Coalitional Games and Contracts Based on Individual Deviations

We study what coalitions form and how the members of each coalition split the coalition value in coalitional games in which only individual deviations are allowed. In this context we employ three stability notions: individual, contractual, and compensational stability. These notions differ in terms of the underlying contractual assumptions. We characterize the coalitional games in which individually stable outcomes exist by means of the top-partition property. Furthermore, we show that any coalition structure of maximum social worth is both contractually and compensationally stable.

Automaticity, spelling, and second language learning

This study investigated the relationship between a chronometric estimate of automaticity for the spelling of French words (Automaticity) and performance on four tests of French language attainment among a sample of Year 11 students of French as a foreign language. Fifty participants each completed a computerized test of French spelling and attainment tests in four aspects of French language learning: reading comprehension, writing fluency, oral fluency, and aural comprehension. Correlations were significant between Automaticity and performance on all four tests of French language attainment as well as on overall attainment.