Information disclosure and depositor discipline in the Chinese banking sector

We investigate the relationship between information disclosure and depositor behaviour in the Chinese banking sector. Specifically, we enquire whether enhanced information disclosure enables investors to more effectively infer a banking institution's risk profile, thereby influencing their deposit decisions. Utilising an unbalanced panel, incorporating financial data from 169 Chinese banks over the 1998–2009 period, we employ generalised-method-of-moments (GMM) estimation procedures to control for potential endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, and persistence in the dependent variable. We uncover evidence that: (i) the growth rate of deposits is sensitive to bank fundamentals after controlling for macroeconomic factors, diversity in ownership structure, and government intervention; (ii) a bank publicly disclosing more transparent information in its financial reports, is more likely to experience growth in its deposit base; and (iii) banks characterised by high information transparency, well-capitalised and adopted international accounting standards, are more able to attract funds by offering higher interest rates.

Banking compliance and dependence corruption: towards an attachment perspective

Why did banking compliance fail so badly in the recent financial crisis and why, according to many, does it continue to do so? Rather than point to the lack of oversight of individuals in bank compliance roles, as many commentators do, in this paper I examine in depth the organizational context that surrounded people in such roles. I focus on those compliance personnel who did speak out about risky practices in their banks, who were forced to escalate the problem and 'whistle-blow' to external parties, and who were punished for doing so. Drawing on recent empirical data from a wider study, I argue that the concept of dependence corruption is useful in this setting, and that it can be extended to encompass interpersonal attachments. This, in turn, problematises the concept of dependence corruption because interpersonal attachments in organisational settings are inevitable. The paper engages with recent debates on whether institutional corruption is an appropriate lens for studying private-sector organisations by arguing for a focus on roles, rather than remaining at the level of institutional fields or individual organisations. Finally, the paper contributes to studies on banking compliance in the context of the recent crisis; without a deeper understanding of those who were forced to extremes to simply do their jobs, reform of the banking sector will prove difficult.

Holding Shareholders to Account: British Banking Stability and Contingent Capital

This chapter seeks to explain the relative stability of the British banking system in terms of its capital structure. From 1826 joint-stock banking was allowed, but shareholder liability was jointly and severally unlimited. Limited liability banks were allowed from 1857–8, but these banks issued partly paid shares with an obligation on shareholders to subscribe for uncalled capital. Contingent capital meant that shareholders and managers would suffer losses in the event of failure and this discouraged risk shifting at the expense of note-holders and depositors. Although individual banks collapsed, the failure rate of banks (in terms of number or capital) did not reach a critical level—10 per cent—beyond which the payments system might have been threatened. This chapter argues that agency problems and systemic risk rose after the abolition of contingent share capital in 1958 and the deregulation of the banking sector in the 1970s.