An anthropometric history of the World, 1810-1980: did migration and globalization influence country trends?

We find that regional height levels around the world were fairly uniform throughout most of the 19th century, with two exceptions: above-average levels in Anglo-Saxon settlement regions and below-average levels in Southeast Asia. After 1880, substantial diver- gences began to differentiate other regions -- making the world population taller, but more unequal. During the late 19th century and 20th century, heights between world regions devi- ated significantly, when incomes also became very unequal. Interestingly, during the “breaking point period” between the two regimes, heights declined significantly in the cattle-rich New World countries, whereas they started to increase in Old Europe. We discuss in this study whether immigration was a core factor to influence the height decline in the “Anthropometric Decline of the Cowboy and Gaucho Empires”.

Anthropometric within-country Inequality and the Estimation of Skill Premia with Anthropometric Indicators

Recently, a method to measure inequality has been proposed that is based on an- thropometric indicators. Baten (1999, 2000) argued that the coefficient of variation of human stature (henceforth ‘CV’) is correlated with overall inequality in a society, and that it can be used as indicator, especially where income inequality measures are lack- ing. This correlation has been confirmed in further analyses, for example by Pradhan et al. (2003), Moradi and Baten (2005), Sunder (2003), Guntupalli and Baten (2006), Blum (2010a), van Zanden et al. (2010), see also Figure 1 and Table 1. The idea is that average height reflects nutritional conditions during early childhood and youth. Since wealthier people have better access to food, shelter and medical resources, they tend to be taller than the poorer part of the population. Hence, the variation of height of a cer- tain cohort may be indicative of income distribution during the decade of their birth. The aim of this study is firstly to provide an overview of different forms of within- country height inequality. Previous studies on the aspects of height inequality are re- viewed. Inequalities between ethnic groups, gender, inhabitants of different regions and income groups are discussed. In the two final sections, we compare height CVs of anthropological inequality with another indicator of inequality, namely skill premia. We also present estimates of skill premia for a set of countries and decades for which “height CVs”, as they will be called in the following, are available.

The Political Economy of Swift's Satires and other Prose Works

Jonathan Swift wrote perceptively about the emerging commercial society
in Britain in the early eighteenth century. His particular focus was on the
financial revolution and its implications for economic and political stability
as well as for shifts of power between the landed and commercial
classes. Following his return to Ireland Swift’s focus shifted to the developmental
problems of his native country. In several pamphlets he advocated
consumption of domestic products, challenged existing political
structures and made trenchant criticisms of absenteeism and other dysfunctional
aspects of the land tenure system. Swift’s politico-economic
concerns are fully reflected in his best known work, Gulliver’s Travels but
his most pointed criticism of the emerging commercial system is contained
in A Modest Proposal. Written in the form of an economic pamphlet, A
Modest Proposal is ostensibly designed to address the problem of poverty
in Ireland. In addition to its implicit criticism of economic policy in Ireland,
the pamphlet challenges the separation of economics and morality as
evidenced in the writings of William Petty and Bernard Mandeville. Swift
parodies Petty’s political arithmetic but it is suggested here that he also
had in his sights the consequentialist reasoning present in the work of
both authors but explicitly so in Mandeville.
Keywords: financial revolution, public debt, paper credit, rationality, political
arithmetic, consequentialism, Petty (William), Mandeville (Bernard)

Teamwork Efficiency and Company Size

We study how ownership structure and management objectives interact in determining the company size without assuming information constraints or any explicit costs of management. In symmetric agent economies, the optimal company size balances the returns to scale of the production function and the returns to collaboration efficiency. For a general class of payoff functions, we characterize the optimal company size, and we compare the optimal company size across different managerial objectives. We demonstrate the restrictiveness of common assumptions on effort aggregation (e.g., constant elasticity of effort substitution), and we show that common intuition (e.g., that corporate companies are more efficient and therefore will be larger than equal-share partnerships) might not hold in general.

Work-related training and the probability of transitioning from non-permanent to permanent employment

It is widely believed that work-related training increases a worker’s probability of moving up the job-quality ladder. This is usually couched in terms of effects on wages, but it has also been argued that training increases the probability of moving from non-permanent forms of employment to more permanent employment. This hypothesis is tested using nationally representative panel data for Australia, a country where the incidence of non-permanent employment, and especially casual employment, is high by international standards. While a positive association between participation in work-related training and the subsequent probability of moving from either casual or fixed-term contract employment to permanent employment is observed among men, this is shown to be driven not by a causal impact of training on transitions but by differences between those who do and do not receive training; i.e., selection bias.

Bernard Mandeville and the doctrine of laissez-faire

The view of Mandeville as a pioneer of laissez-faire is difficultto reconcile with his repeated insistence that private vices were turnedinto public benefits by the ‘dexterous management of the skilfulpolitician’. Even if references to the skilful politician are regarded asshorthand for a legal and institutional framework, there remains thequestion of whether such a framework is a spontaneous order or theproduct of purposeful experiment as Mandeville thought? Mandevillewarned about the harmful effects of meddling but his complaint wasabout the actions of fashionable do-gooders rather than government. Heunderstood that the voluntariness of a transaction could be regarded asa defence against complaints of unfairness but he was quick to pointout the limitations of voluntariness especially in the market for labour.Mandeville’s objective was to teach people what they are not what theyshould be. He pointed to the strengths of the emerging market systembut was not afraid to expose its faults.

Econometric analysis of microscopic simulation models

Microscopic simulation models are often evaluated based on visual inspection of the results. This paper presents formal econometric techniques to compare microscopic simulation (MS) models with real-life data. A related result is a methodology to compare different MS models with each other. For this purpose, possible parameters of interest, such as mean returns, or autocorrelation patterns, are classified and characterized. For each class of characteristics, the appropriate techniques are presented. We illustrate the methodology by comparing the MS model developed by He and Li [J. Econ. Dynam. Control, 2007, 31, 3396-3426, Quant. Finance, 2008, 8, 59-79] with actual data.

Endogenous Two-Sided Markets with Repeated Transactions

We consider homogeneous two-sided markets, in which connected buyer-seller pairs bargain and trade repeatedly. In this infinite market game with exogenous matching probabilities and a common discount factor, we prove the existence of equilibria in stationary strategies. The equilibrium payoffs are given implicitly as a solution to a system of linear equations. Then, we endogenize the matching mechanism in a link formation stage that precedes the market game. When agents are sufficiently patient and link costs are low, we provide an algorithm to construct minimally connected networks that are pairwise stable with respect to the expected payoffs in the trading stage. The constructed networks are essentially efficient and consist of components with a constant buyer-seller ratio. The latter ratio increases (decreases) for a buyer (seller) that deletes one of her links in a pairwise stable component.