An Empirical Analysis of Scale and Scope Economies and Technical Change in an Irish Multiproduct Banking Firm

In contrast to most empirical investigations of the efficiency of multiproduct financial institutions, which either estimate scale and scope economies with a given state of technology, or only analyse technical change in the presence of overall scale economies, this study estimates overall scale economies, product-specific scale economies and scope economies in the presence of both neutral and non-neutral technical change. Also, in contrast to most other empirical studies in this area, standard errors are computed for all relevant statistics. The findings indicate diseconomies of scope; overall diseconomies of scale; product-specific economies are decreasing for investments and increasing for loans; in addition to substantial neutral technical change, biased technical change is labour- and capital-saving and deposits-using in character.

A Question of Legitimacy? A Dynamic Perspective on Multinational Firm Control

The control and coordination of a network of geographically and culturally dispersed subsidiaries is one of the most prominent challenges in international management. However, many empirical findings on the effectiveness of various control mechanisms and combinations thereof are still counterintuitive. This study uses longitudinal case studies and cross-sectional interview data to extend control theory by examining why, how, and in what sequence large multinational firms (MNCs) implement controls in their networks of foreign subsidiaries. Our analysis draws from literature on institutional theory, embeddedness, and organizational power to demonstrate that MNC headquarters need to overcome institutional duality when implementing their controls abroad. We find that headquarters do so by using social controls, primarily as a way of legitimizing and institutionalizing their process and output controls that are implemented subsequently.

A long-term analysis of pumped hydro storage to firm wind power

Although pumped hydro storage is seen as a strategic key asset by grid operators, financing it is complicated in new liberalised markets. It could be argued that the optimum generation portfolio is now determined by the economic viability of generators based on a short to medium term return on investment. This has meant that capital intensive projects such as pumped hydro storage are less attractive for wholesale electricity companies because the payback periods are too long. In tandem a significant amount of wind power has entered the generation mix, which has resulted in operating and planning integration issues due to wind's inherent uncertain, varying spatial and temporal nature. These integration issues can be overcome using fast acting gas peaking plant or energy storage. Most analysis of wind power integration using storage to date has used stochastic optimisation for power system balancing or arbitrage modelling to examine techno-economic viability. In this research a deterministic dynamic programming long term generation expansion model is employed to optimise the generation mix, total system costs and total carbon dioxide emissions, and unlike other studies calculates reserve to firm wind power. The key finding of this study is that the incentive to build capital-intensive pumped hydro storage to firm wind power is limited unless exogenous market costs come very strongly into play. Furthermore it was demonstrated that reserve increases with increasing wind power showing the importance of ancillary services in future power systems. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Corporate Ownership, Control, and Firm Performance in Victorian Britain

Scholars have long debated whether ownership structure matters for firm performance. The standard view with respect to Victorian Britain is that family-controlled companies had a detrimental effect on operating profit and shareholder value. Here, we examine this view using a hand-collected corporate ownership dataset. Our main finding is that it was not necessarily the broad structure of corporate ownership that mattered for performance, but whether family blockholders had a governance role. Large active blockholders tended to increase operating performance, implying that they reduced managerial agency problems. In contrast, we find that directors who were independent of large family owners were more likely to increase shareholder value.