Phase Locked Loop and Modulo Games, The Dogma Loops; and “Finding Ibrida”

This dissertation consists of two independent musical compositions and an article detailing the process of the design and assembly of an electric guitar with particular emphasis on the carefully curated suite of embedded effects.

The first piece, 'Phase Locked Loop and Modulo Games' is scored for electric guitar and a single echo of equal volume less than a beat away. One could think of the piece as a 15 minute canon at the unison at the dotted eighth note (or at times the quarter or triplet-quarter), however the compositional motivation is more about weaving a composite texture between the guitar and its echo that is, while in theory extremely contrapuntal, in actuality is simply a single [superhuman] melodic line.

The second piece, 'The Dogma Loops' picks up a few compositional threads left by ‘Phase Locked Loop’ and weaves them into an entirely new tapestry. 'Phase Locked Loop' is motivated by the creation of a complex musical composite that is for the most part electronically transparent. 'The Dogma Loops' questions that same notion of composite electronic complexity by essentially asking a question: "what are the inputs to an interactive electronic system that create the most complex outputs via the simplest musical means possible?"

'The Dogma Loops' is scored for Electric Guitar (doubling on Ukulele), Violin and Violoncello. All of the principal instruments require an electronic pickup (except the Uke). The work is in three sections played attacca; [Automation Games], [Point of Origin] and [Cloning Vectors].

The third and final component of the document is the article 'Finding Ibrida.' This article details the process of the design and assembly of an electric guitar with integrated effects, while also providing the deeper context (conceptual and technical) which motivated the efforts and informed the challenges to hybridize the various technologies (tubes, transistors, digital effects and a microcontroller subsystem). The project was motivated by a desire for rigorous technical and hands-on engagement with analog signal processing as applied to the electric guitar. ‘Finding Ibrida’ explores sound, some myths and lore of guitar tech and the history of electric guitar distortion and its culture of sonic exploration.

Design of Scheduling Algorithms Using Game Theoretic Ideas

Scheduling a set of jobs over a collection of machines to optimize a certain quality-of-service measure is one of the most important research topics in both computer science theory and practice. In this thesis, we design algorithms that optimize {\em flow-time} (or delay) of jobs for scheduling problems that arise in a wide range of applications. We consider the classical model of unrelated machine scheduling and resolve several long standing open problems; we introduce new models that capture the novel algorithmic challenges in scheduling jobs in data centers or large clusters; we study the effect of selfish behavior in distributed and decentralized environments; we design algorithms that strive to balance the energy consumption and performance.

The technically interesting aspect of our work is the surprising connections we establish between approximation and online algorithms, economics, game theory, and queuing theory. It is the interplay of ideas from these different areas that lies at the heart of most of the algorithms presented in this thesis.

The main contributions of the thesis can be placed in one of the following categories.

1. Classical Unrelated Machine Scheduling: We give the first polygorithmic approximation algorithms for minimizing the average flow-time and minimizing the maximum flow-time in the offline setting. In the online and non-clairvoyant setting, we design the first non-clairvoyant algorithm for minimizing the weighted flow-time in the resource augmentation model. Our work introduces iterated rounding technique for the offline flow-time optimization, and gives the first framework to analyze non-clairvoyant algorithms for unrelated machines.

2. Polytope Scheduling Problem: To capture the multidimensional nature of the scheduling problems that arise in practice, we introduce Polytope Scheduling Problem (\psp). The \psp problem generalizes almost all classical scheduling models, and also captures hitherto unstudied scheduling problems such as routing multi-commodity flows, routing multicast (video-on-demand) trees, and multi-dimensional resource allocation. We design several competitive algorithms for the \psp problem and its variants for the objectives of minimizing the flow-time and completion time. Our work establishes many interesting connections between scheduling and market equilibrium concepts, fairness and non-clairvoyant scheduling, and queuing theoretic notion of stability and resource augmentation analysis.

3. Energy Efficient Scheduling: We give the first non-clairvoyant algorithm for minimizing the total flow-time + energy in the online and resource augmentation model for the most general setting of unrelated machines.

4. Selfish Scheduling: We study the effect of selfish behavior in scheduling and routing problems. We define a fairness index for scheduling policies called {\em bounded stretch}, and show that for the objective of minimizing the average (weighted) completion time, policies with small stretch lead to equilibrium outcomes with small price of anarchy. Our work gives the first linear/ convex programming duality based framework to bound the price of anarchy for general equilibrium concepts such as coarse correlated equilibrium.

A Study of How Economic Attitudes Are Shaped by Environmental Shocks and Life Experiences

Social attitudes, attitudes toward financial risk and attitudes toward deferred gratification are thought to influence many important economic decisions over the life-course. In economic theory, these attitudes are key components in diverse models of behavior, including collective action, saving and investment decisions and occupational choice. The relevance of these attitudes have been confirmed empirically. Yet, the factors that influence them are not well understood. This research evaluates how these attitudes are affected by large disruptive events, namely, a natural disaster and a civil conflict, and also by an individual-specific life event, namely, having children.

By implementing rigorous empirical strategies drawing on rich longitudinal datasets, this research project advances our understanding of how life experiences shape these attitudes. Moreover, compelling evidence is provided that the observed changes in attitudes are likely to reflect changes in preferences given that they are not driven just by changes in financial circumstances. Therefore the findings of this research project also contribute to the discussion of whether preferences are really fixed, a usual assumption in economics.

In the first chapter, I study how altruistic and trusting attitudes are affected by exposure to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami as long as ten years after the disaster occurred. Establishing a causal relationship between natural disasters and attitudes presents several challenges as endogenous exposure and sample selection can confound the analysis. I take on these challenges by exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in exposure to the tsunami and by relying on a longitudinal dataset representative of the pre-tsunami population in two districts of Aceh, Indonesia. The sample is drawn from the Study of the Tsunami Aftermath and Recovery (STAR), a survey with data collected both before and after the disaster and especially designed to identify the impact of the tsunami. The altruistic and trusting attitudes of the respondents are measured by their behavior in the dictator and trust games. I find that witnessing closely the damage caused by the tsunami but without suffering severe economic damage oneself increases altruistic and trusting behavior, particularly towards individuals from tsunami affected communities. Having suffered severe economic damage has no impact on altruistic behavior but may have increased trusting behavior. These effects do not seem to be caused by the consequences of the tsunami on people’s financial situation. Instead they are consistent with how experiences of loss and solidarity may have shaped social attitudes by affecting empathy and perceptions of who is deserving of aid and trust.

In the second chapter, co-authored with Ryan Brown, Duncan Thomas and Andrea Velasquez, we investigate how attitudes toward financial risk are affected by elevated levels of insecurity and uncertainty brought on by the Mexican Drug War. To conduct our analysis, we pair the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), a rich longitudinal dataset ideally suited for our purposes, with a dataset on homicide rates at the month and municipality-level. The homicide rates capture well the overall crime environment created by the drug war. The MxFLS elicits risk attitudes by asking respondents to choose between hypothetical gambles with different payoffs. Our strategy to identify a causal effect has two key components. First, we implement an individual fixed effects strategy which allows us to control for all time-invariant heterogeneity. The remaining time variant heterogeneity is unlikely to be correlated with changes in the local crime environment given the well-documented political origins of the Mexican Drug War. We also show supporting evidence in this regard. The second component of our identification strategy is to use an intent-to-treat approach to shield our estimates from endogenous migration. Our findings indicate that exposure to greater local-area violent crime results in increased risk aversion. This effect is not driven by changes in financial circumstances, but may be explained instead by heightened fear of victimization. Nonetheless, we find that having greater economic resources mitigate the impact. This may be due to individuals with greater economic resources being able to avoid crime by affording better transportation or security at work.

The third chapter, co-authored with Duncan Thomas, evaluates whether attitudes toward deferred gratification change after having children. For this study we also exploit the MxFLS, which elicits attitudes toward deferred gratification (commonly known as time discounting) by asking individuals to choose between hypothetical payments at different points in time. We implement a difference-in-difference estimator to control for all time-invariant heterogeneity and show that our results are robust to the inclusion of time varying characteristics likely correlated with child birth. We find that becoming a mother increases time discounting especially in the first two years after childbirth and in particular for those women without a spouse at home. Having additional children does not have an effect and the effect for men seems to go in the opposite direction. These heterogeneous effects suggest that child rearing may affect time discounting due to generated stress or not fully anticipated spending needs.

Game-Theoretically Allocating Resources to Catch Evaders and Payments to Stabilize Teams

Allocating resources optimally is a nontrivial task, especially when multiple

self-interested agents with conflicting goals are involved. This dissertation

uses techniques from game theory to study two classes of such problems:

allocating resources to catch agents that attempt to evade them, and allocating

payments to agents in a team in order to stabilize it. Besides discussing what

allocations are optimal from various game-theoretic perspectives, we also study

how to efficiently compute them, and if no such algorithms are found, what

computational hardness results can be proved.

The first class of problems is inspired by real-world applications such as the

TOEFL iBT test, course final exams, driver's license tests, and airport security

patrols. We call them test games and security games. This dissertation first

studies test games separately, and then proposes a framework of Catcher-Evader

games (CE games) that generalizes both test games and security games. We show

that the optimal test strategy can be efficiently computed for scored test

games, but it is hard to compute for many binary test games. Optimal Stackelberg

strategies are hard to compute for CE games, but we give an empirically

efficient algorithm for computing their Nash equilibria. We also prove that the

Nash equilibria of a CE game are interchangeable.

The second class of problems involves how to split a reward that is collectively

obtained by a team. For example, how should a startup distribute its shares, and

what salary should an enterprise pay to its employees. Several stability-based

solution concepts in cooperative game theory, such as the core, the least core,

and the nucleolus, are well suited to this purpose when the goal is to avoid

coalitions of agents breaking off. We show that some of these solution concepts

can be justified as the most stable payments under noise. Moreover, by adjusting

the noise models (to be arguably more realistic), we obtain new solution

concepts including the partial nucleolus, the multiplicative least core, and the

multiplicative nucleolus. We then study the computational complexity of those

solution concepts under the constraint of superadditivity. Our result is based

on what we call Small-Issues-Large-Team games and it applies to popular

representation schemes such as MC-nets.

The enduring impact of transient emotions on decision making

People often do not realize they are being influenced by an incidental emotional state. As a result, decisions based on a fleeting incidental emotion can become the basis for future decisions and hence outlive the original cause for the behavior (i.e., the emotion itself). Using a sequence of ultimatum and dictator games, we provide empirical evidence for the enduring impact of transient emotions on economic decision making. Behavioral consistency and false consensus are presented as potential underlying processes. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.