether animal signals convey honest information is a central evolutionary question, since selection pressures could, in some circumstances, favour dishonesty. A prior study of signalling in hermit crabs proposed that the cheliped extension display of Pagurus bernhardus might represent such an instance of dishonesty. A limitation of this conclusion, however, was that honesty was defined in the context of size assessment, neglecting the potential information that displays might transmit about signallers' variable internal states. Recent analyses of signalling in this same species have shown that its displays provide reliable information about the amount of risk crabs are prepared to tolerate, which therefore might enable signallers to use these displays to honestly convey their motivation to take such risks. Here we test this 'honest advertisement of motivation' hypothesis by varying crabs' need for food and analysing their signalling during simulated feeding conflicts against a model. When crabs were starved for 1-5 days, they dropped significantly in weight. Despite this decrement in resource-holding potential and energy reserves, crabs were more likely to perform cheliped extension displays the longer they were food deprived. Longer-starved crabs, whose subjective resource value was greater, also displayed at a higher rate and were more likely to risk seizing the food from the model. We conclude that cheliped extension is a reliable indicator of crabs' internal state and suggest how this honest signal might operate in conflicts over a variety of other resources in addition to food. We propose that future studies detecting apparent dishonesty should analyse many possible signal-state correlations before concluding a signal is actually dishonest. (c) 2008 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.