Rola Francji i Niemiec w procesie integracji europejskiej w latach 1992-2007

Francja i Niemcy przez stulecia walczyły o zdobycie władzy i przejęcie wpływów na kontynencie europejskim i traktowały siebie nawzajem jako największe zagrożenie. Jednak tragiczna pierwsza połowa XX wieku przyniosła z jednej strony pragnienie zapewnienia, iż okropności wojny już nigdy się nie powtórzą, a z drugiej strony poczucie, że nieodzowna jest zmiana dwustronnych stosunków panujących między Berlinem a Paryżem. Konieczność stworzenia przestrzeni wolności i współpracy doprowadziła niegdysiejszych wrogów do stworzenia idei integracji najważniejszych części gospodarki. Pomysł zjednoczenia krajów Europy Zachodniej przekształcił się w kolejnych latach w symbol zaangażowania francusko-niemieckiego. Dwie republiki stały się rdzeniem europejskiej współpracy i spiritus movens zmian politycznych, ekonomicznych i instytucjonalnych w powojennej Europie. Po upadku komunizmu w 1989 roku ich rola zyskała nowy wymiar w odmiennych warunkach geopolitycznych - od momentu podpisania Traktatu z Maastricht w 1992 roku francusko-niemiecki duet powiększył swe znaczenie i wpływ na politykę nowej Unii Europejskiej. Realizacja zapisów Traktatu z Maastricht i kolejnych dokumentów, w tym Traktatu z Lizbony, koncentracja na kwestiach reform instytucjonalnych, jak również przygotowania do wschodniego rozszerzenia UE mogą być rozpatrywane jedynie w odniesieniu do wspólnych działań prowadzonych przez nadreński tandem. Realizacja trzech filarów integracji: współpracy w wymiarze ekonomicznym i społecznym, wspólnej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa, jak również współpracy policyjnej i sądowej w sprawach karnych, podkreślają znaczenie couple franco-allemand i zwracają uwagę na rolę lidera, jaką Paryż i Berlin odgrywają w dziedzinie integracji.

Samorozwój studenta jako proces i efekt kształcenia

Idea uczenia się przez całe życie jest jedną z istotnych założeń w budowaniu społeczeństwa opartego na wiedzy. Jest również jednym z kluczowych czynników Procesu Bolońskiego. Pragnienie uczenia się przez całe życie ma na celu stworzenie społeczeństwa wiedzy. Jednakże możliwe jest to tylko wówczas, gdy wyzwolimy w jednostkach takie mechanizmy samorozwojowe jak: samopoznanie, samoocena, poczucie własnej skuteczności, samokształcenie. Uwalniają się one oraz dojrzewają jako skutek komunikacji interpersonalnej. Znaczącą rolę w rozwoju wspomnianych mechanizmów odgrywają nauczyciele akademiccy. Niniejszy artykuł zawiera rozważania teoretyczne oraz doniesienia z badań empirycznych.

Filozofia antyczna wobec problemu interpretacji. Rozwój alegorezy od przedsokratyków do Arystotelesa

The present work examines the beginnings of ancient hermeneutics. More specifically, it discusses the connection between the rise of the practice of allegoresis, on the one hand, and the emergence of the first theory of figurative language, on the other. Thus, this book investigates the specific historical and cultural circumstances that enabled the ancient Greeks not only to discover the possibility of allegorical interpretation, but also to treat figurative language as a philosophical problem. By posing difficulties in understanding the enigmatic sense of various esoteric doctrines, poems, oracles and riddles, figurative language created the context for theoretical reflection on the meaning of these “messages”. Hence, ancient interpreters began to ponder over the nature and functions of figurative (“enigmatic”) language as well as over the techniques of its proper use and interpretation. Although the practice of allegorical interpretation was closely linked to the development of the whole of ancient philosophy, the present work covers only the period from the 6th to the 4th century B.C. It concentrates, then, on the philosophical and cultural consequences of allegoresis in the classical age. The main thesis advocated here has it that the ancient Greeks were in-clined to regard allegory as a cognitive problem rather than merely as a stylistic or a literary one. When searching for the hidden meanings of various esoteric doc-trines, poems, oracles and riddles, ancient interpreters of these “messages” assumed allegory to be the only tool suitable for articulating certain matters. In other words, it was their belief that the use of figurative language resulted from the necessity of expressing things that were otherwise inexpressible. The present work has been organized in the following manner. The first part contains historical and philological discussions that provide the point of departure for more philosophical considerations. This part consists of two introductory chapters. Chapter one situates the practice of allegorical interpretation at the borderline of two different traditions: the rhetorical-grammatical and the hermeneutical. In order to clearly differentiate between the two, chapter one distinguishes between allegory and allegoresis, on the one hand, and allegoresis and exegesis, on the other. While pointing to the conventionality (and even arbitrariness) of such distinctions, the chapter argues, nevertheless, for their heuristic usefulness. The remaining part of chapter one focuses on a historical and philological reconstruction of the most important conceptual tools of ancient hermeneutics. Discussing the semantics of such terms as allēgoría, hypónoia, ainigma and symbolon proves important for at least two crucial reasons. Firstly, it reveals the mutual affinity between allegoresis and divination, i.e., practices that are inherently connected with the need to discover the latent meaning of the “message” in question (whether poem or oracle). Secondly, these philological analyses bring to light the specificity of the ancient understanding of such concepts as allegory or symbol. It goes without saying that antiquity employed these terms in a manner quite disparate from modernity. Chapter one concludes with a discussion of ancient views on the cognitive value of figurative (“enigmatic”) language. Chapter two focuses on the role that allegoresis played in the process of transforming mythos into logos. It is suggested here that it was the practice of allegorical interpretation that made it possible to preserve the traditional myths as an important point of reference for the whole of ancient philosophy. Thus, chapter two argues that the existence of a clear opposition between mythos into logos in Preplatonic philosophy is highly questionable in light of the indisputable fact that the Presocratics, Sophists and Cynics were profoundly convinced about the cognitive value of mythos (this conviction was also shared by Plato and Aristotle, but their attitude towards myth was more complex). Consequently, chapter two argues that in Preplatonic philosophy, myth played a function analogous to the concepts discussed in chapter one (i.e., hidden meanings, enigmas and symbols), for in all these cases, ancient interpreters found tools for conveying issues that were otherwise difficult to convey. Chapter two concludes with a classification of various types of allegoresis. Whilst chapters one and two serve as a historical and philological introduction, the second part of this book concentrates on the close relationship between the development of allegoresis, on the one hand, and the flowering of philosophy, on the other. Thus, chapter three discusses the crucial role that allegorical interpretation came to play in Preplatonic philosophy, chapter four deals with Plato’s highly complex and ambivalent attitude to allegoresis, and chapter five has been devoted to Aristotle’s original approach to the practice of allegorical interpretation. It is evident that allegoresis was of paramount importance for the ancient thinkers, irrespective of whether they would value it positively (Preplatonic philosophers and Aristotle) or negatively (Plato). Beginning with the 6th century B.C., the ancient practice of allegorical interpretation is motivated by two distinct interests. On the one hand, the practice of allegorical interpretation reflects the more or less “conservative” attachment to the authority of the poet (whether Homer, Hesiod or Orpheus). The purpose of this apologetic allegoresis is to exonerate poetry from the charges leveled at it by the first philosophers and, though to a lesser degree, historians. Generally, these allegorists seek to save the traditional paideia that builds on the works of the poets. On the other hand, the practice of allegorical interpretation reflects also the more or less “progressive” desire to make original use of the authority of the poet (whether Homer, Hesiod or Orpheus) so as to promote a given philosophical doctrine. The objective of this instrumental allegoresis is to exculpate philosophy from the accusations brought against it by the more conservative circles. Needless to say, these allegorists significantly contribute to the process of the gradual replacing of the mythical view of the world with its more philosophical explanation. The present book suggests that it is the philosophy of Aristotle that should be regarded as a sort of acme in the development of ancient hermeneutics. The reasons for this are twofold. On the one hand, the Stagirite positively values the practice of allegoresis, rehabilitating, thus, the tradition of Preplatonic philosophy against Plato. And, on the other hand, Aristotle initiates the theoretical reflection on figurative (“enigmatic”) language. Hence, in Aristotle we encounter not only the practice of allegoresis, but also the theory of allegory (although the philosopher does not use the term allēgoría). With the situation being as it is, the significance of Aristotle’s work cannot be overestimated. First of all, the Stagirite introduces the concept of metaphor into the then philosophical considerations. From that moment onwards, the phenomenon of figurative language becomes an important philosophical issue. After Aristo-tle, the preponderance of thinkers would feel obliged to specify the rules for the appropriate use of figurative language and the techniques of its correct interpretation. Furthermore, Aristotle ascribes to metaphor (and to various other “excellent” sayings) the function of increasing and enhancing our knowledge. Thus, according to the Stagirite, figurative language is not only an ornamental device, but it can also have a significant explanatory power. Finally, Aristotle observes that figurative expressions cause words to become ambiguous. In this context, the philosopher notices that ambiguity can enrich the language of a poet, but it can also hinder a dialectical discussion. Accordingly, Aristotle is inclined to value polysemy either positively or negatively. Importantly, however, the Stagirite is perfectly aware of the fact that in natural languages ambiguity is unavoidable. This is why Aristotle initiates a syste-matic reflection on the phenomenon of ambiguity and distinguishes its various kinds. In Aristotle, ambiguity is, then, both a problem that needs to be identified and a tool that can help in elucidating intricate philosophical issues. This unique approach to ambiguity and figurative (“enigmatic”) language enabled Aristotle to formulate invaluable intuitions that still await appropriate recognition.