Voting games with incomplete information

We examine voting situations in which individuals have incomplete information over each others' true preferences. In many respects, this work is motivated by a desire to provide a more complete understanding of so-called probabilistic voting.

Chapter 2 examines the similarities and differences between the incentives faced by politicians who seek to maximize expected vote share, expected plurality, or probability of victory in single member: single vote, simple plurality electoral systems. We find that, in general, the candidates' optimal policies in such an electoral system vary greatly depending on their objective function. We provide several examples, as well as a genericity result which states that almost all such electoral systems (with respect to the distributions of voter behavior) will exhibit different incentives for candidates who seek to maximize expected vote share and those who seek to maximize probability of victory.

In Chapter 3, we adopt a random utility maximizing framework in which individuals' preferences are subject to action-specific exogenous shocks. We show that Nash equilibria exist in voting games possessing such an information structure and in which voters and candidates are each aware that every voter's preferences are subject to such shocks. A special case of our framework is that in which voters are playing a Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), (1998)). We then examine candidate competition in such games and show that, for sufficiently large electorates, regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space or the number of candidates, there exists a strict equilibrium at the social welfare optimum (i.e., the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utility functions). In two candidate contests we find that this equilibrium is unique.

Finally, in Chapter 4, we attempt the first steps towards a theory of equilibrium in games possessing both continuous action spaces and action-specific preference shocks. Our notion of equilibrium, Variational Response Equilibrium, is shown to exist in all games with continuous payoff functions. We discuss the similarities and differences between this notion of equilibrium and the notion of Quantal Response Equilibrium and offer possible extensions of our framework.

Sustainable IT and IT for sustainability

Energy and sustainability have become one of the most critical issues of our generation. While the abundant potential of renewable energy such as solar and wind provides a real opportunity for sustainability, their intermittency and uncertainty present a daunting operating challenge. This thesis aims to develop analytical models, deployable algorithms, and real systems to enable efficient integration of renewable energy into complex distributed systems with limited information.

The first thrust of the thesis is to make IT systems more sustainable by facilitating the integration of renewable energy into these systems. IT represents the fastest growing sectors in energy usage and greenhouse gas pollution. Over the last decade there are dramatic improvements in the energy efficiency of IT systems, but the efficiency improvements do not necessarily lead to reduction in energy consumption because more servers are demanded. Further, little effort has been put in making IT more sustainable, and most of the improvements are from improved "engineering" rather than improved "algorithms". In contrast, my work focuses on developing algorithms with rigorous theoretical analysis that improve the sustainability of IT. In particular, this thesis seeks to exploit the flexibilities of cloud workloads both (i) in time by scheduling delay-tolerant workloads and (ii) in space by routing requests to geographically diverse data centers. These opportunities allow data centers to adaptively respond to renewable availability, varying cooling efficiency, and fluctuating energy prices, while still meeting performance requirements. The design of the enabling algorithms is however very challenging because of limited information, non-smooth objective functions and the need for distributed control. Novel distributed algorithms are developed with theoretically provable guarantees to enable the "follow the renewables" routing. Moving from theory to practice, I helped HP design and implement industry's first Net-zero Energy Data Center.

The second thrust of this thesis is to use IT systems to improve the sustainability and efficiency of our energy infrastructure through data center demand response. The main challenges as we integrate more renewable sources to the existing power grid come from the fluctuation and unpredictability of renewable generation. Although energy storage and reserves can potentially solve the issues, they are very costly. One promising alternative is to make the cloud data centers demand responsive. The potential of such an approach is huge.

To realize this potential, we need adaptive and distributed control of cloud data centers and new electricity market designs for distributed electricity resources. My work is progressing in both directions. In particular, I have designed online algorithms with theoretically guaranteed performance for data center operators to deal with uncertainties under popular demand response programs. Based on local control rules of customers, I have further designed new pricing schemes for demand response to align the interests of customers, utility companies, and the society to improve social welfare.