The Impact of Extension and Ecosystem Services on Smallholders’ Credit Constraint.

On formal credit markets, access to formal credit and reasonable credit terms of smallholder farmers
in rural sub-Saharan Africa is limited due to adverse selection. Financial institutions operating in
rural areas often cannot distinguish between borrowers (farmers) that are creditworthy and those that
are not, thus, allocate limited resource to agriculture to reduce credit risk. In the presence of limited business quality signaling by smallholder farmers, financial institutions shall demand for collateral and/or offer unfavorable contract terms. Moreover, agricultural productivity of rural sub-Saharan
Africa, dominated by subsistence or small-scale farmers, is also negatively impacted by the adverse
effect of climate change. A strategy that may make the farming practices of smallholder farmer’s
climate resilient and profitable may also improve smallholder farmer's access to formal credit. This
study investigates to what extent participating in ecosystem and extension services (EES) programs
signals business quality of smallholders, thus granting them credit accessibility. We collected data
on 210 smallholder farmers in 2013, comprising farmers that receive payments for ecosystem
services (PES) and farm management training from the International Small Group Tree Planting
Program (TIST) Kenya to test the aforementioned theory empirically. We use game theory,
particularly a screening and sorting model, to illustrate the prospects for farmers with EES to access
formal credit and to improve their credit terms given that they receive PES and banking services
training. Furthermore, the PES’ long term duration (10 – 30 years) generates stable cash-flow which
may be perceived as collateral substitute. Results suggest that smallholder farmers in the TIST
program were less likely to be credit constraint compared to non-TIST farmers. Distance to market,
education, livestock and farm income are factors that determine access to credit from microfinance
institutions in rural Kenya. Amongst farmers that have obtained loans, those keeping business records
enjoy more favorable formal credit conditions. These farmers were observed to pay ca. 5 percent less
interest rate in microfinance charges. For TIST farmers, this type of farm management practices may
be attributed to the banking services and other training they receive within the program. While the
availability of classical collateral (farmlands) and PES may reduce interest rate, the latter was found
to be statistically insignificant. This research underlines the importance of an effective extension
services in rural areas of developing countries and the need to improve gains from conservation
agriculture and ensuing PES. The benefits associated with EES and PES may encompass agricultural
financing.

The Size Distribution of US Banks and Credit Unions

This study examines the firm size distribution of US banks and credit unions. A truncated lognormal distribution describes the size distribution, measured using assets data, of a large population of small, community-based commercial banks. The size distribution of a smaller but increasingly dominant cohort of large banks, which operate a high-volume low-cost retail banking model, exhibits power-law behaviour. There is a progressive increase in skewness over time, and Zipf’s Law is rejected as a descriptor of the size distribution in the upper tail. By contrast, the asset size distribution of the population of credit unions conforms closely to the lognormal distribution.

Building public policy on shifting sands: the case of the National Asset Management Agency

Over the last thirty years, there has been an increased demand for better management of public sector organisations (PSOs). This requires that they are answerable for the inputs that they are given but also for what they achieve with these inputs (Hood 1991; Hood 1995). It is suggested that this will improve the management of the organisation through better planning and control, and the achievement of greater accountability (Smith 1995). However, such a rational approach with clear goals and the means to measure achievement can cause difficulties for many PSOs. These difficulties include the distinctive nature of the public sector due to the political environment within which the public sector manager operates (Stewart and Walsh 1992) and the fact that PSOs will have many stakeholders, each of whom will have their own specific objectives based on their own perspective (Boyle 1995). This can
result in goal ambiguity which means that there is leeway in interpreting the results of the PSO. The National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) was set up to bring stability to the financial system by buying loans from the banks (which were in most cases, non-performing loans). The intention was to cleanse the banks of these loans so that they could return to their normal business of taking deposits and making loans. However, the legislation, also gave NAMA a wide range of other responsibilities including responsibility for facilitating credit in the economy and protecting the interests of taxpayers. In more recent times, NAMA has been given responsibility for building social housing. This wide-range of activities is a clear example of a PSO being given multiple goals which may conflict and is therefore likely to lead to goal ambiguity. This makes it very difficult to evaluate NAMA’s performance as they are attempting to meet numerous goals at the same time and also highlights the complexity of policy making in the public sector. The purpose of this paper is to examine how NAMA dealt with goal ambiguity. This will be done through a thematic analysis of its annual reports over the last five years. The paper’s will contribute to the ongoing debate about the evaluation of PSOs and the complex environment within which they operate which makes evaluation difficult as they are
answerable to multiple stakeholders who have different objectives and different criteria for measuring success.

Feasibility, normative heuristics and the proper place of historical responsibility – a reply to Ohndorf et al.

In this comment, we pick up three points raised by Ohndorf et al. (2015) in their reply to our ethical assessment of the German Advisory Council’s Budget Approach (WBGUBA). First, we discuss and clarify the relationship between ethics and political feasibility, highlighting that the way Ohndorf et el. use feasibility creates an unwarranted status quo bias. Second, we explain the proper place historical responsibility should have within the WBGUBA, stressing the fact that the reasons why we choose one policy proposal over another matter. Third, we analyze the limited extent to which a normative heuristic should motivate an ethically ambitious policy proposal like the WBGUBA.