STAR 3 randomized controlled trial to compare sensor-augmented insulin pump therapy with multiple daily injections in the treatment of type 1 diabetes: research design, methods, and baseline characteristics of enrolled subjects.

BACKGROUND: Sensor-augmented pump therapy (SAPT) integrates real-time continuous glucose monitoring (RT-CGM) with continuous subcutaneous insulin infusion (CSII) and offers an alternative to multiple daily injections (MDI). Previous studies provide evidence that SAPT may improve clinical outcomes among people with type 1 diabetes. Sensor-Augmented Pump Therapy for A1c Reduction (STAR) 3 is a multicenter randomized controlled trial comparing the efficacy of SAPT to that of MDI in subjects with type 1 diabetes. METHODS: Subjects were randomized to either continue with MDI or transition to SAPT for 1 year. Subjects in the MDI cohort were allowed to transition to SAPT for 6 months after completion of the study. SAPT subjects who completed the study were also allowed to continue for 6 months. The primary end point was the difference between treatment groups in change in hemoglobin A1c (HbA1c) percentage from baseline to 1 year of treatment. Secondary end points included percentage of subjects with HbA1c < or =7% and without severe hypoglycemia, as well as area under the curve of time spent in normal glycemic ranges. Tertiary end points include percentage of subjects with HbA1c < or =7%, key safety end points, user satisfaction, and responses on standardized assessments. RESULTS: A total of 495 subjects were enrolled, and the baseline characteristics similar between the SAPT and MDI groups. Study completion is anticipated in June 2010. CONCLUSIONS: Results of this randomized controlled trial should help establish whether an integrated RT-CGM and CSII system benefits patients with type 1 diabetes more than MDI.

Weight loss intervention for young adults using mobile technology: design and rationale of a randomized controlled trial - Cell Phone Intervention for You (CITY).

BACKGROUND: The obesity epidemic has spread to young adults, leading to significant public health implications later in adulthood. Intervention in early adulthood may be an effective public health strategy for reducing the long-term health impact of the epidemic. Few weight loss trials have been conducted in young adults. It is unclear what weight loss strategies are beneficial in this population. PURPOSE: To describe the design and rationale of the NHLBI-sponsored Cell Phone Intervention for You (CITY) study, which is a single center, randomized three-arm trial that compares the impact on weight loss of 1) a behavioral intervention that is delivered almost entirely via cell phone technology (Cell Phone group); and 2) a behavioral intervention delivered mainly through monthly personal coaching calls enhanced by self-monitoring via cell phone (Personal Coaching group), each compared to 3) a usual care, advice-only control condition. METHODS: A total of 365 community-dwelling overweight/obese adults aged 18-35 years were randomized to receive one of these three interventions for 24 months in parallel group design. Study personnel assessing outcomes were blinded to group assignment. The primary outcome is weight change at 24 [corrected] months. We hypothesize that each active intervention will cause more weight loss than the usual care condition. Study completion is anticipated in 2014. CONCLUSIONS: If effective, implementation of the CITY interventions could mitigate the alarming rates of obesity in young adults through promotion of weight loss. ClinicalTrial.gov: NCT01092364.

Adaptive intervention design in mobile health: Intervention design and development in the Cell Phone Intervention for You trial.

BACKGROUND/AIMS: The obesity epidemic has spread to young adults, and obesity is a significant risk factor for cardiovascular disease. The prominence and increasing functionality of mobile phones may provide an opportunity to deliver longitudinal and scalable weight management interventions in young adults. The aim of this article is to describe the design and development of the intervention tested in the Cell Phone Intervention for You study and to highlight the importance of adaptive intervention design that made it possible. The Cell Phone Intervention for You study was a National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute-sponsored, controlled, 24-month randomized clinical trial comparing two active interventions to a usual-care control group. Participants were 365 overweight or obese (body mass index≥25 kg/m2) young adults. METHODS: Both active interventions were designed based on social cognitive theory and incorporated techniques for behavioral self-management and motivational enhancement. Initial intervention development occurred during a 1-year formative phase utilizing focus groups and iterative, participatory design. During the intervention testing, adaptive intervention design, where an intervention is updated or extended throughout a trial while assuring the delivery of exactly the same intervention to each cohort, was employed. The adaptive intervention design strategy distributed technical work and allowed introduction of novel components in phases intended to help promote and sustain participant engagement. Adaptive intervention design was made possible by exploiting the mobile phone's remote data capabilities so that adoption of particular application components could be continuously monitored and components subsequently added or updated remotely. RESULTS: The cell phone intervention was delivered almost entirely via cell phone and was always-present, proactive, and interactive-providing passive and active reminders, frequent opportunities for knowledge dissemination, and multiple tools for self-tracking and receiving tailored feedback. The intervention changed over 2 years to promote and sustain engagement. The personal coaching intervention, alternatively, was primarily personal coaching with trained coaches based on a proven intervention, enhanced with a mobile application, but where all interactions with the technology were participant-initiated. CONCLUSION: The complexity and length of the technology-based randomized clinical trial created challenges in engagement and technology adaptation, which were generally discovered using novel remote monitoring technology and addressed using the adaptive intervention design. Investigators should plan to develop tools and procedures that explicitly support continuous remote monitoring of interventions to support adaptive intervention design in long-term, technology-based studies, as well as developing the interventions themselves.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.