18 resultados para Internet games
Resumo:
Recent empirical studies have shown that Internet topologies exhibit power laws of the form for the following relationships: (P1) outdegree of node (domain or router) versus rank; (P2) number of nodes versus outdegree; (P3) number of node pairs y = x^α within a neighborhood versus neighborhood size (in hops); and (P4) eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix versus rank. However, causes for the appearance of such power laws have not been convincingly given. In this paper, we examine four factors in the formation of Internet topologies. These factors are (F1) preferential connectivity of a new node to existing nodes; (F2) incremental growth of the network; (F3) distribution of nodes in space; and (F4) locality of edge connections. In synthetically generated network topologies, we study the relevance of each factor in causing the aforementioned power laws as well as other properties, namely diameter, average path length and clustering coefficient. Different kinds of network topologies are generated: (T1) topologies generated using our parametrized generator, we call BRITE; (T2) random topologies generated using the well-known Waxman model; (T3) Transit-Stub topologies generated using GT-ITM tool; and (T4) regular grid topologies. We observe that some generated topologies may not obey power laws P1 and P2. Thus, the existence of these power laws can be used to validate the accuracy of a given tool in generating representative Internet topologies. Power laws P3 and P4 were observed in nearly all considered topologies, but different topologies showed different values of the power exponent α. Thus, while the presence of power laws P3 and P4 do not give strong evidence for the representativeness of a generated topology, the value of α in P3 and P4 can be used as a litmus test for the representativeness of a generated topology. We also find that factors F1 and F2 are the key contributors in our study which provide the resemblance of our generated topologies to that of the Internet.
Resumo:
In this position paper, we review basic control strategies that machines acting as "traffic controllers" could deploy in order to improve the management of Internet services. Such traffic controllers are likely to spur the widespread emergence of advanced applications, which have (so far) been hindered by the inability of the networking infrastructure to deliver on the promise of Quality-of-Service (QoS).
Resumo:
In a typical overlay network for routing or content sharing, each node must select a fixed number of immediate overlay neighbors for routing traffic or content queries. A selfish node entering such a network would select neighbors so as to minimize the weighted sum of expected access costs to all its destinations. Previous work on selfish neighbor selection has built intuition with simple models where edges are undirected, access costs are modeled by hop-counts, and nodes have potentially unbounded degrees. However, in practice, important constraints not captured by these models lead to richer games with substantively and fundamentally different outcomes. Our work models neighbor selection as a game involving directed links, constraints on the number of allowed neighbors, and costs reflecting both network latency and node preference. We express a node's "best response" wiring strategy as a k-median problem on asymmetric distance, and use this formulation to obtain pure Nash equilibria. We experimentally examine the properties of such stable wirings on synthetic topologies, as well as on real topologies and maps constructed from PlanetLab and AS-level Internet measurements. Our results indicate that selfish nodes can reap substantial performance benefits when connecting to overlay networks composed of non-selfish nodes. On the other hand, in overlays that are dominated by selfish nodes, the resulting stable wirings are optimized to such great extent that even non-selfish newcomers can extract near-optimal performance through naive wiring strategies.