Models for engaging public-private partnerships in civil infrastructure projects: A case of ‘having your cake and eating it too’?

Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) are established globally as an important mode of procurement and the features of PPP, not least of which the transfer of risk, appeal to governments and particularly in the current economic climate. There are many other advantages of PPP that are claimed as outweighing the costs of PPP and affording Value for Money (VfM) relative to traditionally financed projects or non-PPP. That said, it is the case that we lack comparative whole-life empirical studies of VfM in PPP and non-PPP. Whilst we await this kind of study, the pace and trajectory of PPP seem set to continue and so in the meantime, the virtues of seeking to improve PPP appear incontrovertible. The decision about which projects, or parts of projects, to offer to the market as a PPP and the decision concerning the allocation or sharing risks as part of engagement of the PPP consortium are among the most fundamental decisions that determine whether PPP deliver VfM. The focus in the paper is on latter decision concerning governments’ attitudes towards risk and more specifically, the effect of this decision on the nature of the emergent PPP consortium, or PPP model, including its economic behavior and outcomes. This paper presents an exploration into the extent to which the seemingly incompatible alternatives of risk allocation and risk sharing, represented by the orthodox/conventional PPP model and the heterodox/alliance PPP model respectively, can be reconciled along with suggestions for new research directions to inform this reconciliation. In so doing, an important step is taken towards charting a path by which governments can harness the relative strengths of both kinds of PPP model.