Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in transitional countries – evidence from Chinese listed firms

The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices adopted by Chinese listed firms are associated with the quality of earnings information. Based on a review of agency and institutional theory, this study develops hypotheses that predict the monitoring effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. Using a combination of univariate and multivariate analyses, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management are tested from 2004 to 2008. Through analysing the empirical results, a number of findings are summarised as below. First, board independence is weakened by the introduction of government officials as independent directors on the boards. Government officials acting as independent directors, claim that they meet the definition of independent director set by the regulation. However, they have some connection with the State, which is the controlling shareholder in listed SOEs affiliated companies. Consequently, the effect of the independent director’s expertise in constraining earnings management is mitigated as demonstrated by an insignificant association between board expertise and earnings management. An alternative explanation for the inefficiency of board independence may point to the pre-selection of independent directors by the powerful CEO. It is argued that a CEO can manipulate the board composition and choose the "desirable" independent directors to monitor themselves. Second, a number of internal mechanisms, such as board size, board activities, and the separation of the roles of the CEO and chair are found to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that there are advantages in having a large and active board in the Chinese setting. This can offset the disadvantages associated with large boards, such as increased bureaucracy, and hence, increase the constraining effects of a large and resourceful board. Third, factor analysis identifies two factors: CEO power and board power. CEO power is the factor which consists of CEO duality and turnover, and board power is composed of board size and board activity. The results of CEO power show that if a Chinese listed company has CEO duality and turnover at the same time, it is more likely to have a high level of earnings management. The significant and negative relationship between board power and accruals indicate that large boards with frequent meetings can be associated with low level of earnings management. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that certain governance mechanisms complement each other to become more efficient monitors of opportunistic earnings management. A combination of board characteristics can increase the negative association with earnings management. Fourth, the insignificant results between audit committees and earnings management in Chinese listed firms suggests that the Chinese regulator should strengthen the audit committee functions. This thesis calls for listed firms to disclose more information on audit committee composition and activities, which can facilitate future research on the Chinese audit committee’s monitoring role. Fifth, the interactive results between State ownership and board characteristics show that dominant State ownership has a moderating effect on board monitoring power as the State totally controls 42% of the issued shares. The high percentage of State ownership makes it difficult for the non-controlling institutional shareholders to challenge the State’s dominant status. As a result, the association between non-controlling institutional ownership and earnings management is insignificant in most situations. Lastly, firms audited by the international Big4 have lower abnormal accruals than firms audited by domestic Chinese audit firms. In addition, the inverse U-shape relationship between audit tenure and earnings quality demonstrates the changing effects of audit quality after a certain period of appointment. Furthermore, this thesis finds that listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges can be an alternative governance mechanism to discipline Chinese firms to follow strict Hong Kong listing requirements. Management of Hong Kong listed companies are exposed to the scrutiny of international investors and Hong Kong regulators. This in turn reduces their chances of conducting self-interested earnings manipulation. This study is designed to fill the gap in governance literature in China that is related to earnings management. Previous research on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in China is not conclusive. The current research builds on previous literature and provides some meaningful implications for practitioners, regulators, academic, and international investors who have investment interests in a transitional country. The findings of this study contribute to corporate governance and earnings management literature in the context of the transitional economy of China. The use of alternative measures for earnings management yields similar results compared with the accruals models and produces additional findings.

Corporate governance and misappropriation

This study examines the occurrence of misappropriation-type fraud within Australian listed firms and the relation between the incidence of this type of fraud and a firm's governance strength. We measure governance strength using factors relating to traditional corporate governance, such as board composition, CEO duality, and audit committee composition, as well as factors relating to information technology governance. In our study, we use actual dollar amount of fraud reported by listed companies responding to the 2004 KPMG Fraud Survey as one of three different misappropriation measures and publicly available firm-specific data to measure the other variables in the model. Our study found that where the chief executive officer (CEO) also holds the position of chairperson of the board of directors, the likelihood of fraud increases. We also find that the greater the number of independent directors on the audit committee, the lower the level of fraud. Taken together, these results are particularly encouraging as they provide support for regulatory bodies such as the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), which place considerable emphasis on the importance of establishing good corporate governance practices. The study provides empirical evidence that employing good corporate governance reduces the risk of the misappropriation of assets.

Independent cinema in the Chinese film industry

Chinese independent cinema has developed for more than twenty years. Two sorts of independent cinema exist in China. One is underground cinema, which is produced without official approvals and cannot be circulated in China, and the other are the films which are legally produced by small private film companies and circulated in the domestic film market. This sort of ‘within-system’ independent cinema has played a significant role in the development of Chinese cinema in terms of culture, economics and ideology. In contrast to the amount of comment on underground filmmaking in China, the significance of ‘within-system’ independent cinema has been underestimated by most scholars. This thesis is a study of how political management has determined the development of Chinese independent cinema and how Chinese independent cinema has developed during its various historical trajectories. This study takes media economics as the research approach, and its major methods utilise archive analysis and interviews. The thesis begins with a general review of the definition and business of American independent cinema. Then, after a literature review of Chinese independent cinema, it identifies significant gaps in previous studies and reviews issues of traditional definition and suggests a new definition. After several case studies on the changes in the most famous Chinese directors’ careers, the thesis shows that state studios and private film companies are two essential domestic backers for filmmaking in China. After that, the body of the thesis provides an examination of the development of ‘within-system’ independent cinema. Specifically, three factors: government intervention, the majors’ performance (state studios and, later, the conglomerates) and the market conduct of independent cinema at various points in their trajectories are studied. The key findings of the study are as follows: First, most scholars have overlooked the existence and the significance of within-system Chinese independent cinema. Drawing on an American definition of the independent sector, this thesis proposes a definition of the sector in China: namely, any film that has not been financed, produced, and/or distributed by majors. The thesis also notes important contradictions in applying this definition: i.e. film-making is still dependent on policies that frame industry development. The thesis recognises that major tensions apply to filmmaking in China, which significantly differentiates the Chinese independents from those in the US. Second, the development of Chinese independent cinema is the result the rise of the private sector and the decline of the state studio system. As state studios encountered difficulties the private sector moved forward; consequently the environment improved for independent cinema. Third, before 2003, the film industry in China had little commercialisation. The government controlled independent cinema by means of license and censorship. State studios produced main melody films and Hollywood attracted most of the audiences. Many independent filmmakers focused on commercial films, thus contributing to film commercialisation. Fourth, after 2003, the film industry became increasingly fragmented. The government created distribution and exhibition opportunities for main melody films; conglomerates collaborated with Hong Kong players; Hong Kong co-productions and Hollywood occupied the film market; and small private film companies produced main melody films in order to earn meagre profits. The original contribution of the thesis is to advance the study of Chinese independent cinema. The study suggests a reasonable and practical definition of Chinese independent cinema. It shows how the Chinese government authorities have implemented economic measures to gain ideological control in the film industry. Finally, this the first study on Chinese independent cinema applying a synthesis of economic, political and historical perspectives.

Low-complexity estimation of CFO and frequency independent I/Q mismatch for OFDM systems

CFO and I/Q mismatch could cause significant performance degradation to OFDM systems. Their estimation and compensation are generally difficult as they are entangled in the received signal. In this paper, we propose some low-complexity estimation and compensation schemes in the receiver, which are robust to various CFO and I/Q mismatch values although the performance is slightly degraded for very small CFO. These schemes consist of three steps: forming a cosine estimator free of I/Q mismatch interference, estimating I/Q mismatch using the estimated cosine value, and forming a sine estimator using samples after I/Q mismatch compensation. These estimators are based on the perception that an estimate of cosine serves much better as the basis for I/Q mismatch estimation than the estimate of CFO derived from the cosine function. Simulation results show that the proposed schemes can improve system performance significantly, and they are robust to CFO and I/Q mismatch.

Frameworks in regulating company directors : rethinking the philosophical foundations to enhance accountability

Sets out a system of corporate governance regulation, aimed at combining legal and social methods of governing director behaviour and at creating a framework flexible enough to accommodate different business and ethical cultures. Outlines the theoretical basis of corporate governance and the broad responsibilities of directors, and discusses the extent to which they can and should be regulated. Discusses the constitution of a regulatory framework encompassing law, soft law and best practice, and ethics.

New strength : independent television companies in China’s television industry

As most of people know that all of mass media are state-owned in China, television stations are not exceptional to belong to the enormous state-owned system. But to date, with the economic reform in the broadcasting system and China entering into WTO, the television industry has increased greatly and the television market has matured with more and more competition. The players in China’s television industry have changed from the monologue of TV stations to multi roles of TV stations, production companies and overseas television companies, although TV stations are still the majority of China’s TV market. Especially, private television production companies are becoming more and more active in this market. In this paper, I will describe the development process and challenges of this group in China and ask whether the emergence of this group means for the whole China’s TV industry?

Independent television production, TV formats and media diversity in China

Beginning around 2003, television studies has seen the growth of interest in the genre of reality shows. However, concentrating on this genre has tended to sideline the even more significant emergence of the program format as a central mode of business and culture in the new television landscape. "Localizing Global TV" redresses this balance, and heralds the emergence of an important, exciting and challenging area of television studies. Topics explored include reality TV, makeover programs, sitcoms, talent shows and fiction serials, as well as broadcaster management policies, production decision chains and audience participation processes. This seminal work will be of considerable interest to media scholars internationally.

Do board contacts matter? : an analysis of the relationship between boards of directors’ ties and the performance of Australia’s largest companies.

Boards of directors are thought to provide access to a wealth of knowledge and resources for the companies they serve, and are considered important to corporate governance. Under the Resource Based View (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) boards are viewed as a strategic resource available to firms. As a consequence there has been a significant research effort aimed at establishing a link between board attributes and company performance. In this thesis I explore and extend the study of interlocking directorships (Mizruchi, 1996; Scott 1991a) by examining the links between directors’ opportunity networks and firm performance. Specifically, I use resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and social capital theory (Burt, 1980b; Coleman, 1988) as the basis for a new measure of a board’s opportunity network. I contend that both directors’ formal company ties and their social ties determine a director’s opportunity network through which they are able to access and mobilise resources for their firms. This approach is based on recent studies that suggest the measurement of interlocks at the director level, rather than at the firm level, may be a more reliable indicator of this phenomenon. This research uses publicly available data drawn from Australia’s top-105 listed companies and their directors in 1999. I employ Social Network Analysis (SNA) (Scott, 1991b) using the UCINET software to analyse the individual director’s formal and social networks. SNA is used to measure a the number of ties a director has to other directors in the top-105 company director network at both one and two degrees of separation, that is, direct ties and indirect (or ‘friend of a friend’) ties. These individual measures of director connectedness are aggregated to produce a board-level network metric for comparison with measures of a firm’s performance using multiple regression analysis. Performance is measured with accounting-based and market-based measures. Findings indicate that better-connected boards are associated with higher market-based company performance (measured by Tobin’s q). However, weaker and mostly unreliable associations were found for accounting-based performance measure ROA. Furthermore, formal (or corporate) network ties are a stronger predictor of market performance than total network ties (comprising social and corporate ties). Similarly, strong ties (connectedness at degree-1) are better predictors of performance than weak ties (connectedness at degree-2). My research makes four contributions to the literature on director interlocks. First, it extends a new way of measuring a board’s opportunity network based on the director rather than the company as the unit of interlock. Second, it establishes evidence of a relationship between market-based measures of firm performance and the connectedness of that firm’s board. Third, it establishes that director’s formal corporate ties matter more to market-based firm performance than their social ties. Fourth, it establishes that director’s strong direct ties are more important to market-based performance than weak ties. The thesis concludes with implications for research and practice, including a more speculative interpretation of these results. In particular, I raise the possibility of reverse causality – that is networked directors seek to join high-performing companies. Thus, the relationship may be a result of symbolic action by companies seeking to increase the legitimacy of their firms rather than a reflection of the social capital available to the companies. This is an important consideration worthy of future investigation.

A new definition for today’s Chinese independent cinema

Different terminologies have been used to characterize the Chinese independent cinema in the 1990s. These definitions focus on the experimental practices outside the official production system and independent of official ideology. The film industry has had distinctive development since the entry of WTO in 2001. Private investors have played essential role in cinematic economy; strict censorship has been obviously relaxed; the film industry is being divided into two opposing extremes. Thus, it is necessary to give a new definition of the Chinese independent cinema. The definition of independent cinema in today China I suggest in the light of American independence is that any film that has not been financed, produced and distributed by majors is independent. At least four corporations are majors in the Chinese film industry. They are China Film Group Corporation, Huayi Brothers Corporation, PolyBona Film Distribution Corporation and Shanghai Film Group Corporation. Except the four majors, all the other film production or distribution companies are independents.

Regulating non-executive directors in Australia : a socio-legal approach

Discusses the role of legislation and codes of conduct in influencing the behaviour of non-executive directors. Outlines the functions of a board of directors and considers the role on non-executive directors in particular. Traces the development of standards of skill required on non-executive directors both under the Australian Corporations Act 2001 and under common law. Questions whether these have brought about a real change in behaviour. Considers whether professionalisation of directorship could be more effective.

Does Chinese traditional values matter in regulating China's company directors? Preliminary findings from surveys in Hong Kong

Much has been said about Chinese corporate governance and the new laws on companies. While most literature focuses on either the political or the legal doctrinal issues, this paper argues that Chinese traditional values do matter in Chinese corporate governance. The object of this paper is to report on the preliminary findings of a project supported by the General Research Fund in Hong Kong (HK). Thus far the survey results from HK respondents support our hypothesis. As such, traditional Chinese values should be on the agenda of the next round of company law reforms in China.