The influence of family ownership on the quality of accounting information

This article explores the quality of accounting information in listed family firms. The authors exploit the features of the Italian equitymarket characterizd by high ownership concentration across all tpes of firms to disentangle the effects of family ownership from other major block holders on the quality of accounting information. The findings document that family firms convey financial information of higher quality compared to the nonfamily peers. Furthermore the authors provide evidence that the determinants of accounting quality differ across family and nonfamily firms.

Ownership structure and business evaluation practices in family SMEs : evidence from empirical research in Italy

This paper presents early results from a pilot project which aims to investigate the relationship between proprietary structure of small and medium- sized Italian family firms and their owners’ orientation towards a “business evaluation process”. Evidence from many studies point out the importance of family business in a worldwide economic environment: in Italy 93% of the businesses are represented by family firms; 98% of them have less than 50 employees (Italian Association of Family Firms, 2004) so we judged family SMEs as a relevant field of investigation. In this study we assume a broad definition of family business as “a firm whose control (50% of shares or voting rights) is closely held by the members of the same family” (Corbetta,1995). “Business evaluation process” is intended here both as “continuous evaluation process” (which is the expression of a well developed managerial attitude) or as an “immediate valuation” (i.e. in the case of new shareholder’s entrance, share exchange among siblings, etc). We set two hypotheses to be tested in this paper: the first is “quantitative” and aims to verify whether the number of owners (independent variable) in a family firm is positively correlated to the business evaluation process. If a family firm is led by only one subject, it is more likely that personal values, culture and feelings may affect his choices more than “purely economic opportunities”; so there is less concern about monitoring economic performance or about the economic value of the firm. As the shareholders’ number increases, economic aspects in managing the firm grow in importance over the personal values and "value orientation" acquires a central role. The second hypothesis investigates if and to what extent the presence of “non- family members” among the owners affects their orientation to the business evaluation process. The “Cramer’s V” test has been used to test the hypotheses; both were not confirmed from these early results; next steps will lead to make an inferential analysis on a representative sample of the population.

Entrepreneurship and family firms : growth and survival

Family businesses dominate in a majority of economies (Astrachan and Shanker, 2003; Chrisman, Chua, and Sharma, 2005; Morck and Yeung, 2004). As entrepreneurial activities have been shown to be central to economic growth it is essential that family businesses, irrespective of ownership patterns, not only survive but also grow thus growing the economy overall. While a great deal is known about entrepreneurial activities and a body of knowledge is being developed in relation to entrepreneurial processes in family firms, more needs to be understood in relation to the dynamics of entrepreneurial activities at the individual family firm level. One area of particular interest is the dynamics within the business and the family and how these dynamics impact upon entrepreneurial activities. Specifically how relationships between and among family members engaged in the business can interact with professional non-family member senior executives. The senior executives can actively use their positions in such ways that initiatives suggested by family members are less successful than they might be. This paper addresses how ‘family’ aspects of a business can assist or impede the entrepreneurial activities of individuals. It takes into account some of the unique features of family businesses – such as the importance of ‘familiness’ as a competitive advantage; the direct links between ownership and control of a business and the recognition (often implicit) that individuals in families do make a difference to how the business functions (Habbershon and Williams, 1999, Sharma, 2004; and Tokarczyk, Hansen Green, and Down, 2007). This emphasis on individuals in families fits well with the idea of entrepreneur as individual, as expressed by Schumpeter (1934), Baumol et al (2007). The theoretical approach that adopted to explore the dynamics of processes occurring within family firms is structuration theory combined with a theory of embeddeness (Dacin, Ventresca and Beal, 1999; Giddens, 1979, 1984, Jack and Anderson, 2002; and Sarason, Dean and Dillard, 2006).

Optimal monitoring in family-owned companies? Evidence from Asia

Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Issue: We propose that high levels of monitoring are not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. In family-owned companies the optimal level of board monitoring required by minority shareholders is expected to be lower than that of other companies. This is because the relative benefits and costs of monitoring are different in family-owned companies. Research Findings: At moderate levels of board monitoring, we find concave relationships between board monitoring variables and firm performance for family-owned companies but not for other companies. The optimal level of board monitoring for our sample of Asian family-owned companies equates to board independence of 38%, separation of the Chairman and CEO positions and establishment of audit and remuneration committees. Additional testing shows that the optimal level of board monitoring is sensitive to the magnitude of the agency conflict between the family group and minority shareholders and the presence of substitute monitoring. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policymakers, the results show that more monitoring is not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, it may be inappropriate for regulators to advise all companies to follow the same set of corporate governance guidelines. However, our results also indicate that the board governance practices of family-owned companies are still well below the identified optimal levels. Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Independence, Board of Directors, Family Firms, Monitoring.

Goreen Narrkwarren Ngrn-tuora : healthy family air : a literature review

This paper will focus on the literature review for Goreen Narrkwarren Ngrn-toura- Healthy Family Air, formerly known as Reducing smoking amongst pregnant Aboriginal women in Victoria: An Holistic Approach. Before we outline the findings from the literature review, we will provide some background information on the project, including why it is important and what and who are involved.

Why do family firms congregate in certain industries?

We propose that family firm involvement and performance across industries is not random and is related to specific industry conditions. Using the population of listed companies on the Taiwan Stock Exchange over the period 1997-2007 we find that family firms are more involved in industries with more fixed assets, consistent with the long-term view of family owners, and in industry conditions that make it potentially easier for family owners to consume private benefits of control. Overall, we document a positive relationship between family firm involvement and performance, which indicates a net advantage for family firm shareholders in industries where family firms congregate. However, we also find that family firm performance is negatively affected when family firms use more debt and maintain a higher control wedge than their industry counterparts.

Ownership structure and concentration and the timeliness of corporate earnings : Malaysian evidence

This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership concentration and structure relate to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags in Malaysia. Based on a sample of 1,276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, the results show that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags. Specifically, closely-held firms are more timely in their price discovery and have shorter reporting lags, particularly if the largest shareholder is a foreigner or a financial institution. Government-owned firms have longer reporting lags, as expected, but we find no evidence that family-owned firms have significantly different timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags than other firms. Additional analysis shows that prior to the implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, firms were more timely in their price discovery but longer in their reporting lag.

Ownership, corporate governance and timeliness of price discovery : Australian evidence

This study investigates whether and how a firm’s ownership and corporate governance affect its timeliness of price discovery, which is referred to as the speed of incorporation of value-relevant information into the stock price. Using a panel data of 1,138 Australian firm-year observations from 2001 to 2008, we predict and find a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and the timeliness of price discovery. We test the identity of the largest shareholder and find that only firms with family as the largest shareholder exhibit faster price discovery. There is no evidence that suggests that the presence of a second largest shareholder affects the timeliness of price discovery materially. Although we find a positive association between corporate governance quality and the timeliness of price discovery, as expected, there is no interaction effect between the largest shareholding and corporate governance in relation to the timeliness of price discovery. Further tests show no evidence of severe endogeneity problems in our study.

Ownership, corporate governance and liquidity in Caribbean firms

This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership structure and corporate governance relate to stock liquidity in the Caribbean. Based on panel data of 71 firms from three selected Caribbean markets − Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago − results show that firms with concentrated ownership are associated with lower liquidity. The identity of the largest shareholder also matters: family firms and firms with foreign holding companies are more liquid than government firms. Although the second largest shareholding does not appear to matter to liquidity, there is some evidence showing that firms with foreign holding companies as the second largest shareholder are less liquid. Caribbean firms suffer from poor corporate governance but this study is unable to establish a significant relationship between corporate governance and liquidity.

Corporate ownership, corporate governance reform and timeliness of earnings : Malaysian evidence

This paper provides the first evidence showing that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of corporate earnings, measured by a stock price-based timeliness metric and the reporting lag. Using panel data of 1276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, we find a non-linear relationship between concentrated ownership, measured by the largest shareholding in a firm, and the reporting lag but not the timeliness of price discovery. Although firms with government as the largest shareholder and political connections have a significantly shorter reporting lag, only the former are timelier in price discovery. Firms with family and foreigners as the largest shareholder however are less timely in price discovery. While the reporting lag is shorter in the period after the integration of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) into Bursa listing rules, its impact on the timeliness of price discovery is mostly immaterial.

The Expanded Human Kallikrein (KLK) gene family : genomic organisation, tissue specific expression and potential functions

The tissue kallikreins are serine proteases encoded by highly conserved multigene families. The rodent kallikrein (KLK) families are particularly large, consisting of 13 26 genes clustered in one chromosomal locus. It has been recently recognised that the human KLK gene family is of a similar size (15 genes) with the identification of another 12 related genes (KLK4-KLK15) within and adjacent to the original human KLK locus (KLK1-3) on chromosome 19q13.4. The structural organisation and size of these new genes is similar to that of other KLK genes except for additional exons encoding 5 or 3 untranslated regions. Moreover, many of these genes have multiple mRNA transcripts, a trait not observed with rodent genes. Unlike all other kallikreins, the KLK4-KLK15 encoded proteases are less related (25–44%) and do not contain a conventional kallikrein loop. Clusters of genes exhibit high prostatic (KLK2-4, KLK15) or pancreatic (KLK6-13) expression, suggesting evolutionary conservation of elements conferring tissue specificity. These genes are also expressed, to varying degrees, in a wider range of tissues suggesting a functional involvement of these newer human kallikrein proteases in a diverse range of physiological processes.