96 resultados para Institutional investors activism
Resumo:
This chapter sets out to explain the factors behind Ireland's exceptional period of economic growth from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s. It suggests that an unbending commitment to economic openness and an on-going effort to establish quality domestic institutions were the main drivers of the so-called ‘Celtic tiger’ phenomenon. The commitment to economic openness manifested itself in the relentless search for inward investment and a willingness to accept deep forms of European integration. Building domestic institutional capabilities involved adopting new-classical macroeconomic policies, creating a robust system of social partnership and reforming the educational system. The two factors positively interacted with each other to create dynamic effects.
Resumo:
This paper analyses some of the factors that impact multinational companies' (MNCs) reaction to the global financial crisis. This paper reports the results from a large-scale study of its impact on MNCs in Australia, considering occurrences of site closures, offshoring, outsourcing, labour force reductions, reductions in working hours, salary reductions, and reductions in training and travel. Evidence showed that MNC reactions varied according to certain institutional and organizational effects. For example, MNCs originating from liberal-market economies are more likely to have offshored and outsourced production and reduced employment. The implications for understanding of MNC behaviour are discussed. © 2013 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.
Resumo:
This paper examines the use of visual technologies by political activists in protest situations to monitor police conduct. Using interview data with Australian video activists, this paper seeks to understand the motivations, techniques and outcomes of video activism, and its relationship to counter-surveillance and police accountability. Our data also indicated that there have been significant transformations in the organization and deployment of counter-surveillance methods since 2000, when there were large-scale protests against the World Economic Forum meeting in Melbourne accompanied by a coordinated campaign that sought to document police misconduct. The paper identifies and examines two inter-related aspects of this: the act of filming and the process of dissemination of this footage. It is noted that technological changes over the last decade have led to a proliferation of visual recording technologies, particularly mobile phone cameras, which have stimulated a corresponding proliferation of images. Analogous innovations in internet communications have stimulated a coterminous proliferation of potential outlets for images Video footage provides activists with a valuable tool for safety and publicity. Nevertheless, we argue, video activism can have unintended consequences, including exposure to legal risks and the amplification of official surveillance. Activists are also often unable to control the political effects of their footage or the purposes to which it is used. We conclude by assessing the impact that transformations in both protest organization and media technologies might have for counter-surveillance techniques based on visual surveillance.
Resumo:
This paper considers the use of non-economic considerations in Article 101(3) analysis of industrial restructuring agreements, using the Commission's Decisions in Synthetic Fibres, Stichting Baksteen, and the recent UK Dairy Initiative as examples. I argue that contra to the Commission's recent economics-based approach; there is room for non-economic considerations to be taken into account within the framework of the European Treaties. The competition law issue is whether the provisions of Article 101(3) can save such agreements.
I further argue that there is legal room for non-economic considerations to be considered in evaluating these restructuring agreements, it is not clear who the appropriate arbiter of these considerations should be given the institutional limitations of courts (which have no democratic mandate), specialised competition agencies (which may be too technocratic in focus) and legislatures (which are susceptible to capture by rent-seeking interest groups).