Pervasive eHealth services a security and privacy risk awareness survey

The human factor is often recognised as a major aspect of cyber-security research. Risk and situational perception are identified as key factors in the decision making process, often playing a lead role in the adoption of security mechanisms. However, risk awareness and perception have been poorly investigated in the field of eHealth wearables. Whilst end-users often have limited understanding of privacy and security of wearables, assessing the perceived risks and consequences will help shape the usability of future security mechanisms. This paper present a survey of the the risks and situational awareness in eHealth services. An analysis of the lack of security and privacy measures in connected health devices is described with recommendations to circumvent critical situations.

Constructivism, constitutionalism and the EU's area of freedom security and justice post-Lisbon

This essay addresses the fundamental conceptual challenges which face the development of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) in the post-Lisbon Treaty era. It argues that Onuf style constructivism is a valid lens with which to examine the development of the AFSJ to date, involving as it does the development of a shared understanding by practitioners, predominantly law enforcement and prosecution professionals, within the structures provided for them, in order to develop a completely new area of law and practice. While this approach will continue to need to be deployed in the development of further new operational areas, such as cybercrime, a new approach is now required, that of constitutionalism. A variety of forms of constitutionalism are then examined in order to establish their suitability as a mode of analysis for these developments.

New challenges for the EU internal security strategy

In recent years, the EU and its member states have experienced a number of changes, as well as challenges, in the areas of politics, economics, security and law. As these areas are interconnected, changes and challenges to any of them have implications for the others, as well as implications for the populations and institutions of the EU or those coming into contact with its international power and influence. This edited collection focuses primarily on security and law, particularly the EU’s internal security strategy. The EU’s Internal Security Strategy, adopted by the Spanish presidency early in 2010, followed the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, building on previous developments within the EU in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) policy. The focus of the EU Internal Security Strategy is to prevent and combat “serious and organised crime, terrorism and cybercrime, in strengthening the management of our external borders and in building resilience to natural and man-made disasters”. The Internal Security strategy intersects and overlaps with the European Union’s Counter-terrorism strategy, the Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA, and the EU’s Security Strategy. The role of and interaction between these strategies, their supplementing documents, and their implications for crime, victims, the law, political relations, democracy and human rights, form the backdrop against which the chapters in this collection are written. Building on original research by its contributors, this collection comprises work by authors from a wide variety of academic and professional areas and perspectives, as well as different countries, on a variety of areas and issues related to or raised by the EU’s Internal Security Strategy, from intelligence-led policing to human trafficking and port security. This book examines, from a wide variety of disciplinary perspectives including law, geography, politics and practice, both this further refinement of existing internal provisions on cross-border crime, and the increasing external relations of the EU in the AFSJ.

The issue of data protection and data security in the (pre-Lisbon) EU third pillar

The key functional operability in the pre-Lisbon PJCCM pillar of the EU is the exchange of intelligence and information amongst the law enforcement bodies of the EU. The twin issues of data protection and data security within what was the EU’s third pillar legal framework therefore come to the fore. With the Lisbon Treaty reform of the EU, and the increased role of the Commission in PJCCM policy areas, and the integration of the PJCCM provisions with what have traditionally been the pillar I activities of Frontex, the opportunity for streamlining the data protection and data security provisions of the law enforcement bodies of the post-Lisbon EU arises. This is recognised by the Commission in their drafting of an amending regulation for Frontex , when they say that they would prefer “to return to the question of personal data in the context of the overall strategy for information exchange to be presented later this year and also taking into account the reflection to be carried out on how to further develop cooperation between agencies in the justice and home affairs field as requested by the Stockholm programme.” The focus of the literature published on this topic, has for the most part, been on the data protection provisions in Pillar I, EC. While the focus of research has recently sifted to the previously Pillar III PJCCM provisions on data protection, a more focused analysis of the interlocking issues of data protection and data security needs to be made in the context of the law enforcement bodies, particularly with regard to those which were based in the pre-Lisbon third pillar. This paper will make a contribution to that debate, arguing that a review of both the data protection and security provision post-Lisbon is required, not only in order to reinforce individual rights, but also inter-agency operability in combating cross-border EU crime. The EC’s provisions on data protection, as enshrined by Directive 95/46/EC, do not apply to the legal frameworks covering developments within the third pillar of the EU. Even Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, which is supposed to cover data protection provisions within PJCCM expressly states that its provisions do not apply to “Europol, Eurojust, the Schengen Information System (SIS)” or to the Customs Information System (CIS). In addition, the post Treaty of Prüm provisions covering the sharing of DNA profiles, dactyloscopic data and vehicle registration data pursuant to Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, are not to be covered by the provisions of the 2008 Framework Decision. As stated by Hijmans and Scirocco, the regime is “best defined as a patchwork of data protection regimes”, with “no legal framework which is stable and unequivocal, like Directive 95/46/EC in the First pillar”. Data security issues are also key to the sharing of data in organised crime or counterterrorism situations. This article will critically analyse the current legal framework for data protection and security within the third pillar of the EU.

A study on situational awareness security and privacy of wearable health monitoring devices

Situational Awareness provides a user centric approach to security and privacy. The human factor is often recognised as the weakest link in security, therefore situational perception and risk awareness play a leading role in the adoption and implementation of security mechanisms. In this study we assess the understanding of security and privacy of users in possession of wearable devices. The findings demonstrate privacy complacency, as the majority of users trust the application and the wearable device manufacturer. Moreover the survey findings demonstrate a lack of understanding of security and privacy by the sample population. Finally the theoretical implications of the findings are discussed.