74 resultados para Supreme Court Act 1995 s 253
em Queensland University of Technology - ePrints Archive
Resumo:
In Virgtel Ltd v Zabusky [2009] QCA 92 the Queensland Court of Appeal considered the scope of an order “as to costs only” within the meaning of s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) (‘the Act”). The Court also declined to accept submissions from one of the parties after oral hearing, and made some useful comments which serve as a reminder to practitioners of their obligations in that regard.
Resumo:
The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 262 provides clear direction on the Court’s expectations of a party seeking leave to appeal a costs order.This decision is likely to impact upon common practice in relation to appeals against costs orders. It sends a clear message to trial judges that they should not give leave as of course when giving a judgment in relation to costs, and that parties seeking leave under s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) should make a separate application. The application should be supported by material presenting an arguable case that the trial judge made an error in the exercise of the discretion of the kind described in House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499. A different, and interesting, aspect of this appeal is that it was the first wholly electronic civil appeal. The court-provided technology had been adopted at trial, and the Court of Appeal dispensed with any requirement for hard copy appeal record books.
Resumo:
The case of Flynn v The Maryborough Sugar Factory Limited [2003] QDC 446 the plaintiff had been awarded damages for personal injuries and there was a charge on those damages under a Commonwealth statute, with a provision in the statute that damages could not be satisfied until the Commonwealth had been paid. The Court considered the point of considerable practical significance of whether interest accrued on the judgment under s48 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) before the defendant had obtained clearances under the Commonwealth legislation.
Resumo:
Not all companies in Australia are amenable to a winding up order pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Supreme Court of New South Wales has previously dealt with such winding up applications by apparently focusing on the inherent jurisdiction of the court to consider whether the court has jurisdiction to firstly consider the winding up application. This article proposes an original alternative paradigm: the plenary power provided to the court by s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) can be utilised to initially attract the jurisdiction of the court and subsequently the inherent jurisdiction specifically utilising the equitable “just and equitable” ground is available to the court to consider and make such a winding up order if appropriate. Variation of such a paradigm may also be available to the court when considering the inherent jurisdiction in relation to corporation matters more generally.
Resumo:
The United States Supreme Court has handed down a once in a generation patent law decision that will have important ramifications for the patentability of non-physical methods, both internationally and in Australia. In Bilski v Kappos, the Supreme Court considered whether an invention must either be tied to a machine or apparatus, or transform an article into a different state or thing to be patentable. It also considered for the first time whether business methods are patentable subject matter. The decision will be of particular interest to practitioners who followed the litigation in Grant v Commissioner of Patents, a Federal Court decision in which a Brisbane-based inventor was denied a patent over a method of protecting an asset from the claims of creditors.
Resumo:
While there are many reasons why a client may seek removal of a caveat (which retains an interest in land or water allocation), the procedures involved require careful adherence.
Resumo:
The decision of Dalton J in Lai v Soineva [2011] QSC 247 has resulted in a change in the latest versions of the Real Estate Institute of Queensland (REIQ) contracts.
Resumo:
In Lambert v Surplice [2004] QDC 092 McGill DCJ considered the extent to which the court should exercise a discretion on an application under s79 of the District Court Act 1967 to transfer a proceeding pending in the Magistrates Court to the District Court.
Resumo:
Effective enforcement of intellectual property (IP) rights has become a significant issue due to concerns about the effects of IP infringement, including trade mark counterfeiting. It is an important issue for the Australian Government as IP rights underpin a strong, modern economy. Criminal offences and civil remedies can be an important element of an enforcement regime. This review of penalties and additional damages in the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (Trade Marks Act) has been prompted by a recommendation made by the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP), recent changes to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (Copyright Act) and concerns raised by stakeholders. The purpose of this paper is to elicit comments on options which IP Australia is considering recommending to Government.
Resumo:
NSW Supreme Court decision - claim resulting from alleged damaging dental treatment of healthy teeth - failure of plaintiff to prove dishonest and fraudulent behaviour - assessment of damages.
Resumo:
In Newson v Aust Scan Pty Ltd t/a Ikea Springwood [2010] QSC 223 the Supreme Court examined the discretion under s 32(2) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), to permit a document which has not been disclosed as required by the pre-court procedures under the PIPA to be used in a subsequent court proceeding. This appears to be the first time that the nature and parameters of the discretion have been judicially considered.
Resumo:
In Legal Services Commissioner and Wright [2010] QSC 168 and Amos v Ian K Fry & Company, the Supreme Court of Queensland considered the scope of some of the provisions of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), including the definition of “third party payer” in s 301 of the Act.