Remembering Liberal Feminism In Radical Ways: Locating Conservative Strategies In The Narratives Of Dr. Christina Hoff Sommers, Tammy Bruce, And Dr. Laura Schlessinger

This dissertation identifies and challenges post-feminist narratives that remember the second wave or 1960s and 1970s liberal feminism as a radical form of activism. The narratives of three prominent post-feminist authors: Dr. Christina Hoff Sommers, Tammy Bruce and Dr. Laura Schlessinger are used as examples of how identification works as a rhetorical device that motivates individual actors to join in a struggle against liberal and radical feminist ideologies. I argue that each author draws on classically liberal and politically conservative virtues to define a "true" feminism that is at odds with alternative feminist commitments. I demonstrate how these authors create a subject position of a "true feminist" that is reminiscent of the classically liberal suffragist. In Burkean terms, each author constitutes the suffragist as a friend and juxtaposes her with the enemy--modern liberal and radical feminists. I articulate the consequences of such dialectical portrayals of feminist activism and further suggest that these authors' visions of feminism reinforce patriarchal practices, urging women to assimilate into a classically liberal society at the cost of social justice. In opposition to their memories of feminism, I offer a radical democratic approach of remembering feminism that is less concerned with the definition of feminism or feminist than it is with holistically addressing oppression and what oppression means to subjugated populations.

The Future Direction of Delaware Law (Including a Brief Exegesis on Fee Shifting Bylaws)

Delaware sets the governance standards for most public companies. The ability to attract corporations could not be explained solely by the existence of a favorable statutory regime. Delaware was not invariably the first or the only state to implement management friendly provisions. Given the interpretive gaps in the statute and the critical importance of the common law in the governance process, courts played an outsized role in setting legal standards. The management friendly nature of the Delaware courts contributed significantly to the state’s attraction to public corporations. A current example of a management friendly trend in the case law had seen the recent decisions setting out the board’s authority to adopt bylaws under Section 109 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), particularly those involving the shifting of fees in litigation against the corporation or its directors. The DGCL allows bylaws that address “the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.” The broad parameters are, however, subject to limits. Bylaws cannot be inconsistent with the certificate of incorporation or “the law.” Law includes the common law. The Delaware courts have used the limitations imposed by “the law” to severely restrict the reach of shareholder inspired bylaws. The courts have not used the same principles to impose similar restraints on bylaws adopted by the board of directors. This can be seen with respect to bylaws that restrict or even eliminate the right of shareholders to bring actions against management and the corporation. In ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund the court approved a fee shifting bylaw that had littl relationship to the internal affairs of the corporation. The decision upheld the bylaw as facially valid.The decision ignored a number of obvious legal infirmities. Among other things, the decision did not adequately address the requirement in Section 109(b) that bylaws be consistent with “the law.” The decision obliquely acknowledged that the provisions would “by their nature, deter litigation” but otherwise made no effort to assess the impact of this deterrence on shareholders causes of action. The provision in fact had the practical effect of restricting, if not eliminating, litigation rights granted by the DGCL and the common law. Perhaps most significantly, however, the bylaws significantly limited common law rights of shareholders to bring actions against the corporation and the board. Given the high dismissal rates for these actions, fee shifting bylaws imposed a meaningful risk of liability on plaintiffs. Moreover, because judgments in derivative suits were paid to the corporation, shareholders serving as plaintiffs confronted the risk of liability without any offsetting direct benefit. By preventing suits in this area, the bylaw effectively insulated the behavior of boards from legal challenge. The ATP decision was poorly reasoned and overstepped acceptable boundaries. The management friendly decision threatened the preeminent role of Delaware in the development of corporate law. The decision raised the specter of federal intervention and the potential for meaningful competition from the states. Because the opinion examined the bylaw in the context of non-stock companies, the reasoning may remain applicable only to those entities and never make the leap to for-profit stock corporations. Nonetheless, the analysis reflects a management friendly approach that does not adequately take into account the impact of the provision on the rights of shareholders.

Comment Letter on Rule 14a-8(I)(10), Securities & Exchange Commission, June 18, 2015

This letter focuses on SEC interpretations of Rule 14a-8(i)(10). The provision allows issuers to exclude shareholder proposals that have been “substantially implemented.” This has traditionally been used to allow for the exclusion of proposals rendered “moot” by the company’s actions. Companies, however, need not implement the shareholder proposal “exactly.” As a result, the staff is often asked to determine whether changes made by the company are substantial. The comment letter discusses positions taken by the staff where the company adopts a proposal asking that shareholders with a specified percentage of shares have the right to call a special meeting but limits eligible shares to those held for a specified period of time.

Comment on Rule 14a-8(i)(9), Securities and Exchange Commission, June 30, 2015

The Securities and Exchange Commission has been analyzing its interpretation under Subsection (i)(9) of Rule 14a-8. This provision allows for the exclusion of shareholder proposals that conflict with those submitted by management. The staff has been examining its interpretation since instructed to do so by the chair of the SEC following a no action appeal in a case involving Whole Foods. A number of letters and memos submitted in connection with the review have analyzed the issue. At least one asserted that any change in interpretation required the Commission to go through the process of notice and comment. This letter asserts that notice and comment is not required, relying extensively on Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association.

High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment

Lying has a complicated relationship with the First Amendment. It is beyond question that some lies – such as perjury or pretending to be a police officer – are not covered by the First Amendment. But it is equally clear that some lies, even intentionally lying about military honors, are entitled to First Amendment protection. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). To date, however, both Supreme Court doctrine and academic commentary has taken for granted that any constitutional protection for lies is purely prophylactic – it protects the liar to avoid chilling truthful speech. This Article is the first to argue, contrary to conventional wisdom, that certain types of lies paradoxically advance the values underlying the First Amendment. Our framework is descriptively novel and doctrinally important insofar as we provide the first comprehensive post-Alvarez look at the wide range of lies that may raise First Amendment issues. Because there was no majority opinion in Alvarez, there is uncertainty about which standard of constitutional scrutiny should apply to protected lies, an issue we examine at length. Moreover, our normative claim is straightforward: when a lie has intrinsic or instrumental value it should be treated differently from other types of lies and warrant the greatest constitutional protection. Specifically, we argue that investigative deceptions – lies used to secure truthful factual information about matters of public concern – deserve the utmost constitutional protection because they advance the underling purposes of free speech: they enhance political discourse, help reveal the truth, and promote individual autonomy. A prototypical investigative deception is the sort of misrepresentation required in order for an undercover journalist, investigator, or activist to gain access to information or images of great political significance that would not be available if the investigator disclosed her reporting or political objectives. Tactical use of such lies have a long history in American journalism and activism, from Upton Sinclair to his modern day heirs. Using the proliferation of anti-whistleblower statutes like Ag Gag laws as an illustrative example, we argue that investigative deceptions are a category of high value lies that ought to receive rigorous protection under the First Amendment. At the same time, we recognize that not all lies are alike and that in other areas, the government regulation of lies serves legitimate interests. We therefore conclude the Article by drawing some limiting principles to our theory.

Glue Technology: A Blueprint for Cultural Integration

Despite the gargantuan stakes that mergers and acquisitions represent, global companies' success rate at integrating organizations has been dismal, incurring billions of dollars in lost shareholder value. International human resources' handling of the cultural integration process is the principal differentiator between success and failure. This Capstone project proposes a process for developing cultural integration mechanisms, known as glue technology, and provides a step-by-step process map for execution through four phases. During planning, the need for glue technology is defined. Through analysis, rewards systems are assessed, and a strategy is chosen. In implementation planning, unanimous executive commitment must be secured. Last is measurement based on the integration plan's objectives. Enabling mechanisms such as removing negative influencers, speed, and communication are discussed.