Unlocking risk allocation and equitable conversion : reform of the passing of risk in the sale of land

The principles relating to the passing of risk under a contract for the sale of real property would seem to have been long settled. The rule under the general law is that the risk of loss of the subject matter under a contract for the sale of real property passes to the buyer upon the creation of a valid and binding contract. This article considers the origin of that rule, how it developed with the growth of equity, and advances the view that it is anomalous in a modern context of property dealings. In doing so, the article adverts to the variety of statutory mechanisms used to subvert the rule, few of which are of practical value. It concludes that the rule is outmoded in many respects and suggests a number of reforms which might be implemented nationally to bring consistency and simplicity to the issue of damage or destruction of improvements which are the subject of a land contract.

Accounting for risk: The advent of capped conveyancing title insurance

Title insurance companies originating from America, have, in the past 15 years become part of the Australian conveyancing landscape. However for most residential freehold owners, their activities would be a mystery. A purchaser does not routinely obtain title insurance, with the companies presently focussing on servicing the mortgagee sector. While the lack of penetration in the residential purchaser market may be attributed to the consumer’s lack of knowledge, evidence from Ontario and New Zealand illustrates that title insurance is likely to become an additional cost in the conveyancing process in Australia. In this article we highlight the reasons why, and demonstrate how title insurers have, by working with the legal profession been able to subtly move the risk of responsibility for compensation for loss, (at least in the first instance) from the state to the insurer, but with the added benefit for the state and the conveyancing agents that the cost of the insurance is ultimately borne by the consumer. In New Zealand this development is being accelerated by the introduction of capped conveyancing title insurance. Whether title insurance will become part of the conveyancing process is no longer the relevant question for Australia, (it undoubtedly will), but the unknown issue is just how title insurance companies will work with conveyancing agents to infiltrate the market, and what response this infiltration will have in terms of the state’s view as to their continued role in the provision of assurance. We suggest that developments from New Zealand in relation to capped conveyancing insurance are likely to be replicated in Australia in the near future, and that the state’s role in providing an assurance fund will continue, though the state may seek to expand the areas in which the right to compensation is restricted.

An evaluation of viability of public private partnerships in social infrastructure procurement projects in Queensland, Australia

Public private partnerships (PPP) have been widely used as a method for public infrastructure project delivery not only locally and internationally, however the adoption of PPPs in social infrastructure procurement has still been very limited. The objective of this paper is to investigate the potential of implementation of current PPP framework in social affordable housing projects in South East Queensland. Data were collected from 22 interviewees with rich experiences in the industry. The findings of this study show that affordable housing investment have been considered by the industry practitioners as a risky business in comparison to other private rental housing investment. The main determents of the adoption of PPPs in social infrastructure project are the tenant-related factors, such as the inability of paying rent and the inability of caring the property. The study also suggests the importance of seeking strategic partnership with community-based organisation that has experiences in managing similar tenants’ profiles. Current PPP guideline is also viewed as inappropriate for the affordable housing projects, but the principle of VFM framework and risk allocation in PPPs still be applied to the affordable housing projects. This study helps to understand the viability of PPP in social housing procurement projects, and point out the importance of developing guideline for multi-stakeholder partnership and the expansion of the current VFM and PPPs guidelines.

Motivational misalignment on an iconic infrastructure project

Aligning the motivation of contractors and consultants to perform better than ‘business-as-usual’ (BAU) on a construction project is a complex undertaking and the costs of failure are high as misalignment can compromise project outcomes. Despite the potential benefits of effective alignment, there is still little information about optimally designing procurement approaches that promote motivation towards ‘above BAU’ goals. The paper contributes to this knowledge gap by examining the negative drivers of motivation in a major construction project that, despite a wide range of performance enhancing incentives, failed to exceed BAU performance. The paper provides a case study of an iconic infrastructure project undertaken in Australia between 2002 and 2004. It is shown that incentives provided to contractors and consultants to achieve above BAU performance can be compromised by a range of negative motivation drivers including: • inequitable contractual risk allocation; • late involvement of key stakeholders; • inconsistency between contract intentions and relationship intentions; • inadequate price negotiation; • inconsistency between the project performance goals and incentive goals; •unfair and inflexible incentive performance measurement processes. Future quantitative research is planned to determine the generalisability of these results.

Factors contributing to successful public private partnership projects : comparing Hong Kong with Australia and the United Kingdom

Purpose: With the increasing interest in Public Private Partnership (PPP) there is a need to investigate the factors contributing to successful delivery of PPP projects. Design/methodology/approach: An empirical questionnaire survey was conducted in Hong Kong and Australia. The survey respondents were asked to rate eighteen factors which contribute to delivering successful PPP projects. Findings: The findings from this survey were further compared with the results achieved by a previous researcher (Li, 2003) in a similar survey conducted in the United Kingdom. The comparison showed that amongst the top five success factors ranked by Hong Kong respondents, three were also ranked highly by the Australians and British. These success factors included: ‘Commitment and responsibility of public and private sectors’; ‘Strong and good private consortium’; and ‘Appropriate risk allocation and risk sharing’. Originality/value: These success factors were therefore found to be important for contributing to successful PPP projects irrespective of geographical locations.

Structural equation model of construction contract dispute potential

This paper presents the results of a structural equation model (SEM) for describing and quantifying the fundamental factors that affect contract disputes between owners and contractors in the construction industry. Through this example, the potential impact of SEM analysis in construction engineering and management research is illustrated. The purpose of the specific model developed in this research is to explain how and why contract related construction problems occur. This study builds upon earlier work, which developed a disputes potential index, and the likelihood of construction disputes was modeled using logistic regression. In this earlier study, questionnaires were completed on 159 construction projects, which measured both qualitative and quantitative aspects of contract disputes, management ability, financial planning, risk allocation, and project scope definition for both owners and contractors. The SEM approach offers several advantages over the previously employed logistic regression methodology. The final set of structural equations provides insight into the interaction of the variables that was not apparent in the original logistic regression modeling methodology.

Client recommendations for financial incentives on construction projects

Purpose: To provide recommendations for construction clients who design and implement financial incentive mechanisms (FIMs) on projects. ---------- Methodology: Four large Australian building projects commissioned by government clients under managing contractor contracts and completed between 2001 and 2005 were examined to explore the ‘drivers’ that promoted motivation toward financial incentive goals. The results were triangulated across data sources, projects and stakeholder types. ---------- Findings: FIM design should incorporate: 1. flexibility to modify goals and measurement procedures over time, 2. multiple goals covering different project areas, 3. distribution of rewards across all the key organizations contributing to team performance (e.g. potentially not just the contractor, but the subcontractors and consultants) and a reward amount sufficient to be valued by potential recipients. FIM benefits are maximized through the following complementary procurement initiatives: 4. equitable contract risk allocation, 5. early contractor involvement in design, 6. value-driven tender selection, 7. relationship workshops, and 8. future work opportunities.---------- Research Limitations: This paper provides practical recommendations to industry and hence does not emphasize theoretical aspects.---------- Practical Implications: The uptake of these recommendations is likely to increase the impact of FIMs on motivation and improve project and industry outcomes. Although the study focuses on government clients of building projects, all the recommendations would seem to apply equally to private-sector clients and to non-building projects.---------- Originality: In order to improve motivation and reward high performance, clients are increasingly using FIM in their construction contracts. Despite the rising use of financial incentives, there is a lack of comprehensive construction-specific knowledge available to help clients maximize outcomes. The study addresses this gap in the literature.

Incentive mechanisms in infrastructure projects : A case-based comparison between Australia and the Netherlands

Despite a general belief that incentive mechanisms can improve value for money during procurement and performance during project execution, empirical research on the actual effects is nascent. This research focuses on the design and implementation of incentive mechanisms in four different infrastructure projects: two road reconstructions in the Netherlands and two building constructions in Australia. Based on an analytical framework of key motivation drivers, a cross cases analysis is conducted in view of performance on the contract assumptions, selection phase, execution phase and project contract performance. It was identified that despite significant differences in the project characteristics, results indicate that they experience similar contextual drivers on the incentive effectiveness. High value was placed on risk allocation and relationship building in the selection and construction phase. The differences can be explained from both contextual and project related characteristics. Although there are limitations with this research in drawing generalizations across two sets of case projects, the results provide a strong base to explore the nature of incentive systems across different geographical and contextual boundaries in future research.

A new first-order decision-making model for the procurement of public sector infrastructure: Procedures and Testing

Given global demand for new infrastructure, governments face substantial challenges in funding new infrastructure and delivering Value for Money (VfM). As part of the background to this challenge, a critique is given of current practice in the selection of the approach to procure major public sector infrastructure in Australia and which is akin to the Multi-Attribute Utility Approach (MAUA). To contribute towards addressing the key weaknesses of MAUA, a new first-order procurement decision-making model is presented. The model addresses the make-or-buy decision (risk allocation); the bundling decision (property rights incentives), as well as the exchange relationship decision (relational to arms-length exchange) in its novel approach to articulating a procurement strategy designed to yield superior VfM across the whole life of the asset. The aim of this paper is report on the development of this decisionmaking model in terms of the procedural tasks to be followed and the method being used to test the model. The planned approach to testing the model uses a sample of 87 Australian major infrastructure projects in the sum of AUD32 billion and deploys a key proxy for VfM comprising expressions of interest, as an indicator of competition.

Government grants - an abrogation or management of risks?

New public management (NPFM), with its hands-on, private sector-style performance measurement, output control, parsimonious use of resources, disaggreation of public sector units and greater competition in the public sector, has significantly affected charitable and nonprofit organisations delivering community services (Hood, 1991; Dunleavy, 1994; George & Wilding, 2002). The literature indicates that nonprofit organisations under NPM believe they are doing more for less: while administration is increasing, core costs are not being met; their dependence on government funding comes at the expense of other funding strategies; and there are concerns about proportionality and power asymmetries in the relationship (Kerr & Savelsberg, 2001; Powell & Dalton, 2011; Smith, 2002, p. 175; Morris, 1999, 2000a). Government agencies are under increased pressure to do more with less, demonstrate value for money, measure social outcomes, not merely outputs and minimise political risk (Grant, 2008; McGreogor-Lowndes, 2008). Government-community service organisation relationships are often viewed as 'uneasy alliances' characterised by the pressures that come with the parties' differing roles and expectations and the pressures that come with the parties' differing roles and expectations and the pressurs of funding and security (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 308; McGregor-Lowndes, 2008, p. 45; Morris, 200a). Significant community services are now delivered to citizens through such relationships, often to the most disadvantaged in the community, and it is important for this to be achieved with equity, efficiently and effectively. On one level, the welfare state was seen as a 'risk management system' for the poor, with the state mitigating the risks of sickness, job loss and old age (Giddens, 1999) with the subsequent neoliberalist outlook shifting this risk back to households (Hacker, 2006). At the core of this risk shift are written contracts. Vincent-Jones (1999,2006) has mapped how NPM is characterised by the use of written contracts for all manner of relations; e.g., relgulation of dealings between government agencies, between individual citizens and the state, and the creation of quais-markets of service providers and infrastructure partners. We take this lens of contracts to examine where risk falls in relation to the outsourcing of community services. First we examine the concept of risk. We consider how risk might be managed and apportioned between governments and community serivce organisations (CSOs) in grant agreements, which are quasiy-market transactions at best. This is informed by insights from the law and economics literature. Then, standard grant agreements covering several years in two jurisdictions - Australia and the United Kingdom - are analysed, to establish the risk allocation between government and CSOs. This is placed in the context of the reform agenda in both jurisdictions. In Australia this context is th enonprofit reforms built around the creation of a national charities regulator, and red tape reduction. In the United Kingdom, the backdrop is the THird Way agenda with its compacts, succeed by Big Society in a climate of austerity. These 'case studies' inform a discussion about who is best placed to bear and manage the risks of community service provision on behalf of government. We conclude by identifying the lessons to be learned from our analysis and possible pathways for further scholarship.

Social and cultural drivers of incentive effectiveness in infrastructure projects

Formal incentives systems aim to encourage improved performance by offering a reward for the achievement of project-specific goals. Despite argued benefits of incentive systems on project delivery outcomes, there remains debate over how incentive systems can be designed to encourage the formation of strong project relationships within a complex social system such as an infrastructure project. This challenge is compounded by the increasing emphasis in construction management research on the important mediating influence of technical and organisational context on project performance. In light of this challenge, the research presented in this paper focuses on the design of incentive systems in four infrastructure projects: two road reconstructions in the Netherlands and two building constructions in Australia. Based on a motivational theory frame, a cross case analysis is conducted to examine differences and similarities across social and cultural drivers impacting on the effectiveness of the incentive systems in light of infrastructure project context. Despite significant differences in case project characteristics, results indicate the projects’ experience similar social drivers impacting on incentive effectiveness. Significant value across the projects was placed on: varied performance goals and multiple opportunities to across the project team to pursue incentive rewards; fair risk allocation across contract parties; value-driven tender selection; improved design-build integration; and promotion of future work opportunities. However, differences across the contexts were identified. Results suggest future work opportunities were a more powerful social driver in upholding reputation and establishing strong project relationships in the Australian context. On the other hand, the relationship initiatives in the Dutch context seemed to be more broadly embraced resulting in a greater willingness to collaboratively manage project risk. Although there are limitations with this research in drawing generalizations across two sets of case projects, the results provide a strong base to explore the social and cultural influences on incentive effectiveness across different geographical and contextual boundaries in future research.

Public private partnership infrastructure delivery: Benefits and costs for society

This research provides additional knowledge on the benefits and costs to society, in particular of road transport procured through Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangements. Currently, the public sector comparator (PSC) and cost-benefit analysis (CBA) used to evaluate and measure the benefits and costs of PPP are limited in their capacity to predict and forecast long-term events. PPP is attractive to governments due to the non-upfront payment, perceived value for money, and risk allocation and transfer to the private investor. However, public sector remains the guarantor, and under-writer of the private investor's loan from financial institutions and other voluntary risks which are unlimited to future compensatory claims. The new knowledge from this research is the introduction of a framework capable of evaluating, and measuring the associated PPP benefits, as well as the costs, effects, and impacts to society which are protracted and sporadic by nature.

Bank guarantees and the reasonable expectations of beneficiaries

A bank guarantee has traditionally been viewed as a cash equivalent. This view is supported by the operation of the autonomy principle. However, the autonomy principle is subject to certain recognised exceptions both at common law and under statute. One of these exceptions is commonly referred to as the negative stipulation or underlying contract exception. In recent times the operation of this particular exception has given rise to a wealth of case law. This article examines whether this recent case law appropriately recognises the reasonable expectations of the beneficiary of a bank guarantee that a bank guarantee should function not only as a security but as a risk allocation device.

Models for engaging public-private partnerships in civil infrastructure projects: A case of ‘having your cake and eating it too’?

Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) are established globally as an important mode of procurement and the features of PPP, not least of which the transfer of risk, appeal to governments and particularly in the current economic climate. There are many other advantages of PPP that are claimed as outweighing the costs of PPP and affording Value for Money (VfM) relative to traditionally financed projects or non-PPP. That said, it is the case that we lack comparative whole-life empirical studies of VfM in PPP and non-PPP. Whilst we await this kind of study, the pace and trajectory of PPP seem set to continue and so in the meantime, the virtues of seeking to improve PPP appear incontrovertible. The decision about which projects, or parts of projects, to offer to the market as a PPP and the decision concerning the allocation or sharing risks as part of engagement of the PPP consortium are among the most fundamental decisions that determine whether PPP deliver VfM. The focus in the paper is on latter decision concerning governments’ attitudes towards risk and more specifically, the effect of this decision on the nature of the emergent PPP consortium, or PPP model, including its economic behavior and outcomes. This paper presents an exploration into the extent to which the seemingly incompatible alternatives of risk allocation and risk sharing, represented by the orthodox/conventional PPP model and the heterodox/alliance PPP model respectively, can be reconciled along with suggestions for new research directions to inform this reconciliation. In so doing, an important step is taken towards charting a path by which governments can harness the relative strengths of both kinds of PPP model.

Performance-based contracting for roads – Experiences of Australia and Indonesia

Many countries over the last decade, have used performance-based contracting (PBC) to manage and maintain roads. The implementation of PBC provides additional benefits for the government/public such as cost savings and improved conditions of contracted road assets. In Australia, PBC is already being implemented on all categories of roads: national, state, urban and rural. Australian PBC arrangement is designed to turn over control and responsibility for roadway system maintenance, rehabilitation, and capital improvement projects to private contractors. Contractors’ responsibilities include determination of treatment types, the design, programming and the undertaking of works needed to maintain road networks at predetermined performance levels. Indonesia initiated two PBC pilot projects in 2011, the Pantura Section Demak-Trengguli (7.68 kilometers) in Central Java Province and Section Ciasem-Pamanukan (18.5 kilometers) in West Java Province. Both sections are categorized as national roads. The contract duration for both of these projects is four years. To facilitate a possible way forward, it is proposed to conduct a study to understand Australia's experiences of advancing from pilot projects to nation-wide programs using PBC. The study focuses on the scope of contracts, bidding processes, risk allocation, and key drivers, using relevant PBC case studies from Australia. Recommendations for future PBC deployment nation-wide should be based on more research associated with risk allocation. This will include investigation of standard conditions of contract. Implications of the contract clauses for the risk management strategy to be adopted by contractors. Based on the nature of risks, some are best managed by the project owner. It is very important that all parties involved to be open to the new rules of contract and to convince themselves about the potential increased benefits of the use of PBC. The most recent states of challenging issues were explored and described.