9 resultados para Methods for decision making
em Duke University
Resumo:
BACKGROUND: Less than 1% of severely obese US adults undergo bariatric surgery annually. It is critical to understand the factors that contribute to its utilization. OBJECTIVES: To understand how primary care physicians (PCPs) make decisions regarding severe obesity treatment and bariatric surgery referral. SETTING: Focus groups with PCPs practicing in small, medium, and large cities in Wisconsin. METHODS: PCPs were asked to discuss prioritization of treatment for a severely obese patient with multiple co-morbidities and considerations regarding bariatric surgery referral. Focus group sessions were analyzed by using a directed approach to content analysis. A taxonomy of consensus codes was developed. Code summaries were created and representative quotes identified. RESULTS: Sixteen PCPs participated in 3 focus groups. Four treatment prioritization approaches were identified: (1) treat the disease that is easiest to address; (2) treat the disease that is perceived as the most dangerous; (3) let the patient set the agenda; and (4) address obesity first because it is the common denominator underlying other co-morbid conditions. Only the latter approach placed emphasis on obesity treatment. Five factors made PCPs hesitate to refer patients for bariatric surgery: (1) wanting to "do no harm"; (2) questioning the long-term effectiveness of bariatric surgery; (3) limited knowledge about bariatric surgery; (4) not wanting to recommend bariatric surgery too early; and (5) not knowing if insurance would cover bariatric surgery. CONCLUSION: Decision making by PCPs for severely obese patients seems to underprioritize obesity treatment and overestimate bariatric surgery risks. This could be addressed with PCP education and improvements in communication between PCPs and bariatric surgeons.
Resumo:
BACKGROUND: Shared decision-making has become the standard of care for most medical treatments. However, little is known about physician communication practices in the decision making for unstable critically ill patients with known end-stage disease. OBJECTIVE: To describe communication practices of physicians making treatment decisions for unstable critically ill patients with end-stage cancer, using the framework of shared decision-making. DESIGN: Analysis of audiotaped encounters between physicians and a standardized patient, in a high-fidelity simulation scenario, to identify best practice communication behaviors. The simulation depicted a 78-year-old man with metastatic gastric cancer, life-threatening hypoxia, and stable preferences to avoid intensive care unit (ICU) admission and intubation. Blinded coders assessed the encounters for verbal communication behaviors associated with handling emotions and discussion of end-of-life goals. We calculated a score for skill at handling emotions (0-6) and at discussing end of life goals (0-16). SUBJECTS: Twenty-seven hospital-based physicians. RESULTS: Independent variables included physician demographics and communication behaviors. We used treatment decisions (ICU admission and initiation of palliation) as a proxy for accurate identification of patient preferences. Eight physicians admitted the patient to the ICU, and 16 initiated palliation. Physicians varied, but on average demonstrated low skill at handling emotions (mean, 0.7) and moderate skill at discussing end-of-life goals (mean, 7.4). We found that skill at discussing end-of-life goals was associated with initiation of palliation (p = 0.04). CONCLUSIONS: It is possible to analyze the decision making of physicians managing unstable critically ill patients with end-stage cancer using the framework of shared decision-making.
Resumo:
In this study, we explored how adolescents in rural Kenya apply religious coping in sexual decision-making in the context of high rates of poverty and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 34 adolescents. One-third (13) reported religious coping related to economic stress, HIV, or sexual decision-making; the majority (29) reported religious coping with these or other stressors. Adolescents reported praying for God to partner with them to engage in positive behaviors, praying for strength to resist unwanted behaviors, and passive strategies characterized by waiting for God to provide resources or protection from HIV. Adolescents in Sub-Saharan Africa may benefit from HIV prevention interventions that integrate and build upon their use of religious coping.
Resumo:
People often do not realize they are being influenced by an incidental emotional state. As a result, decisions based on a fleeting incidental emotion can become the basis for future decisions and hence outlive the original cause for the behavior (i.e., the emotion itself). Using a sequence of ultimatum and dictator games, we provide empirical evidence for the enduring impact of transient emotions on economic decision making. Behavioral consistency and false consensus are presented as potential underlying processes. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
Considerable scientific and intervention attention has been paid to judgment and decision-making systems associated with aggressive behavior in youth. However, most empirical studies have investigated social-cognitive correlates of stable child and adolescent aggressiveness, and less is known about real-time decision making to engage in aggressive behavior. A model of real-time decision making must incorporate both impulsive actions and rational thought. The present paper advances a process model (response evaluation and decision; RED) of real-time behavioral judgments and decision making in aggressive youths with mathematic representations that may be used to quantify response strength. These components are a heuristic to describe decision making, though it is doubtful that individuals always mentally complete these steps. RED represents an organization of social-cognitive operations believed to be active during the response decision step of social information processing. The model posits that RED processes can be circumvented through impulsive responding. This article provides a description and integration of thoughtful, rational decision making and nonrational impulsivity in aggressive behavioral interactions.
Resumo:
Context can have a powerful influence on decision-making strategies in humans. In particular, people sometimes shift their economic preferences depending on the broader social context, such as the presence of potential competitors or mating partners. Despite the important role of competition in primate conspecific interactions, as well as evidence that competitive social contexts impact primates' social cognitive skills, there has been little study of how social context influences the strategies that nonhumans show when making decisions about the value of resources. Here we investigate the impact of social context on preferences for risk (variability in payoffs) in our two closest phylogenetic relatives, chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, and bonobos, Pan paniscus. In a first study, we examine the impact of competition on patterns of risky choice. In a second study, we examine whether a positive play context affects risky choices. We find that (1) apes are more likely to choose the risky option when making decisions in a competitive context; and (2) the play context did not influence their risk preferences. Overall these results suggest that some types of social contexts can shift patterns of decision making in nonhuman apes, much like in humans. Comparative studies of chimpanzees and bonobos can therefore help illuminate the evolutionary processes shaping human economic behaviour. © 2012 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.
Resumo:
Humans make decisions in highly complex physical, economic and social environments. In order to adaptively choose, the human brain has to learn about- and attend to- sensory cues that provide information about the potential outcome of different courses of action. Here I present three event-related potential (ERP) studies, in which I evaluated the role of the interactions between attention and reward learning in economic decision-making. I focused my analyses on three ERP components (Chap. 1): (1) the N2pc, an early lateralized ERP response reflecting the lateralized focus of visual; (2) the feedback-related negativity (FRN), which reflects the process by which the brain extracts utility from feedback; and (3) the P300 (P3), which reflects the amount of attention devoted to feedback-processing. I found that learned stimulus-reward associations can influence the rapid allocation of attention (N2pc) towards outcome-predicting cues, and that differences in this attention allocation process are associated with individual differences in economic decision performance (Chap. 2). Such individual differences were also linked to differences in neural responses reflecting the amount of attention devoted to processing monetary outcomes (P3) (Chap. 3). Finally, the relative amount of attention devoted to processing rewards for oneself versus others (as reflected by the P3) predicted both charitable giving and self-reported engagement in real-life altruistic behaviors across individuals (Chap. 4). Overall, these findings indicate that attention and reward processing interact and can influence each other in the brain. Moreover, they indicate that individual differences in economic choice behavior are associated both with biases in the manner in which attention is drawn towards sensory cues that inform subsequent choices, and with biases in the way that attention is allocated to learn from the outcomes of recent choices.
Resumo:
Adolescence is often viewed as a time of irrational, risky decision-making - despite adolescents' competence in other cognitive domains. In this study, we examined the strategies used by adolescents (N=30) and young adults (N=47) to resolve complex, multi-outcome economic gambles. Compared to adults, adolescents were more likely to make conservative, loss-minimizing choices consistent with economic models. Eye-tracking data showed that prior to decisions, adolescents acquired more information in a more thorough manner; that is, they engaged in a more analytic processing strategy indicative of trade-offs between decision variables. In contrast, young adults' decisions were more consistent with heuristics that simplified the decision problem, at the expense of analytic precision. Collectively, these results demonstrate a counter-intuitive developmental transition in economic decision making: adolescents' decisions are more consistent with rational-choice models, while young adults more readily engage task-appropriate heuristics.