Application of a hybrid Entropy–McKinsey Matrix method in evaluating sustainable urbanization : a China case study

Although urbanization can promote social and economic development, it can also cause various problems. As the key decision makers of urbanization, local governments should be able to evaluate urbanization performance, summarize experiences, and find problems caused by urbanization. This paper introduces a hybrid Entropy–McKinsey Matrix method for evaluating sustainable urbanization. The McKinsey Matrix is commonly referred to as the GE Matrix. The values of a development index (DI) and coordination index (CI) are calculated by employing the Entropy method and are used as a basis for constructing a GE Matrix. The matrix can assist in assessing sustainable urbanization performance by locating the urbanization state point. A case study of the city of Jinan in China demonstrates the process of using the evaluation method. The case study reveals that the method is an effective tool in helping policy makers understand the performance of urban sustainability and therefore formulate suitable strategies for guiding urbanization toward better sustainability.

Water sensitive urban design in landscape projects in Shijiazhuang and Yueyang in China [水敏性城市设计 (WSUD) 策略及景观项目中的应用 (中国石家莊和中國岳陽)]

With the rapid urbanization progress, water resources protection and water pollution control have become key problems of human environment construction and social sustainable development. Many countries, especially Australia, have mature experiences. Water Sensitive Urban Design (WSUD) is one of the successful strategies that is put forward under this global situation and helps releasing heavy environmental pressure from urbanization. The paper discussed main principles of WSUD and then took Shijiazhuang, Heibei and Yueng, Hunan for examples trying to apply WSUD in river landscape projects in China's new urban area, thus doing contributions to more sustainable water management in new urban areas in China.

The land hoarding and land inspector dilemma in China : an evolutionary game theoretic perspective

China has experienced considerable economic growth since 1978, which was accompanied by unprecedented growth in urbanization and, more recently, by associated rising urban housing and land banking issues. One such issue is that of land hoarding - where real estate developers purchase land to hold unused in the rising market for a future lucrative sale, often several years later. This practice is outlawed in China, where land use is controlled by increasingly strengthened Government policies and inspectors. Despite this, land hoarding continues apace, with the main culprits being the developers and inspectors working subversively. This resembles a game between two players - the inspector and the developer - which provides the setting for this paper in developing an evolutionary game theory model to provide insights into dealing with the dilemmas faced by the players. The logic and dilemma of land banking strategy and illegal land banking issues are analysed, along with the land inspector’s role from a game theory perspective by determining the replication dynamic mechanism and evolutionary stable strategies under the various conditions that the players face. The major factors influencing the actions of land inspectors, on the other hand, are the costs of inspection, no matter if it is strict or indolent, conflict costs, and income and penalties from corruption. From this, it is shown that, when the net loss for corruption (income from corruption minus the penalties for corruption and cost of strict inspections) is less than the cost of strict inspections, the final evolutionary stable strategy of the inspectors is to carry out indolent inspections. Then, whether penalising developers for hoarding is severe or not, the evolutionary strategy for the developer is to hoard. The implications for land use control mechanisms and associated developer-inspector actions and counteractions are then examined in the light of the model's properties.

Collective land system in China: Congenital flaw or acquired irrational weakness?

With the level of urbanization in China now exceeding 50%, its collective rural land system is under increasing pressure, creating conditions in which there is increasing conflict between the efficient use of land for agricultural purposes and its retention as security for the rural population. This paper first examines the fundamental nature of China's collective land system by analyzing the collectivization history of China, then provides a comprehensive appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the collective land system's role in history and the challenges it faces in modern times. The main changes needed for the current collective system are identified as (1) the establishment of a new transfer mechanism for potential collective construction land, (2) the completion of land rights verification and consolidation work, and (3) the endowment of villagers with more rights to enjoy the distribution of land incremental value. The paper's main contribution is to question the relevance of collective rural land system in contemporary China, where a shift is now taking place from one of pure economic development to one involving more social concerns, and propose potential viable amendments to integrate the need for both perspectives.

Urban growth dilemmas and solutions in China: Looking forward to 2030

China’s urbanization and industrialization are occupying farmland in large amounts, which is strongly driven by land finance regime. This is due to the intensified regional/local competition for manufacturing investment opportunities that push local governments to expropriate farmland at low prices while lease land at high market value to property developers. The additional revenue obtained in this way, termed financial increment in land values, can drive local economic growth, and provide associated infrastructure and other public services. At the same time, however, a floating population of large numbers of inadequately compensated land-lost farmers, although unable to become citizens, have to migrate into the urban areas for work, causing overheated employment and housing markets, with rocketing unaffordable housing prices. This, together with various micro factors relating to the party/state’s promotion/evaluation system play an essential role leading to some serious economic, environment and social consequences, e.g., on migrant welfare, the displacement of peasants and the loss of land resources that requires immediate attention. Our question is: whether such type of urbanization is sustainable? What are the mechanisms behind such a phenomenal urbanization process? From the perspective of institutionalism, this paper aims to investigate the institutional background of the urban growth dilemma and solutions in urban China and to introduce further an inter-regional game theoretical framework to indicate why the present urbanization pattern is unsustainable. Looking forward to 2030, paradigm policy changes are made from the triple consideration of floating population, social security and urban environmental pressures. This involves: (1) changing land increment based finance regime into land stock finance system; (2) the citizenization of migrant workers with affordable housing, and; (3) creating a more enlightened local government officer appraisal system to better take into account societal issues such as welfare and beyond.