2 resultados para information theory
em Academic Archive On-line (Jönköping University
Resumo:
Background and problem – As a result of financial crises and the realization of a broader stakeholder network, recent decades have seen an increase in stakeholder demand for non- financial information in corporate reporting. This has led to a situation of information overload where separate financial and sustainability reports have developed in length and complexity interdependent of each other. Integrated reporting has been presented as a solution to this problematic situation. The question is whether the corporate world believe this to be the solution and if the development of corporate reporting is heading in this direction. Purpose - This thesis aims to examine and assess to what extent companies listed on the OMX Stockholm 30 (OMXS30), as per 2016-02-28, comply with the Strategic content element of the <IR> Framework and how this disclosure has developed since the framework’s pilot project and official release by using a self-constructed disclosure index based on its specific items. Methodology – The purpose was fulfilled through an analysis of 104 annual reports comprising 26 companies during the period of 2011-2014. The annual reports were assessed using a self-constructed disclosure index based on the <IR> Framework content element Strategy and Resource Allocation, where one point was given for each disclosed item. Analysis and conclusions – The study found that the OMXS30-listed companies to a large extent complies with the strategic content element of the <IR> Framework and that this compliance has seen a steady growth throughout the researched time span. There is still room for improvement however with a total average framework compliance of 84% for 2014. Although many items are being reported on, there are indications that companies generally miss out on the core values of Integrated reporting.
Resumo:
The conceptual domain of agency theory is one of the dominant organisational theory perspectives applied in current family business research (Chrisman et al., 2010). According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), agency costs generally arise due to individuals’ selfinterest and decision making based on rational thinking and oriented toward own preferences. With more people involved in decision making, such as through the separation of ownership and management, agency costs occur due to different preferences and information asymmetries between the owner (principal) and the employed management (agent) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In other words, agents take decisions based on their individual preferences (for example, short term, financial gains) instead of the owners’ preferences (for example, long term, sustainable development).