Activism and Restraint within the UK Supreme Court

This article provides evidence for the extent to which the UK Supreme Court as a body - and Supreme Court Justices as individuals - have displayed an activist or restrained attitude to their decision-making role. Taking October 2009 as the starting point (when the UKSC came into existence) the article surveys the degree to which the Court and individual Justices have (1) departed from precedents, (2) interpreted legislation in unanticipated ways, (3) rejected the government's position on matters of social, economic or foreign policy, and (4) developed the common law. The article concludes that, while the Supreme Court as a whole remains as conservative as the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords which preceded it (with the possible exception of its approach to immigration law), there are notable differences between the attitudes of individual Justices, one or two of whom appear to be straining at the leash.

The inclusion and juridification of victims on the Island of Ireland

Concern for crime victims has been a growing political issue in improving the legitimacy and success of the criminal justice system through the rhetoric of rights. Since the 1970s there have been numerous reforms and policy documents produced to enhance victims’ satisfaction in the criminal justice system. Both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland have seen a sea-change in more recent years from a focus on services for victims to a greater emphasis on procedural rights. The purpose of this chapter is to chart these reforms against the backdrop of wider political and regional changes emanating from the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights, and to critically examine whether the position of crime victims has actually ameliorated.

While separated into two legal jurisdictions, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland as common law countries have both grappled with similar challenges in improving crime victim satisfaction in adversarial criminal proceedings. This chapter begins by discussing the historical and theoretical concern for crime victims in the criminal justice system, and how this has changed in recent years. The rest of the chapter is split into two parts focusing on the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Both parts examine the provisions of services to victims, and the move towards more procedural rights for victims in terms of information, participation, protection and compensation. The chapter concludes by finding that despite being different legal jurisdictions, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland have introduced many similar reforms for crime victims in recent years.

Commentary on Locke's Second Treatise on Government (1690)

Extracts from a treatise in which Locke sets out his labour theory of property.
Locke's writings on the labour theory of property provided eighteenth century proponents of the concept of copyright at common law (that is, copyright as a natural authorial property right) with a philosophical basis upon which to develop their arguments. The commentary explores the significance of a series of correspondence between John Locke and Edward Clarke, then MP for Taunton, concerning the lapse of the Licensing Act 1662 (uk_1662), and in the run up to the passing of the Statute of Anne 1710 (uk_1710). The commentary argues that, regardless of how Locke's writings on property were subsequently co-opted in the mid-eighteenth century debates as to the nature of copyright, it is doubtful whether Locke himself considered that copyright existed at common law.

Commentary on Baller v. Watson (1737)

This case marks the first occasion, following the passage of the Statute of Anne 1710 (uk_1710), on which a living author sought to prevent the infringement of his own copyright before the courts, as well as the first time on which a ‘perpetual' injunction was granted to prevent the further unauthorised reproduction of the work.
The commentary describes the circumstances which led Gay to publish the work himself, by subscription, as well as the success he enjoyed (albeit posthumously) in preventing unauthorised versions of the work from being published. That a ‘perpetual' injunction was granted at the conclusion of the litigation was subsequently interpreted, by advocates of common law copyright, to suggest that, regardless of the Statute of Anne, the Lord Chancellor considered copyright to be a perpetual right.

Commentary on Warburton's Letter from an Author (1747)

The first of a number of public commentaries contributing to the mid-eighteenth century debate over the nature of literary property (see also: An Enquiry into the Nature of Literary Property (uk_1762a); An Argument in Defence of Literary Property (uk_1774a)).
Warburton, a strong proponent of the common law rights of the author, provided the first significant commentary upon the nature and classification of property and its relevance to, and relationship with, an author's work. Part of this commentary discusses Warburton's attempts to articulate a clear conceptual distinction between the claim of an inventor to the protection of a patent provided by the state, and the natural right of an author to the property in his work.

Commentary on Tonson v. Collins (1762)

Significant case in which the arguments for and against the existence of copyright at common law were extensively debated for the first time before the Court of King's Bench. Both William Blackstone (author of Commentaries Upon the Laws of England, and one of the judges to hold in favour of the common law right in Donaldson v. Becket (uk_1774)) and Joseph Yates (who would later provide the dissenting opinion in Millar v. Taylor (uk_1769)) appeared on behalf of the plaintiff and the defendant respectively.

Commentary on An Enquiry into the Nature and Origin of Literary Property (1762)

One of a number of published commentaries contributing to the mid-eighteenth century debate concerning the nature of literary property. The author of An Enquiry sought to repudiate the concept of a natural authorial property right existing at common law. In so doing, he specifically engaged with various aspects of William Warburton's earlier commentary (see: uk_1747), as well as presenting arguments that drew upon the nature of property in general, the differences between the right claimed by proponents of the common law right and other acknowledged incorporeal properties, the similarities between patents and copyright, the history of literary property, the experience of other jurisdictions (drawing upon Venice in particular), and the consequences that would follow from conceding the existence of a perpetual right both for authors in particular and society in general. This commentary, in turn, drew its own response in the guise of A Vindication of the Exclusive Rights of Authors, to their own work (1762).

Commentary on Millar v. Taylor (1769)

Decision of the Court of King's Bench providing that, regardless of the provisions of the Statute of Anne 1710 (uk_1710), an author enjoyed the exclusive right of publishing his work in perpetuity.
Lord Mansfield, leading a majority decision of the court, provides a robust and influential justification as to the existence of an author's rights in literary property at common law. Yates, J., focussing upon the potential detriment to the public that would flow from the existence of a perpetual right, provides the dissenting opinion. The commentary explores the background to the litigation, in particular the nature of the threat which the Scottish reprint industry posed to the London book trade, relevant case-law leading up to the decision, as well as the substance of the judicial opinions.

Commentary on Hinton v. Donaldson (1773)

The Scottish Court of Session, drawing upon principles of the civil law tradition, as well as arguments concerning broader national, social and cultural interests, reject the concept of copyright at common law - a decision that is in direct conflict with that of Millar v. Taylor (1769). Lord Monboddo provides the dissenting opinion, drawing upon the labour theory of property rights, and argues for a unified approach to the issue in relation to the common law of both England and Scotland.
Drawing upon Scottish Records Office archives the commentary explores the background to, and substance of, the decision. It suggests that, given the nature of the economic threat which the Scottish reprint industry posed to the London book trade, particularly in relation to an increasingly lucrative export market, Hinton undermined much of the value of the decision in Millar. The conflict between Millar and Hinton made it almost inevitable that the question of literary property would soon reach the House of Lords.

Commentary on Beckford v. Hood (1798)

Case in which the King's Bench decided that a plaintiff could recover damages at common law for copyright infringement even though his work had not been registered with the Stationers' Company in accordance with the formalities set out in the Statute of Anne 1710 (uk_1710).
The case provides the first occasion on which the judiciary revisited and reconsidered the meaning of the House of Lords' decision in Donaldson v. Becket (uk_1774). The commentary explores the substance and significance of the decision and, in particular, the influence it had upon the manner in which the decision in Donaldson was subsequently understood throughout the early nineteenth century. The commentary also details the impact the decision had upon the extent to which publishers would adhere to the library deposit provision within the copyright legislation.

Commentary on Maugham's Treatise on the Laws of Literary Property (1828)

The first British legal treatise dedicated specifically to the law of copyright written by a strong advocate of the common law rights of the author. Maugham, in addition to providing a commentary upon the law of copyright, also used his work to lobby for both an extension to the copyright term (ideally resulting in a perpetual right) and a reduction in the library deposit requirements (arguing that authors should only be required to deposit one copy of their work for the British Museum). In proselytising the need for a change to the law in both areas he drew frequent comparisons with the law of other jurisdictions (in particular France and Germany). The work became a standard point of reference for many British and American authors who followed.

Commentary on Jeffreys v. Boosey (1854)

The second decision of the House of Lords to consider the nature of copyright law. As was the case in Donaldson v. Becket (1774) (uk_1774) the law lords were in disagreement with the majority of common law judges invited to speak to the issue for the consideration of the House. In the course of their opinions, two of the law lords (Lord Brougham and Lord St Leonards) explicitly reject the concept of copyright at common law. Rather than a natural authorial property right, they present copyright as a purely statutory phenomenon specifically grounded in public interest concerns. Ultimately, the Lords decided that a foreign national, resident abroad, but first publishing in Britain, enjoys no protection in his work under British copyright law.

What is the Point of Copyright History?

Copyright history has long been a subject of intense and contested enquiry, and has once again become the subject of critical scrutiny with the publication of "Copyright at Common Law in 1774" by Prof Tomas Gomez-Arostegui in the Connecticut Law Review ((2014) 47 Conn. L. Rev. 1).
This online resource documents two events organised to explore the impact of "Copyright at Common Law in 1774". It incorporates a public lecture by Prof Gomez-Arostegui, and the full record of a one-day symposium of international experts debating the implications of Gomez-Arostegui's scholarship in this domain.

Beyond the ‘Tomlinson Trap’: Analysing the Effectiveness of Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006

One of the intentions underpinning section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 was to provide reassurance to individual volunteers, and voluntary organisations, involved in what the provision called ‘desirable activities’ and including sport. The perception was that such volunteers, motivated by an apprehension about their increased vulnerability to negligence liability, and as driven by a fear of a wider societal compensation culture, were engaging excessively in risk-averse behaviour to the detriment of such socially desirable activities. Academic commentary on section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 has largely regarded the provision as unnecessary and doing little more than restating existing common law practice. This article argues otherwise and, on critically reviewing the emerging jurisprudence, posits the alternative view that section 1, in practice, affords an enhanced level of protection and safeguarding for individuals undertaking functions in connection with a desirable activity. Nonetheless, the occasionally idiosyncratic judicial interpretation given to term ‘desirable activity’, potentially compounded by recent enactment of the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015, remains problematic. Two points of interest will be used to inform this debate. First, an analysis of the then House of Lords’ decision in Tomlinson and its celebrated ‘balancing exercise’ when assessing reasonableness in the context of negligence liability. Second, a fuller analysis of the application of section 1 in the specific context of negligence actions relating to the coaching of sport where it is argued that the, albeit limited, jurisprudence might support the practical utility of a heightened evidential threshold of gross negligence.