An Investigation into the Failure to Implement a Universal School Lunch Program during WWII and Postwar Reconstruction in Canada: The Case of Ontario

The purpose of this research is to investigate the various social, political and economic factors that contributed to Canada’s failure to implement a universal school lunch program during the 1940s. Although Canada developed several other social welfare programs in the post-war period, it remains one of the only industrialized nations that does not provide hot meals to children in elementary or secondary schools. Data from the province of Ontario, a major site of postwar reconstruction and policy-making, has been taken up to inform the broader national discourse on school lunches from the 1940s. National, Ontario provincial and City of Toronto archival records were collected and analyzed according to common themes, in order to identify key barriers that constrained government support of a hot meal program. Archival records were identified using key words, and were limited to materials created between 1930-1952. Analysis suggests that sufficient need for a hot meal program had not been established during the 1940s. Despite misleading nutrition messages, rates of malnutrition and nutrient-related disease were at an all-time low, and many Ontario school boards did not appear to have the necessary infrastructure required to supply all pupils with hot meals. The Canadian government had already employed significant resources to improve existing social security programs by coupling them with health education. This strategy reflected a shift in understanding malnutrition as a knowledge-based problem, as opposed to income-based. This understanding was further reinforced through the moralized dissemination of nutrition information, which placed blame on women for improperly raising their children. Ultimately, the strong uptake of nutrition as a public health issue in Ontario may have limited prospective responses to solutions already utilized in the public health domain, and directed favour away from a universal school lunch program for Canada.

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.