Consequences of big data on the individual: Interview

The speed with which data has moved from being scarce, expensive and valuable, thus justifying detailed and careful verification and analysis to a situation where the streams of detailed data are almost too large to handle has caused a series of shifts to occur. Legal systems already have severe problems keeping up with, or even in touch with, the rate at which unexpected outcomes flow from information technology. The capacity to harness massive quantities of existing data has driven Big Data applications until recently. Now the data flows in real time are rising swiftly, become more invasive and offer monitoring potential that is eagerly sought by commerce and government alike. The ambiguities as to who own this often quite remarkably intrusive personal data need to be resolved – and rapidly - but are likely to encounter rising resistance from industrial and commercial bodies who see this data flow as ‘theirs’. There have been many changes in ICT that has led to stresses in the resolution of the conflicts between IP exploiters and their customers, but this one is of a different scale due to the wide potential for individual customisation of pricing, identification and the rising commercial value of integrated streams of diverse personal data. A new reconciliation between the parties involved is needed. New business models, and a shift in the current confusions over who owns what data into alignments that are in better accord with the community expectations. After all they are the customers, and the emergence of information monopolies needs to be balanced by appropriate consumer/subject rights. This will be a difficult discussion, but one that is needed to realise the great benefits to all that are clearly available if these issues can be positively resolved. The customers need to make these data flow contestable in some form. These Big data flows are only going to grow and become ever more instructive. A better balance is necessary, For the first time these changes are directly affecting governance of democracies, as the very effective micro targeting tools deployed in recent elections have shown. Yet the data gathered is not available to the subjects. This is not a survivable social model. The Private Data Commons needs our help. Businesses and governments exploit big data without regard for issues of legality, data quality, disparate data meanings, and process quality. This often results in poor decisions, with individuals bearing the greatest risk. The threats harbored by big data extend far beyond the individual, however, and call for new legal structures, business processes, and concepts such as a Private Data Commons. This Web extra is the audio part of a video in which author Marcus Wigan expands on his article "Big Data's Big Unintended Consequences" and discusses how businesses and governments exploit big data without regard for issues of legality, data quality, disparate data meanings, and process quality. This often results in poor decisions, with individuals bearing the greatest risk. The threats harbored by big data extend far beyond the individual, however, and call for new legal structures, business processes, and concepts such as a Private Data Commons.

An assessment of data leakage in Firefox under different conditions.

Data leakage is a serious issue and can result in the loss of sensitive data, compromising user accounts and details, potentially affecting millions of internet users. This paper contributes to research in online security and reducing personal footprint by evaluating the levels of privacy provided by the Firefox browser. The aim of identifying conditions that would minimize data leakage and maximize data privacy is addressed by assessing and comparing data leakage in the four possible browsing modes: normal and private modes using a browser installed on the host PC or using a portable browser from a connected USB device respectively. To provide a firm foundation for analysis, a series of carefully designed, pre-planned browsing sessions were repeated in each of the various modes of Firefox. This included low RAM environments to determine any effects low RAM may have on browser data leakage. The results show that considerable data leakage may occur within Firefox. In normal mode, all of the browsing information is stored within the Mozilla profile folder in Firefox-specific SQLite databases and sessionstore.js. While passwords were not stored as plain text, other confidential information such as credit card numbers could be recovered from the Form history under certain conditions. There is no difference when using a portable browser in normal mode, except that the Mozilla profile folder is located on the USB device rather than the host's hard disk. By comparison, private browsing reduces data leakage. Our findings confirm that no information is written to the Firefox-related locations on the hard disk or USB device during private browsing, implying that no deletion would be necessary and no remnants of data would be forensically recoverable from unallocated space. However, two aspects of data leakage occurred equally in all four browsing modes. Firstly, all of the browsing history was stored in the live RAM and was therefore accessible while the browser remained open. Secondly, in low RAM situations, the operating system caches out RAM to pagefile.sys on the host's hard disk. Irrespective of the browsing mode used, this may include Firefox history elements which can then remain forensically recoverable for considerable time.