Una revisión de la Cadena Datos-Información-Conocimiento desde el Pragmatismo de Peirce

La Cadena Datos-Información-Conocimiento (DIC), denominada “Jerarquía de la Información” o “Pirámide del Conocimiento”, es uno de los modelos más importantes en la Gestión de la Información y la Gestión del Conocimiento. Por lo general, la estructuración de la cadena se ha ido definiendo como una arquitectura en la que cada elemento se levanta sobre el elemento inmediatamente inferior; sin embargo no existe un consenso en la definición de los elementos, ni acerca de los procesos que transforman un elemento de un nivel a uno del siguiente nivel. En este artículo se realiza una revisión de la Cadena Datos-Información-Conocimiento examinando las definiciones más relevantes sobre sus elementos y sobre su articulación en la literatura, para sintetizar las acepciones más comunes. Se analizan los elementos de la Cadena DIC desde la semiótica de Peirce; enfoque que nos permite aclarar los significados e identificar las diferencias, las relaciones y los roles que desempeñan en la cadena desde el punto de vista del pragmatismo. Finalmente se propone una definición de la Cadena DIC apoyada en las categorías triádicas de signos y la semiosis ilimitada de Peirce, los niveles de sistemas de signos de Stamper y las metáforas de Zeleny.

Narrative Deliberation? On Storytelling as a Necessary Component of Public Deliberation

This paper deals with the place of narrative, that is, storytelling, in public deliberation. A distinction is made between weak and strong conceptions of narrative. According to the weak one, storytelling is but one rhetorical device among others with which social actors produce and convey meaning. In contrast, the strong conception holds that narrative is necessary to communicate, and argue, about topics such as the human experience of time, collective identities and the moral and ethical validity of values. The upshot of this idea is that storytelling should be a necessary component of any ideal of public deliberation. Contrary to recent work by deliberative theorists, who tend to adopt the weak conception of narrative, the author argues for embracing the strong one. The main contention of this article is that stories not only have a legitimate place in deliberation, but are even necessary to formulate certain arguments in the fi rst place; for instance, arguments drawing on historical experience. This claim, namely that narrative is constitutive of certain arguments, in the sense that, without it, said reasons cannot be articulated, is illustrated by deliberative theory’s own narrative underpinnings. Finally, certain possible objections against the strong conception of narrative are dispelled.

Looking for Determinants of Ontological Security in the Spain of the Crisis

The concept of ontological security has a remarkable echo in the current sociology to describe emotional status of men of late modernity. However, the concept created by Giddens in the eighties has been little used in empirical research covering various sources of risk or uncertainty. In this paper, a scale for ontological security is proposed. To do this, we start from the results of a research focused on the relationship between risk, uncertainty and vulnerability in the context of the economic crisis in Spain. These results were produced through nine focus groups and a telephone survey with standardized questionnaire applied to a national sample of 2,408 individuals over 18 years. This work is divided into three main sections. In the fi rst, a scale has been built from the results of the application of different items present in the questionnaire used. The second part explores the relationships of the scale obtained with the variables further approximate the emotional dimensions of individuals. The third part observes the variables that contribute to changes in the scale: These variables show the structural feature of the ontological security.

Humanism is a violence typical of the beasts. Philosozing with a Hammer, using Levinas and Derrida, the Measure of the Human and the Human as a measure

Levinas’s reflections arose as a critique of traditional philosophy which, since it was based on presence and identity, leads to the exclusion of the other. Instead of an onto-logical thought the Lithuanian proposes that the ipseity of the human being be constituted by alterity, and that it be so ethically, because the subject is sub-ject, that is, that which upholds, responsibility. In an attempt to take the obligatory attention to the otherness of the other even further, Derrida would develop a radical critique of the Levinasian posture. Deconstruction of every trace of ipseity and sovereignty in the relationship with the other, the reading that we have done of the work of Derrida opts for a no definable understanding of the human. That is why every de-limitation of an ethical field as a properly human implies a brutal violence that the levinasian humanism of the other tried to exceed.

Justificación y error en Descartes: un argumento pragmatista en la validación cartesiana del criterio de claridad y distinción

La percepción clara y distinta es el elemento sobre el que se asienta la certeza metafísica de Descartes. Con todo, el planteamiento de los argumentos escépticos referidos a la duda metódica cartesiana ha evidenciado la necesidad de hallar una justificación al propio criterio de la percepción clara y distinta. Frente a los intentos basados en la indubitabilidad de la percepción o en la garantía surgida de la bondad divina, se defenderá una justificación alternativa pragmatista.

Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom

the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.