ENGINEERING DIGITAL SHARING PLATFORM TO CREATE SOCIAL CONTAGION: EVIDENCE FROM LARGE SCALE RANDOMIZED FIELD EXPERIMENTS

Peer-to-peer information sharing has fundamentally changed customer decision-making process. Recent developments in information technologies have enabled digital sharing platforms to influence various granular aspects of the information sharing process. Despite the growing importance of digital information sharing, little research has examined the optimal design choices for a platform seeking to maximize returns from information sharing. My dissertation seeks to fill this gap. Specifically, I study novel interventions that can be implemented by the platform at different stages of the information sharing. In collaboration with a leading for-profit platform and a non-profit platform, I conduct three large-scale field experiments to causally identify the impact of these interventions on customers’ sharing behaviors as well as the sharing outcomes. The first essay examines whether and how a firm can enhance social contagion by simply varying the message shared by customers with their friends. Using a large randomized field experiment, I find that i) adding only information about the sender’s purchase status increases the likelihood of recipients’ purchase; ii) adding only information about referral reward increases recipients’ follow-up referrals; and iii) adding information about both the sender’s purchase as well as the referral rewards increases neither the likelihood of purchase nor follow-up referrals. I then discuss the underlying mechanisms. The second essay studies whether and how a firm can design unconditional incentive to engage customers who already reveal willingness to share. I conduct a field experiment to examine the impact of incentive design on sender’s purchase as well as further referral behavior. I find evidence that incentive structure has a significant, but interestingly opposing, impact on both outcomes. The results also provide insights about senders’ motives in sharing. The third essay examines whether and how a non-profit platform can use mobile messaging to leverage recipients’ social ties to encourage blood donation. I design a large field experiment to causally identify the impact of different types of information and incentives on donor’s self-donation and group donation behavior. My results show that non-profits can stimulate group effect and increase blood donation, but only with group reward. Such group reward works by motivating a different donor population. In summary, the findings from the three studies will offer valuable insights for platforms and social enterprises on how to engineer digital platforms to create social contagion. The rich data from randomized experiments and complementary sources (archive and survey) also allows me to test the underlying mechanism at work. In this way, my dissertation provides both managerial implication and theoretical contribution to the phenomenon of peer-to-peer information sharing.

ESSAYS IN ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

This dissertation studies technological change in the context of energy and environmental economics. Technology plays a key role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector. Chapter 1 estimates a structural model of the car industry that allows for endogenous product characteristics to investigate how gasoline taxes, R&D subsidies and competition affect fuel efficiency and vehicle prices in the medium-run, both through car-makers' decisions to adopt technologies and through their investments in knowledge capital. I use technology adoption and automotive patents data for 1986-2006 to estimate this model. I show that 92% of fuel efficiency improvements between 1986 and 2006 were driven by technology adoption, while the role of knowledge capital is largely to reduce the marginal production costs of fuel-efficient cars. A counterfactual predicts that an additional $1/gallon gasoline tax in 2006 would have increased the technology adoption rate, and raised average fuel efficiency by 0.47 miles/gallon, twice the annual fuel efficiency improvement in 2003-2006. An R&D subsidy that would reduce the marginal cost of knowledge capital by 25% in 2006 would have raised investment in knowledge capital. This subsidy would have raised fuel efficiency only by 0.06 miles/gallon in 2006, but would have increased variable profits by $2.3 billion over all firms that year. Passenger vehicle fuel economy standards in the United States will require substantial improvements in new vehicle fuel economy over the next decade. Economic theory suggests that vehicle manufacturers adopt greater fuel-saving technologies for vehicles with larger market size. Chapter 2 documents a strong connection between market size, measured by sales, and technology adoption. Using variation consumer demographics and purchasing pattern to account for the endogeneity of market size, we find that a 10 percent increase in market size raises vehicle fuel efficiency by 0.3 percent, as compared to a mean improvement of 1.4 percent per year over 1997-2013. Historically, fuel price and demographic-driven market size changes have had large effects on technology adoption. Furthermore, fuel taxes would induce firms to adopt fuel-saving technologies on their most efficient cars, thereby polarizing the fuel efficiency distribution of the new vehicle fleet.

Essays in Market Design

In this dissertation, I study three problems in market design: the allocation of resources to schools using deferred acceptance algorithms, the demand reduction of employees on centralized labor markets, and the alleviation of traffic congestion. I show how institutional and behavioral considerations specific to each problem can alleviate several practical limitations faced by current solutions. For the case of traffic congestion, I show experimentally that the proposed solution is effective. In Chapter 1, I investigate how school districts could assign resources to schools when it is desirable to provide stable assignments. An assignment is stable if there is no student currently assigned to a school that would prefer to be assigned to a different school that would admit him if it had the resources. Current assignment algorithms assume resources are fixed. I show how simple modifications to these algorithms produce stable allocations of resources and students to schools. In Chapter 2, I show how the negotiation of salaries within centralized labor markets using deferred acceptance algorithms eliminates the incentives of the hiring firms to strategically reduce their demand. It is well-known that it is impossible to eliminate these incentives for the hiring firms in markets without negotiation of salaries. Chapter 3 investigates how to achieve an efficient distribution of traffic congestion on a road network. Traffic congestion is the product of an externality: drivers do not consider the cost they impose on other drivers by entering a road. In theory, Pigouvian prices would solve the problem. In practice, however, these prices face two important limitations: i) the information required to calculate these prices is unavailable to policy makers and ii) these prices would effectively be new taxes that would transfer resources from the public to the government. I show how to construct congestion prices that retrieve the required information from the drivers and do not transfer resources to the government. I circumvent the limitations of Pigouvian prices by assuming that individuals make some mistakes when selecting routes and have a tendency towards truth-telling. Both assumptions are very robust observations in experimental economics.

Essays on Matching Markets and Their Equilibria

Matching theory and matching markets are a core component of modern economic theory and market design. This dissertation presents three original contributions to this area. The first essay constructs a matching mechanism in an incomplete information matching market in which the positive assortative match is the unique efficient and unique stable match. The mechanism asks each agent in the matching market to reveal her privately known type. Through its novel payment rule, truthful revelation forms an ex post Nash equilibrium in this setting. This mechanism works in one-, two- and many-sided matching markets, thus offering the first mechanism to unify these matching markets under a single mechanism design framework. The second essay confronts a problem of matching in an environment in which no efficient and incentive compatible matching mechanism exists due to matching externalities. I develop a two-stage matching game in which a contracting stage facilitates subsequent conditionally efficient and incentive compatible Vickrey auction stage. Infinite repetition of this two-stage matching game enforces the contract in every period. This mechanism produces inequitably distributed social improvement: parties to the contract receive all of the gains and then some. The final essay demonstrates the existence of prices which stably and efficiently partition a single set of agents into firms and workers, and match those two sets to each other. This pricing system extends Kelso and Crawford's general equilibrium results in a labor market matching model and links one- and two-sided matching markets as well.

Trade Shocks and Local Labor Markets' Linkages: Theory and Evidence

In the past few years, there has been a concern among economists and policy makers that increased openness to international trade affects some regions in a country more than others. Recent research has found that local labor markets more exposed to import competition through their initial employment composition experience worse outcomes in several dimensions such as, employment, wages, and poverty. Although there is evidence that regions within a country exhibit variation in the intensity with which they trade with each other and with other countries, trade linkages have been ignored in empirical analyses of the regional effects of trade, which focus on differences in employment composition. In this dissertation, I investigate how local labor markets' trade linkages shape the response of wages to international trade shocks. In the second chapter, I lay out a standard multi-sector general equilibrium model of trade, where domestic regions trade with each other and with the rest of the world. Using this benchmark, I decompose a region's wage change resulting from a national import cost shock into a direct effect on prices, holding other endogenous variables constant, and a series of general equilibrium effects. I argue the direct effect provides a natural measure of exposure to import competition within the model since it summarizes the effect of the shock on a region's wage as a function of initial conditions given by its trade linkages. I call my proposed measure linkage exposure while I refer to the measures used in previous studies as employment exposure. My theoretical analysis also shows that the assumptions previous studies make on trade linkages are not consistent with the standard trade model. In the third chapter, I calibrate the model to the Brazilian economy in 1991--at the beginning of a period of trade liberalization--to perform a series of experiments. In each of them, I reduce the Brazilian import cost by 1 percent in a single sector and I calculate how much of the cross-regional variation in counterfactual wage changes is explained by exposure measures. Over this set of experiments, employment exposure explains, for the median sector, 2 percent of the variation in counterfactual wage changes while linkage exposure explains 44 percent. In addition, I propose an estimation strategy that incorporates trade linkages in the analysis of the effects of trade on observed wages. In the model, changes in wages are completely determined by changes in market access, an endogenous variable that summarizes the real demand faced by a region. I show that a linkage measure of exposure is a valid instrument for changes in market access within Brazil. By using observed wage changes in Brazil between 1991-2000, my estimates imply that a region at the 25th percentile of the change in domestic market access induced by trade liberalization, experiences a 0.6 log points larger wage decline (or smaller wage increase) than a region at the 75th percentile. The estimates from a regression of wages changes on exposure imply that a region at the 25th percentile of exposure experiences a 3 log points larger wage decline (or smaller wage increase) than a region at the 75th percentile. I conclude that estimates based on exposure overstate the negative impact of trade liberalization on wages in Brazil. In the fourth chapter, I extend the standard model to allow for two types of workers according to their education levels: skilled and unskilled. I show that there is substantial variation across Brazilian regions in the skill premium. I use the exogenous variation provided by tariff changes to estimate the impact of market access on the skill premium. I find that decreased domestic market access resulting from trade liberalization resulted in a higher skill premium. I propose a mechanism to explain this result: that the manufacturing sector is relatively more intensive in unskilled labor and I show empirical evidence that supports this hypothesis.