Hybrid heuristic-waterfilling game theory approach in MC-CDMA resource allocation

This paper discusses the power allocation with fixed rate constraint problem in multi-carrier code division multiple access (MC-CDMA) networks, that has been solved through game theoretic perspective by the use of an iterative water-filling algorithm (IWFA). The problem is analyzed under various interference density configurations, and its reliability is studied in terms of solution existence and uniqueness. Moreover, numerical results reveal the approach shortcoming, thus a new method combining swarm intelligence and IWFA is proposed to make practicable the use of game theoretic approaches in realistic MC-CDMA systems scenarios. The contribution of this paper is twofold: (i) provide a complete analysis for the existence and uniqueness of the game solution, from simple to more realist and complex interference scenarios; (ii) propose a hybrid power allocation optimization method combining swarm intelligence, game theory and IWFA. To corroborate the effectiveness of the proposed method, an outage probability analysis in realistic interference scenarios, and a complexity comparison with the classical IWFA are presented. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

A further note on the college admission game

When a stable matching rule is used for a college admission market, questions on incentives facing agents of both sides of the market naturally emerge. This note states and proves four important results which fill a gap in the theory of incentives for the college admission model. Two of them have never been demonstrated but have been used along the years and are responsible for the success that this theory has had in explaining empirical economic phenomena.

Complex Transition to Cooperative Behavior in a Structured Population Model

Cooperation plays an important role in the evolution of species and human societies. The understanding of the emergence and persistence of cooperation in those systems is a fascinating and fundamental question. Many mechanisms were extensively studied and proposed as supporting cooperation. The current work addresses the role of migration for the maintenance of cooperation in structured populations. This problem is investigated in an evolutionary perspective through the prisoner's dilemma game paradigm. It is found that migration and structure play an essential role in the evolution of the cooperative behavior. The possible outcomes of the model are extinction of the entire population, dominance of the cooperative strategy and coexistence between cooperators and defectors. The coexistence phase is obtained in the range of large migration rates. It is also verified the existence of a critical level of structuring beyond that cooperation is always likely. In resume, we conclude that the increase in the number of demes as well as in the migration rate favor the fixation of the cooperative behavior.