Human dimensions of bycatch reduction technology: Current assumptions and directions for future research

Bycatch reduction technology (BRT) modifies fishing gear to increase selectivity and avoid capture of non-target species, or to facilitate their non-lethal release. As a solution to fisheries-related mortality of non-target species, BRT is an attractive option; effectively implemented, BRT presents a technical 'fix' that can reduce pressure for politically contentious and economically detrimental interventions, such as fisheries closures. While a number of factors might contribute to effective implementation, our review of BRT literature finds that research has focused on technical design and experimental performance of individual technologies. In contrast, and with a few notable exceptions, research on the human and institutional context of BRT, and more specifically on how fishers respond to BRT, is limited. This is not to say that fisher attitudes are ignored or overlooked, but that incentives for fisher uptake of BRT are usually assumed rather than assessed or demonstrated. Three assumptions about fisher incentives dominate: (1) economic incentives will generate acceptance of BRT; (2) enforcement will generate compliance with BRT; and (3) 'participation' by fishers will increase acceptance and compliance, and overall support for BRT. In this paper, we explore evidence for and against these assumptions and situate our analysis in the wider social science literature on fisheries. Our goal is to highlight the need and suggest focal areas for further research. © Inter-Research 2008.

Impact of economic, regulatory, and patent policies on innovation in cancer chemoprevention.

Chemoprevention agents are an emerging new scientific area that holds out the promise of delaying or avoiding a number of common cancers. These new agents face significant scientific, regulatory, and economic barriers, however, which have limited investment in their research and development (R&D). These barriers include above-average clinical trial scales, lengthy time frames between discovery and Food and Drug Administration approval, liability risks (because they are given to healthy individuals), and a growing funding gap for early-stage candidates. The longer time frames and risks associated with chemoprevention also cause exclusivity time on core patents to be limited or subject to significant uncertainties. We conclude that chemoprevention uniquely challenges the structure of incentives embodied in the economic, regulatory, and patent policies for the biopharmaceutical industry. Many of these policy issues are illustrated by the recently Food and Drug Administration-approved preventive agents Gardasil and raloxifene. Our recommendations to increase R&D investment in chemoprevention agents include (a) increased data exclusivity times on new biological and chemical drugs to compensate for longer gestation periods and increasing R&D costs; chemoprevention is at the far end of the distribution in this regard; (b) policies such as early-stage research grants and clinical development tax credits targeted specifically to chemoprevention agents (these are policies that have been very successful in increasing R&D investment for orphan drugs); and (c) a no-fault liability insurance program like that currently in place for children's vaccines.

Economic return of clinical trials performed under the pediatric exclusivity program.

CONTEXT: In 1997, Congress authorized the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to grant 6-month extensions of marketing rights through the Pediatric Exclusivity Program if industry sponsors complete FDA-requested pediatric trials. The program has been praised for creating incentives for studies in children and has been criticized as a "windfall" to the innovator drug industry. This critique has been a substantial part of congressional debate on the program, which is due to expire in 2007. OBJECTIVE: To quantify the economic return to industry for completing pediatric exclusivity trials. DESIGN AND SETTING: A cohort study of programs conducted for pediatric exclusivity. Nine drugs that were granted pediatric exclusivity were selected. From the final study reports submitted to the FDA (2002-2004), key elements of the clinical trial design and study operations were obtained, and the cost of performing each study was estimated and converted into estimates of after-tax cash outflows. Three-year market sales were obtained and converted into estimates of after-tax cash inflows based on 6 months of additional market protection. Net economic return (cash inflows minus outflows) and net return-to-costs ratio (net economic return divided by cash outflows) for each product were then calculated. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Net economic return and net return-to-cost ratio. RESULTS: The indications studied reflect a broad representation of the program: asthma, tumors, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, hypertension, depression/generalized anxiety disorder, diabetes mellitus, gastroesophageal reflux, bacterial infection, and bone mineralization. The distribution of net economic return for 6 months of exclusivity varied substantially among products (net economic return ranged from -$8.9 million to $507.9 million and net return-to-cost ratio ranged from -0.68 to 73.63). CONCLUSIONS: The economic return for pediatric exclusivity is variable. As an incentive to complete much-needed clinical trials in children, pediatric exclusivity can generate lucrative returns or produce more modest returns on investment.

Using Behavioral Insights For a Better Understanding of Economic Decisions (Regarding Savings, Inequality and Dishonesty)

This dissertation consists of three essays on behavioral economics, with a general aim of enriching our understanding of economic decisions using behavioral insights and experimental methodology. Each essay takes on one particular topic with this general aim.

The first chapter studies savings behavior of the poor. In this project, partnering with a savings product provider in Kenya, we tested the extent to which behavioral interventions and financial incentives can increase the saving rate of individuals with low and irregular income. Our experiment lasted for six months and included a total of twelve conditions. The control condition received weekly reminders and balance reporting via text messages. The treatment conditions received in addition one of the following interventions: (1) reminder text messages framed as if they came from the participant’s kid (2) a golden colored coin with numbers for each week of the trial, on which participants were asked to keep track of their weekly deposits (3) a match of weekly savings: The match was either 10% or 20% up to a certain amount per week. The match was either deposited at the end of each week or the highest possible match was deposited at the start of each week and was adjusted at the end. Among these interventions, by far the most effective was the coin: Those in the coin condition saved on average the highest amount and more than twice as those in the control condition. We hypothesize that being a tangible track-keeping object; the coin made subjects remember to save more often. Our results support the line of literature suggesting that saving decisions involve psychological aspects and that policy makers and product designers should take these influences into account.

The second chapter is related to views towards inequality. In this project, we investigate how the perceived fairness of income distributions depends on the beliefs about the process that generated the inequality. Specifically, we examine how two crucial features of this process affect fairness views: (1) Procedural justice - equal treatment of all, (2) Agency - one's ability to determine his/her income. We do this in a lab experiment by varying the equality of opportunity (procedural justice), and one's ability to make choices, which consequently influence subjects’ ability to influence their income (agency). We then elicit ex-post redistribution decisions of the earnings as a function of these two elements. Our results suggest both agency and procedural justice matter for fairness. Our main findings can be summarized as follows: (1) Highlighting the importance of agency, we find that inequality resulting from risk is considered to be fair only when risk is chosen freely; (2) Highlighting the importance of procedural justice, we find that introducing inequality of opportunity significantly increases redistribution, however the share of subjects redistributing none remain close to the share of subjects redistributing fully revealing an underlying heterogeneity in the population about how fairness views should account for inequality of opportunity.

The third chapter is on morality. In this project, we study whether religious rituals act as an internal reminder for basic moral principles and thus affect moral judgments. To this end, we conducted two survey experiments in Turkey and Israel to specifically test the effect of Ramadan and Yom Kippur. The results from the Turkish sample how that Ramadan has a significant effect on moral judgments to some extent for those who report to believe in God. Those who believe in God judged the moral acceptability of ten out of sixty one actions significantly differently in Ramadan, whereas those who reported not to believe in God significantly changed their judgments only for one action in Ramadan. Our results extends the hypothesis established by lab experiments that religious reminders have a significant effect on morality, by testing it in the field in the natural environment of religious rituals.

This thesis is part of a broader collaborative research agenda with both colleagues and advisors. The programming, analyses, and writing, as well as any errors in this work, are my own.

Essays on the Role of Government Incentives in the Private Provision of Social Goods

The economic rationale for public intervention into private markets through price mechanisms is twofold: to correct market failures and to redistribute resources. Financial incentives are one such price mechanism. In this dissertation, I specifically address the role of financial incentives in providing social goods in two separate contexts: a redistributive policy that enables low income working families to access affordable childcare in the US and an experimental pay-for-performance intervention to improve population health outcomes in rural India. In the first two papers, I investigate the effects of government incentives for providing grandchild care on grandmothers’ short- and long-term outcomes. In the third paper, coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato, and Marcos Vera-Hernandez, we use an experimental framework to consider the the effects of financial incentives in improving maternal and child health outcomes in the Indian state of Karnataka.

Grandmothers provide a significant amount of childcare in the US, but little is known about how this informal, and often uncompensated, time transfer impacts their economic and health outcomes. The first two chapters of this dissertation address the impact of federally funded, state-level means-tested programs that compensate grandparent-provided childcare on the retirement security of older women, an economically vulnerable group of considerable policy interest. I use the variation in the availability and generosity of childcare subsidies to model the effect of government payments for grandchild care on grandmothers’ time use, income, earnings, interfamily transfers, and health outcomes. After establishing that more generous government payments induce grandmothers to provide more hours of childcare, I find that grandmothers adjust their behavior by reducing their formal labor supply and earnings. Grandmothers make up for lost earnings by claiming Social Security earlier, increasing their reliance on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and reducing financial transfers to their children. While the policy does not appear to negatively impact grandmothers’ immediate economic well-being, there are significant costs to the state, in terms of both up-front costs for care payments and long-term costs as a result of grandmothers’ increased reliance on social insurance.

The final paper, The Role of Non-Cognitive Traits in Response to Financial Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial of Obstetrics Care Providers in India, is coauthored with Manoj Mohanan, Grant Miller, Katherine Donato and Marcos Vera-Hernandez. We report the results from “Improving Maternal and Child Health in India: Evaluating Demand and Supply Side Strategies” (IMACHINE), a randomized controlled experiment designed to test the effectiveness of supply-side incentives for private obstetrics care providers in rural Karnataka, India. In particular, the experimental design compares two different types of incentives: (1) those based on the quality of inputs providers offer their patients (inputs contracts) and (2) those based on the reduction of incidence of four adverse maternal and neonatal health outcomes (outcomes contracts). Along with studying the relative effectiveness of the different financial incentives, we also investigate the role of provider characteristics, preferences, expectations and non-cognitive traits in mitigating the effects of incentive contracts.

We find that both contract types input incentive contracts reduce rates of post-partum hemorrhage, the leading cause of maternal mortality in India by about 20%. We also find some evidence of multitasking as output incentive contract providers reduce the level of postnatal newborn care received by their patients. We find that patient health improvements in response to both contract types are concentrated among higher trained providers. We find improvements in patient care to be concentrated among the lower trained providers. Contrary to our expectations, we also find improvements in patient health to be concentrated among the most risk averse providers, while more patient providers respond relatively little to the incentives, and these difference are most evident in the outputs contract arm. The results are opposite for patient care outcomes; risk averse providers have significantly lower rates of patient care and more patient providers provide higher quality care in response to the outputs contract. We find evidence that overconfidence among providers about their expectations about possible improvements reduces the effectiveness of both types of incentive contracts for improving both patient outcomes and patient care. Finally, we find no heterogeneous response based on non-cognitive traits.

Public goods in networks

This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find, first, that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision. In every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked, collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The Islamic commercial crisis: Institutional roots of economic underdevelopment in the Middle East

During the second millennium, the Middle East's commerce with Western Europe fell increasingly under European domination. Two factors played critical roles. First, the Islamic inheritance system, by raising the costs of dissolving a partnership following a partner's death, kept Middle Eastern commercial enterprises small and ephemeral. Second, certain European inheritance systems facilitated large and durable partnerships by reducing the likelihood of premature dissolution. The upshot is that European enterprises grew larger than those of the Islamic world. Moreover, while ever larger enterprises propelled further organizational transformations in Europe, persistently small enterprises inhibited economic modernization in the Middle East.

Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences-ties-in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school-single tiebreaking-in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21).

Coevolution of capitalism and political representation: The choice of electoral systems

Protocorporatist West European countries in which economic interests were collectively organized adopted PR in the first quarter of the twentieth century, whereas liberal countries in which economic interests were not collectively organized did not. Political parties, as Marcus Kreuzer points out, choose electoral systems. So how do economic interests translate into party political incentives to adopt electoral reform? We argue that parties in protocorporatist countries were representative of and closely linked to economic interests. As electoral competition in single member districts increased sharply up to World War I, great difficulties resulted for the representative parties whose leaders were seen as interest committed. They could not credibly compete for votes outside their interest without leadership changes or reductions in interest influence. Proportional representation offered an obvious solution, allowing parties to target their own voters and their organized interest to continue effective influence in the legislature. In each respect, the opposite was true of liberal countries. Data on party preferences strongly confirm this model. (Kreuzer's historical criticisms are largely incorrect, as shown in detail in the online supplementary Appendix.). © 2010 American Political Science Association.

Socio-economic status and malaria-related outcomes in Mvomero District, Tanzania.

While policies often target malaria prevention and treatment - proximal causes of malaria and related health outcomes - too little attention has been given to the role of household- and individual-level socio-economic status (SES) as a fundamental cause of disease risk in developing countries. This paper presents a conceptual model outlining ways in which SES may influence malaria-related outcomes. Building on this conceptual model, we use household data from rural Mvomero, Tanzania, to examine empirical relationships among multiple measures of household and individual SES and demographics, on the one hand, and malaria prevention, illness, and diagnosis and treatment behaviours, on the other. We find that access to prevention and treatment is significantly associated with indicators of households' wealth; education-based disparities do not emerge in this context. Meanwhile, reported malaria illness shows a stronger association with demographic variables than with SES (controlling for prevention). Greater understanding of the mechanisms through which SES and malaria policies interact to influence disease risk can help to reduce health disparities and reduce the malaria burden in an equitable manner.

Physical and economic potential of geological CO2 storage in saline aquifers.

Carbon sequestration in sandstone saline reservoirs holds great potential for mitigating climate change, but its storage potential and cost per ton of avoided CO2 emissions are uncertain. We develop a general model to determine the maximum theoretical constraints on both storage potential and injection rate and use it to characterize the economic viability of geosequestration in sandstone saline aquifers. When applied to a representative set of aquifer characteristics, the model yields results that compare favorably with pilot projects currently underway. Over a range of reservoir properties, maximum effective storage peaks at an optimal depth of 1600 m, at which point 0.18-0.31 metric tons can be stored per cubic meter of bulk volume of reservoir. Maximum modeled injection rates predict minima for storage costs in a typical basin in the range of $2-7/ ton CO2 (2005 U.S.$) depending on depth and basin characteristics in our base-case scenario. Because the properties of natural reservoirs in the United States vary substantially, storage costs could in some cases be lower or higher by orders of magnitude. We conclude that available geosequestration capacity exhibits a wide range of technological and economic attractiveness. Like traditional projects in the extractive industries, geosequestration capacity should be exploited starting with the low-cost storage options first then moving gradually up the supply curve.

Evolving brand-name and generic drug competition may warrant a revision of the Hatch-Waxman Act.

The evolution of pharmaceutical competition since Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 raises questions about whether the act's intended balance of incentives for cost savings and continued innovation has been achieved. Generic drug usage and challenges to brand-name drugs' patents have increased markedly, resulting in greatly increased cost savings but also potentially reduced incentives for innovators. Congress should review whether Hatch-Waxman is achieving its intended purpose of balancing incentives for generics and innovation. It also should consider whether the law should be amended so that some of its provisions are brought more in line with recently enacted legislation governing approval of so-called biosimilars, or the corollary for biologics of generic competition for small-molecule drugs.