Critical pedagogy theory and the family business

In contemporary times family business research has been dominated by three theoretical perspectives; principal-agent theory, stewardship theory, and resource-based view theory (Siebels 2012) but at the same time scholars argue that what still needs further attention is how underlying processes and phenomena can be explained (Melin, Nordqvist & Sharma  2014). In order to understand themes such as repression or relations of asymmetry the suggestion in this chapter is to move towards a critical stance of thinking which involves problematizing the obvious issues in family firms (Alvesson & Deetz 2000) and moreover allowing the critical perspective to destabilize assumptions made within earlier research (Freire, 1974). By discussing critical theory in general but foremost the Freirean  (1970, 1974) critical pedagogy specifically, the arguments in the chapter revolves around how critical pedagogy can open up for a more novel view on family business. The purpose is via critical pedagogy discuss family business from a limited situation perspective, and to argue for a Freirean (1970) dialogue as means of developing a critical consciousness for family members in the family business context. The chapter concludes with some recommendations on platforms or common grounds in which dialogue and raising of consciousness can occur in which the concept can open up possibilities for interesting learning transfer and bring multidimensional knowledge into the family firm.

Agency theory and the family business

The conceptual domain of agency theory is one of the dominant organisational theory perspectives applied in current family business research (Chrisman et al., 2010). According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), agency costs generally arise due to individuals’ selfinterest and decision making based on rational thinking and oriented toward own preferences. With more people involved in decision making, such as through the separation of ownership and management, agency costs occur due to different preferences and information asymmetries between the owner (principal) and the employed management (agent) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In other words, agents take decisions based on their individual preferences (for example, short term, financial gains) instead of the owners’ preferences (for example, long term, sustainable development).