Novel information sharing syntax for data sharing between police and community partners, using role-based security.

The exchange of information between the police and community partners forms a central aspect of effective community service provision. In the context of policing, a robust and timely communications mechanism is required between police agencies and community partner domains, including: Primary healthcare (such as a Family Physician or a General Practitioner); Secondary healthcare (such as hospitals); Social Services; Education; and Fire and Rescue services. Investigations into high-profile cases such as the Victoria Climbié murder in 2000, the murders of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman in 2002, and, more recently, the death of baby Peter Connelly through child abuse in 2007, highlight the requirement for a robust information-sharing framework. This paper presents a novel syntax that supports information-sharing requests, within strict data-sharing policy definitions. Such requests may form the basis for any information-sharing agreement that can exist between the police and their community partners. It defines a role-based architecture, with partner domains, with a syntax for the effective and efficient information sharing, using SPoC (Single Point-of-Contact) agents to control in-formation exchange. The application of policy definitions using rules within these SPoCs is inspired by network firewall rules and thus define information exchange permissions. These rules can be imple-mented by software filtering agents that act as information gateways between partner domains. Roles are exposed from each domain to give the rights to exchange information as defined within the policy definition. This work involves collaboration with the Scottish Police, as part of the Scottish Institute for Policing Research (SIPR), and aims to improve the safety of individuals by reducing risks to the community using enhanced information-sharing mechanisms.

An assessment of data leakage in Firefox under different conditions.

Data leakage is a serious issue and can result in the loss of sensitive data, compromising user accounts and details, potentially affecting millions of internet users. This paper contributes to research in online security and reducing personal footprint by evaluating the levels of privacy provided by the Firefox browser. The aim of identifying conditions that would minimize data leakage and maximize data privacy is addressed by assessing and comparing data leakage in the four possible browsing modes: normal and private modes using a browser installed on the host PC or using a portable browser from a connected USB device respectively. To provide a firm foundation for analysis, a series of carefully designed, pre-planned browsing sessions were repeated in each of the various modes of Firefox. This included low RAM environments to determine any effects low RAM may have on browser data leakage. The results show that considerable data leakage may occur within Firefox. In normal mode, all of the browsing information is stored within the Mozilla profile folder in Firefox-specific SQLite databases and sessionstore.js. While passwords were not stored as plain text, other confidential information such as credit card numbers could be recovered from the Form history under certain conditions. There is no difference when using a portable browser in normal mode, except that the Mozilla profile folder is located on the USB device rather than the host's hard disk. By comparison, private browsing reduces data leakage. Our findings confirm that no information is written to the Firefox-related locations on the hard disk or USB device during private browsing, implying that no deletion would be necessary and no remnants of data would be forensically recoverable from unallocated space. However, two aspects of data leakage occurred equally in all four browsing modes. Firstly, all of the browsing history was stored in the live RAM and was therefore accessible while the browser remained open. Secondly, in low RAM situations, the operating system caches out RAM to pagefile.sys on the host's hard disk. Irrespective of the browsing mode used, this may include Firefox history elements which can then remain forensically recoverable for considerable time.