MIMU sensors for joint kinematic estimation: anatomical landmarking and frame correction

The ability to capture human motion allows researchers to evaluate an individual’s gait. Gait can be measured in different ways, from camera-based systems to Magnetic and Inertial Measurement Units (MIMU). The former uses cameras to track positional information of photo-reflective markers, while the latter uses accelerometers, gyroscopes, and magnetometers to measure segment orientation. Both systems can be used to measure joint kinematics, but the results vary because of their differences in anatomical calibrations. The objective of this thesis was to study potential solutions for reducing joint angle discrepancies between MIMU and camera-based systems. The first study worked to correct the anatomical frame differences between MIMU and camera-based systems via the joint angles of both systems. This study looked at full lower body correction versus correcting a single joint. Single joint correction showed slightly better alignment of both systems, but does not take into account that body segments are generally affected by more than one joint. The second study explores the possibility of anatomical landmarking using a single camera and a pointer apparatus. Results showed anatomical landmark position could be determined using a single camera, as the anatomical landmarks found from this study and a camera-based system showed similar results. This thesis worked on providing a novel way for obtaining anatomical landmarks with a single point-and-shoot camera, as well aligning anatomical frames between MIMUs and camera-based systems using joint angles.

Language, Logos, and Social Ontology: Naturalist and Post-Naturalist Narratives of Human Rationality and Social Reality

I distinguish two ways that philosophers have approached and explained the reality and status of human social institutions. I call these approaches “naturalist” and “post-naturalist”. Common to both approaches is an understanding that the status of mind and its relation to the world or “nature” has implications on a conception of the status of institutional reality. Naturalists hold that mind is explicable within a scientific frame that conceives of mind as a fundamentally material process. By proxy, social reality is also materially explicable. Post-naturalists critique this view, holding instead that naturalism is parasitic on contemporary science—it therefore is non-compulsory and distorts how we ought to understand mind and social reality. A comparison of naturalism and post-naturalism will comprise the content of the first chapter. The second chapter turns to tracing out the dimensions of a post-naturalist narrative of mind and social reality. Post-naturalists conceive of mind and its activity of thought as sui generis, and it transpires from this that social institutions are better understood as a rational mind’s mode of the expression in the world. Post-naturalism conceives of social reality as a necessary dimension of thought. Thought requires a second person and thereby a tradition or context of norms that come to both structure its expression and become the products of expression. This is in contrast to the idea that social reality is a production of minds, and thereby derivative. Social reality, self-conscious thought, and thought of the second person are therefore three dimensions of a greater unity.