Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences-ties-in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school-single tiebreaking-in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21).

Adolescent weight status and self-reported school performance in South Korea.

Using a nationally representative sample of 142 783 middle school (13-15 years old) and high school (16-18 years old) students in South Korea, this study examined whether (1) overweight and obesity are more likely to be associated with lower self-reported school performance; (2) overweight and obese students are more likely to enrol in a vocational high school as opposed to a general high school; (3) the association between obesity and poorer self-reported school performance is mediated through body image stress and health status. We found that excess weight was negatively associated with self-reported school performance among middle and general high school students, and that obese students had a higher probability of being enrolled in a vocational over a general high school. We did not find strong evidence on the mediating role of body image stress and health status.

Beyond signaling and human capital: Education and the revelation of ability

We provide evidence that college graduation plays a direct role in revealing ability to the labor market. Using the NLSY79, our results suggest that ability is observed nearly perfectly for college graduates, but is revealed to the labor market more gradually for high school graduates. Consequently, from the beginning of their careers, college graduates are paid in accordance with their own ability, while the wages of high school graduates are initially unrelated to their own ability. This view of ability revelation in the labor market has considerable power in explaining racial differences in wages, education, and returns to ability.