The text and the tale: differences between scientific reports and scientists’ reportings on the eruption of Mount Chance, Montserrat

This article looks at the difference between scientists’ written reports and their oral accounts, explanations and stories. The subject of these discourses is the eruption of Mount Chance on Montserrat, a British Overseas Territory in the Eastern Caribbean, and its continued monitoring and reporting. Scientific notions of risk and uncertainty which feature in these texts and tales will subsequently be examined and critiqued. Further to this, this article will end by pointing out that, ironically, the latter - the tale – can in some cases be a more effective and approximate mode of communication with the public than the former – the text.

Philosophy, Social Hope and Democratic Criticism:Critical Theory for a Global Age

The attempt to connect philosophy and social hope has been one of the key distinguishing features of critical theory as a tradition of enquiry. This connection has been questioned forcefully from the perspective of a post-philosophical pragmatism, as articulated by Rorty. In this article I consider two strategies that have been adopted by critical theorists in seeking to reject Rorty's suggestion that we should abandon the attempt to ground social hope in philosophical reason. We consider argumentative strategies of the philosophical anthropologist and of the rational proceduralist. Once the exchanges between Rorty and these two strands of critical theory have been reconstructed and assessed, an alternative perspective emerges. It is argued that philosophical reasoning best helps to sustain social hope in a rapidly changing world when we consider it in terms of the practice of democratic criticism.

Stylistics, criticism and mythrepresentation again: squaring the circle with Ray Mackay's subjective solution for all problems

This article is a response to an article by Ray Mackay (1996) which constitutes an attack on stylistic analysis in general, and the writings of the above authors and Ron Carter in particular. Mackay's article (in Language and Communication) accuses stylistics of 'scientificness' and claims that its attempt to provide objective analyses of literary texts is futile.1 We suggest that Mackay has misrepresented what stylisticians have said about objectivity, and that his understanding of objectivity, science and the nature of text-interpretative argument is seriously flawed.

A survey of formalisms for representing and reasoning with scientific knowledge

With the rapid growth in the quantity and complexity of scientific knowledge available for scientists, and allied professionals, the problems associated with harnessing this knowledge are well recognized. Some of these problems are a result of the uncertainties and inconsistencies that arise in this knowledge. Other problems arise from heterogeneous and informal formats for this knowledge. To address these problems, developments in the application of knowledge representation and reasoning technologies can allow scientific knowledge to be captured in logic-based formalisms. Using such formalisms, we can undertake reasoning with the uncertainty and inconsistency to allow automated techniques to be used for querying and combining of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, by harnessing background knowledge, the querying and combining tasks can be carried out more intelligently. In this paper, we review some of the significant proposals for formalisms for representing and reasoning with scientific knowledge.