An assessment of data leakage in Firefox under different conditions.
Data(s) |
10/07/2014
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Resumo |
Data leakage is a serious issue and can result in the loss of sensitive data, compromising user accounts and details, potentially affecting millions of internet users. This paper contributes to research in online security and reducing personal footprint by evaluating the levels of privacy provided by the Firefox browser. The aim of identifying conditions that would minimize data leakage and maximize data privacy is addressed by assessing and comparing data leakage in the four possible browsing modes: normal and private modes using a browser installed on the host PC or using a portable browser from a connected USB device respectively. To provide a firm foundation for analysis, a series of carefully designed, pre-planned browsing sessions were repeated in each of the various modes of Firefox. This included low RAM environments to determine any effects low RAM may have on browser data leakage. The results show that considerable data leakage may occur within Firefox. In normal mode, all of the browsing information is stored within the Mozilla profile folder in Firefox-specific SQLite databases and sessionstore.js. While passwords were not stored as plain text, other confidential information such as credit card numbers could be recovered from the Form history under certain conditions. There is no difference when using a portable browser in normal mode, except that the Mozilla profile folder is located on the USB device rather than the host's hard disk. By comparison, private browsing reduces data leakage. Our findings confirm that no information is written to the Firefox-related locations on the hard disk or USB device during private browsing, implying that no deletion would be necessary and no remnants of data would be forensically recoverable from unallocated space. However, two aspects of data leakage occurred equally in all four browsing modes. Firstly, all of the browsing history was stored in the live RAM and was therefore accessible while the browser remained open. Secondly, in low RAM situations, the operating system caches out RAM to pagefile.sys on the host's hard disk. Irrespective of the browsing mode used, this may include Firefox history elements which can then remain forensically recoverable for considerable time. |
Formato |
other application/pdf |
Identificador |
http://researchrepository.napier.ac.uk/10349/1/CFET%202014%20Conference%20Paper%20Acceptance2.msg http://researchrepository.napier.ac.uk/10349/2/Findlay_Leimich_CFET2014.pdf Findlay, Calum and Leimich, Petra (2014) An assessment of data leakage in Firefox under different conditions. In: CFET 2014: 7th International Conference on Cybercrime Forensics Education & Training, 10 -11 July 2014, Christ Church,. (Unpublished) |
Idioma(s) |
en en |
Relação |
http://researchrepository.napier.ac.uk/10349/ |
Palavras-Chave | #QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science |
Tipo |
Conference or Workshop Item PeerReviewed |