Exchange relationships in building services maintenance activity : a test of transaction cost economics and the resource dependency view

The firm is faced with a decision concerning the nature of intra-organizational exchange relationships with internal human resources and the nature or inter-organizational exchange relationships with market firms. In both situations, the firm can develop an exchange that ranges from a discrete exchange to a relational exchange. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Resource Dependency View (RDV) represent alternative efficiency-based explanations fo the nature of the exchange relationship. The aim of the paper is to test these two theories in respect of air conditioning maintenance in retail centres. Multiple sources of information are genereated from case studies of Australian retail centres to test these theories in respoect of internalized operations management (concerning strategic aspects of air conditioning maintenance) and externalized planned routine air conditioning maintenance. The analysis of the data centres on pattern matching. It is concluded that the data supports TCE - on the basis of a development in TCE's contractual schema. Further research is suggested towards taking a pluralistic stance and developing a combined efficiency and power hypothesis - upon which Williamson has speculated. For practice, the conclusions also offer a timely cautionary note concerning the adoption of one approach in all exchange relationships.

Integrating the resource-based view and transaction cost economics in immigrant business performance

This paper presents a new integrated framework that integrates the resource-based view and transaction cost economics to explain the phenomenon of immigrant entrepreneurship. We extend the existing literature on immigrant entrepreneurship by identifying different types of ethnic network resources and demonstrating how these resources interact with transaction costs in the context of Chinese immigrants. Thus, our study contributes to the literature by providing a theoretical framework which identifies mechanisms immigrant entrepreneurs use to strategically deploy resources to minimize costs and maximize performance outcomes.

Transaction Cost Analysis of PPP Risk Share

PPP (Public Private Partnerships) is a new operation mode of infrastructure projects, which usually undergo long periods and have various kinds of risks in technology, market, politics, policy, finance, society, natural conditions and cooperation. So the government and the private agency should establish the risk-sharing mechanism to ensure the successful implementation of the project. As an important branch of the new institutional economics, transaction cost economics and its analysis method have been proved to be beneficial to the proper allocation of risks between the two parts in PPP projects and the improvement of operation efficiency of PPP risk-sharing mechanism. This paper analyzed the transaction cost of the projects risk-sharing method and the both risk carriers. It pointed out that the risk-sharing method of PPP projects not only reflected the spirit of cooperation between public sector and private agency, but also minimized the total transaction cost of the risk sharing mechanism itself. Meanwhile, the risk takers had to strike a balance between the beforehand cost and the afterwards cost so as to control the cost of risk management. The paper finally suggested three ways which might be useful to reduce the transaction cost: to choose appropriate type of contract of PPP risk-sharing mechanism, to prevent information asymmetry and to establish mutual trust between the two participants.

Information sharing with key suppliers : a transaction cost theory perspective

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explain variations in discretionary information shared between buyers and key suppliers. The paper also aims to examine how the extent of information shared affects buyers’ performance in terms of resource usage, output, and flexibility. ----- ----- Design/methodology/approach: The data for the paper comprise 221 Finnish and Swedish non-service companies obtained through a mail survey. The hypothesized relationships were tested using partial least squares modelling with reflective and formative constructs.----- ----- Findings: The results of the study suggest that (environmental and demand) uncertainty and interdependency can to some degree explain the extent of information shared between a buyer and key supplier. Furthermore, information sharing improves buyers’ performance with respect to resource usage, output, and flexibility.----- ----- Research limitations/implications: A limitation to the paper relates to the data, which only included buyers.Abetter approach would have been to collect data from both, buyers and key suppliers. Practical implications – Companies face a wide range of supply chain solutions that enable and encourage collaboration across organizations. This paper suggests a more selective and balanced approach toward adopting the solutions offered as the benefits are contingent on a number of factors such as uncertainty. Also, the risks of information sharing are far too high for a one size fits all approach.----- ----- Originality/value: The paper illustrates the applicability of transaction cost theory to the contemporary era of e-commerce. With this finding, transaction cost economics can provide a valuable lens with which to view and interpret interorganizational information sharing, a topic that has received much attention in the recent years.

Modelling the intention to adopt cloud computing services : a transaction cost theory perspective

This paper uses transaction cost theory to study cloud computing adoption. A model is developed and tested with data from an Australian survey. According to the results, perceived vendor opportunism and perceived legislative uncertainty around cloud computing were significantly associated with perceived cloud computing security risk. There was also a significant negative relationship between perceived cloud computing security risk and the intention to adopt cloud services. This study also reports on adoption rates of cloud computing in terms of applications, as well as the types of services used.

Asset specificity and behavioural uncertainty as moderators of the sales growth : employment growth relationship in emerging ventures

Sales growth and employment growth are the two most widely used growth indicators for new ventures; yet, sales growth and employment growth are not interchangeable measures of new venture growth. Rather, they are related, but somewhat independent constructs that respond differently to a variety of criteria. Most of the literature treats this as a methodological technicality. However, sales growth with or without accompanying employment growth has very different implications for managers and policy makers. A better understanding of what drives these different growth metrics has the potential to lead to better decision making. To improve that understanding we apply transaction cost economics reasoning to predict when sales growth will be or will not be accompanied by employment growth. Our results indicate that our predictions are borne out consistently in resource-constrained contexts but not in resource-munificent contexts.

Asset specificity and behavioral uncertainty as moderators of the sales growth-employment growth relationship in emerging ventures

New venture growth is a central topic in entrepreneurship research. Although sales growth is emerging as the most commonly used measure of growth for emerging ventures, employment growth has also been used frequently. However, empirical research demonstrates that there are only very low to moderately sized correlations between the two (Delmar et aL, 2003; Weinzimmer, et al., 1998). In addition) sales growth and employment growth respond differently to a wide variety of criteria (Baum et al., 2001; Delmar et al., 2003). In this study we use transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1996) as a theoretical base to examine transaction cost influences on the addition of new employees as emerging ventures experience sales growth. \\le theorize that transaction cost economics variables will moderate the relationship between sales growth and employment growth. W'e develop and test hypotheses related to asset specificity, behavioral uncertainty, and the influence of resource munificence on the strength of the sales growth/ employment growth relationship. Asset specificity is theorized to be a positive moderator of the relationship between sales growth and employment growth. When the behavioral uncertainty associated with adding new employees is greater than that of outsourcing or subcontracting, it is hypothesized to be a negative moderator of the sales growth/employment growth relationship. We also hypothesize that resource scarcity will strengthen those relationships.

Analysing governance categories used on project alliances in the construction industry

In Australia, collaborative contracts, and in particular, project alliances, have been increasingly used to govern infrastructure projects. These contracts use formal and informal governance mechanisms to manage the delivery of infrastructure projects. Formal mechanisms such as financial risk sharing are specified in the contract, while informal mechanisms such as integrated teams are not. Given that the literature contains a multiplicity of often untestable definitions, this paper reports on a review of the literature to operationalize the concepts of formal and informal governance. This work is the first phase of a study that will examine the optimal balance of formal and informal governance structures. Desk-top review of leading journals in the areas of construction management and business management, as well as recent government documents and industry guidelines, was undertaken to to conceptualise and operationalize formal and informal governance mechanisms. The study primarily draws on transaction-cost economics (e.g. Williamson 1979; Williamson 1991), relational contract theory (Feinman 2000; Macneil 2000) and social psychology theory (e.g. Gulati 1995). Content analysis of the literature was undertaken to identify key governance mechanisms. Content analysis is a commonly used methodology in the social sciences area. It provides rich data through the systematic and objective review of literature (Krippendorff 2004). NVivo 9, a qualitative data analysis software package, was used to assist in this process. A previous study by the authors identified that formal governance mechanisms can be classified into seven measurable categories: (1) negotiated cost, (2) competitive cost, (3) commercial framework, (4) risk and reward sharing, (5) qualitative performance, (6) collaborative multi-party agreement, and (7) early contractor involvement. Similarly, informal governance mechanisms can be classified into four measureable categories: (1) leadership structure, (2) integrated team, (3) team workshops, and (4) joint management system. This paper explores and further defines the key operational characteristics of each mechanism category, highlighting its impact on value for money in alliance project delivery. The paper’s contribution is that it provides the basis for future research to compare the impact of a range of individual mechanisms within each category, as a means of improving the performance of construction projects.

Standard business reporting in Australia : efficiency, effectiveness, or both?

The benefits of using eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) as a business reporting standard have been widely canvassed in the extant literature, in particular, as the enabling technology for standard business reporting tools. One of the key benefits noted is the ability of standard business reporting to create significant efficiencies in the regulatory reporting process. Efficiency-driven cost reductions are highly desirable by data and report producers. However, they may not have the same potential to create long-term firm value as improved effectiveness of decision making. This study assesses the perceptions of Australian business stakeholders in relation to the benefits of the Australian standard business reporting instantiation (SBR) for financial reporting. These perceptions were drawn from interviews of persons knowledgeable in XBRL-based standard business reporting and submissions to Treasury relative to SBR reporting options. The combination of interviews and submissions permit insights into the views of various groups of stakeholders in relation to the potential benefits. In line with predictions based on a transaction-cost economics perspective, interviewees who primarily came from a data and report-producer background mentioned benefits that centre largely on asset specificity and efficiency. The interviewees who principally came from a data and report-consumer background mentioned benefits that centre on reducing decision-making uncertainty and decision-making effectiveness. The data and report consumers also took a broader view of the benefits of SBR to the financial reporting supply chain. Our research suggests that advocates of SBR have successfully promoted its efficiency benefits to potential users. However, the effectiveness benefits of SBR, for example, the decision-making benefits offered to investors via standardised reports, while becoming more broadly acknowledged, remain not a priority for all stakeholders.

Understanding Formal and Informal Governance on Infrastructure Projects - Literature Review [industry report]

In Australia, collaborative contracts have been increasingly used to govern infrastructure projects. These contracts combine formal and informal mechanisms to manage project delivery. Formal mechanisms (e.g. financial risk sharing) are specified in the contract, while informal mechanisms (e.g. integrated team) are not. The paper reports on a literature review to operationalise the concepts of formal and informal governance, as the literature contains a multiplicity of, often un-testable, definitions. This work is the first phase of a study that will examine the optimal balance of formal and informal governance structures. Desk-top review of leading journals in the areas of construction management and business management, as well as recent government documents and industry guidelines, was undertaken to to conceptualise and operatinalise formal and informal governance mechanisms. The study primarily draws on transaction-cost economics (e.g. Williamson 1979; 1991), relational contract theory (Feinman 2000; Macneil 2000) and social psychology theory (e.g. Gulati 1995). Content analysis of the literature was undertaken to identify key governance mechanisms. Content analysis is a commonly used methodology in the social sciences area. It provides rich data through the systematic and objective review of literature (Krippendorff 2004). NVivo 9, a qualitative data analysis software package, was used to assist in this process. Formal governance mechanisms were found to be usefully broken down into four measurable categories: (1) target cost arrangement (2) financial risk and reward sharing regime (3) transparent financials and (4) collaborative multi-party agreement Informal governance mechanisms were found to be usefully broken down into three measurable categories: (1) leadership structure (2) integrated team (3) joint management system We expect these categories to effectively capture the key governance drivers of outcomes on infrastructure projects. These categories will be further refined and broken down into individual governance mechanisms for assessment through a large-scale Australian survey planned for late 2012. These individual mechanisms will feature in the questionnaire that QUT will deliver to AAA in October 2012.

Deriving optimal competition in infrastructure procurement

Typically only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure major infrastructure projects. The theories of Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and Transaction Cost Economics are reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).

Corporate-cooperative management of fisheries: A potential alternative governance structure for low value small fisheries?

While the economic and environmental benefits of fisheries management are well accepted, the costs of effective management in low value fisheries, including the research necessary to underpin such management, may be considerable relative to the total economic benefits they may generate. Co-management is often seen as a panacea in low value fisheries. Increasing fisher participation increases legitimacy of management decision in the absence of detailed scientific input. However, where only a small number of operators exist, the potential benefits of co-management are negated by the high transaction cost to the individual fishers engaging in the management process. From an economic perspective, sole ownership has been identified as the management structure which can best achieve biological and economic sustainability. Moving low value fisheries with a small number of participants to a corporate-cooperative management model may come close to achieving these sole ownership benefits, with lower transaction costs. In this paper we look at the applicability of different management models with industry involvement to low value fisheries with a small number of participants. We provide an illustration as to how a fishery could be transitioned to a corporate-cooperative management model that captures the key benefits of sole management at a low cost and is consistent with societal objectives.