Detection of amino-terminal extracellular domain of somatostatin receptor 2 by specific monoclonal antibodies and quantification of receptor density in medulloblastoma.

Somatostatin receptor 2 (SSTR2) is expressed by most medulloblastomas (MEDs). We isolated monoclonal antibodies (MAbs) to the 12-mer (33)QTEPYYDLTSNA(44), which resides in the extracellular domain of the SSTR2 amino terminus, screened the peptide-bound MAbs by fluorescence microassay on D341 and D283 MED cells, and demonstrated homogeneous cell-surface binding, indicating that all cells expressed cell surface-detectable epitopes. Five radiolabeled MAbs were tested for immunoreactive fraction (IRF), affinity (KA) (Scatchard analysis vs. D341 MED cells), and internalization by MED cells. One IgG(3) MAb exhibited a 50-100% IRF, but low KA. Four IgG(2a) MAbs had 46-94% IRFs and modest KAs versus intact cells (0.21-1.2 x 10(8) M(-1)). Following binding of radiolabeled MAbs to D341 MED at 4 degrees C, no significant internalization was observed, which is consistent with results obtained in the absence of ligand. However, all MAbs exhibited long-term association with the cells; binding at 37 degrees C after 2 h was 65-66%, and after 24 h, 52-64%. In tests with MAbs C10 and H5, the number of cell surface receptors per cell, estimated by Scatchard and quantitative FACS analyses, was 3.9 x 10(4) for the "glial" phenotype DAOY MED cell line and 0.6-8.8 x 10(5) for four neuronal phenotype MED cell lines. Our results indicate a potential immunotherapeutic application for these MAbs.

Coevolution of capitalism and political representation: The choice of electoral systems

Protocorporatist West European countries in which economic interests were collectively organized adopted PR in the first quarter of the twentieth century, whereas liberal countries in which economic interests were not collectively organized did not. Political parties, as Marcus Kreuzer points out, choose electoral systems. So how do economic interests translate into party political incentives to adopt electoral reform? We argue that parties in protocorporatist countries were representative of and closely linked to economic interests. As electoral competition in single member districts increased sharply up to World War I, great difficulties resulted for the representative parties whose leaders were seen as interest committed. They could not credibly compete for votes outside their interest without leadership changes or reductions in interest influence. Proportional representation offered an obvious solution, allowing parties to target their own voters and their organized interest to continue effective influence in the legislature. In each respect, the opposite was true of liberal countries. Data on party preferences strongly confirm this model. (Kreuzer's historical criticisms are largely incorrect, as shown in detail in the online supplementary Appendix.). © 2010 American Political Science Association.

The price of innovation: new estimates of drug development costs.

The research and development costs of 68 randomly selected new drugs were obtained from a survey of 10 pharmaceutical firms. These data were used to estimate the average pre-tax cost of new drug development. The costs of compounds abandoned during testing were linked to the costs of compounds that obtained marketing approval. The estimated average out-of-pocket cost per new drug is 403 million US dollars (2000 dollars). Capitalizing out-of-pocket costs to the point of marketing approval at a real discount rate of 11% yields a total pre-approval cost estimate of 802 million US dollars (2000 dollars). When compared to the results of an earlier study with a similar methodology, total capitalized costs were shown to have increased at an annual rate of 7.4% above general price inflation.