Analysing strategic alliances in building construction

Building construction is a highly competitive and risky business. This competitiveness is compounded where conflicting objectives amongst contracting and subcontracting firms sets the stage for an adversarial and potentially destructive approach. There is a need for change in the construction industry—not only to a more cooperative approach to build mutual trust, respect and good faith—but also from a confrontationist and adversarial attitude to a harmonious relationship. It is necessary to change the culture to create a win-win situation. “Strategic Alliances” is one such concept. A strategic alliance is a cooperative arrangement between two or more organisations that forms part of their overall strategies, and contributes to achieving their major goals and objectives. This paper begins with an overview of the Australian building construction industry, then reviews the literature and describes an analysis framework comprising six attributes of strategic alliances—trust, commitment, interdependence, cooperation, communication, and joint problem solving. Given the trend towards greater emphasis on broader contracting firm performance criteria, indicators are proposed as a component of the tender evaluation process for public works.

Strategic alliances in building construction : a tender evaluation tool for the public sector

Building construction is a highly competitive and risky business. This competitiveness is compounded where conflicting objectives amongst contracting and subcontracting firms set the stage for an adversarial and potentially destructive business relationship. Clients, especially those from the public sector, need broader tender evaluation criteria to complement the traditional focus on bid price. There is also a need for change in the construction industry—not only to a more cooperative approach between the constructing parties—but also from a confrontationist attitude to a more harmonious relationship between all stakeholders in providing constructed facilities. A strategic alliance is a cooperative relationship between two or more organisations that forms part of their overall strategies, and contributes to achieving their major goals and objectives. Strategic alliances in building construction may provide a useful tool to assist public sector construction managers evaluate tenders and concurrently encourage more cooperative relationships amongst construction stakeholders. This paper begins with an overview of the Australian building construction industry, then reviews the existing strategic alliance literature and describes an analysis framework comprising six attributes of strategic alliances for application to construction organisations—trust, commitment, interdependence, cooperation, communication, and joint problem solving. These attributes are currently being used to collect data from 70 building construction firms in Queensland to assess their respective levels of strategic alliance. Given the trend towards broader indicators of construction firm performance, these attributes are proposed as a tool for use in the tender evaluation process for public works.

To bound or not to bound: preliminary Theory of Time Bounds Specification in strategic alliances

This article augments Resource Dependence Theory with Real Options reasoning in order to explain time bounds specification in strategic alliances. Whereas prior work has found about a 50/50 split between alliances that are time bound and those that are open-ended, their substantive differences and antecedents are ill understood. To address this, we suggest that the two alliance modes present different real options trade-offs in adaptation to environmental uncertainty: ceteris paribus, time-bound alliances are likely to provide abandonment options over open-ended alliances, but require additional investments to extend the alliance when this turns out to be desirable after formation. Open-ended alliances are likely to provide growth options over open-ended alliances, but they demand additional effort to abandon the alliance if post-formation circumstances so desire. Therefore, we expect time bounds specification to be a function of environmental uncertainty: organizations in more uncertain environments will be relatively more likely to place time bounds on their strategic alliances. Longitudinal archival and survey data collected amongst 39 industry clusters provides empirical support for our claims, which contribute to the recent renaissance of resource dependence theory by specifying the conditions under which organizations choose different time windows in strategic partnering.

Built to last versus meant to end : time bounds specification in strategic alliances

This article explores an important temporal aspect of the design of strategic alliances by focusing on the issue of time bounds specification. Time bounds specification refers to a choice on behalf of prospective alliance partners at the time of alliance formation to either pre-specify the duration of an alliance to a specific time window, or to keep the alliance open-ended (Reuer & Ariňo, 2007). For instance, Das (2006) mentions the example of the alliance between Telemundo Network and Mexican Argos Comunicacion (MAC). Announced in October 2000, this alliance entailed a joint production of 1200 hours of comedy, news, drama, reality and novella programs (Das, 2006). Conditioned on the projected date of completing the 1200 hours of programs, Telemundo Network and MAC pre-specified the time bounds of the alliance ex ante. Such time-bound alliances are said to be particularly prevalent in project-based industries, like movie production, construction, telecommunications and pharmaceuticals (Schwab & Miner, 2008). In many other instances, however, firms may choose to keep their alliances open-ended, not specifying a specific time bound at the time of alliance formation. The choice between designing open-ended alliances that are “built to last”, versus time bound alliances that are “meant to end” is important. Seminal works like Axelrod (1984), Heide & Miner (1992), and Parkhe (1993) demonstrated that the choice to place temporal bounds on a collaborative venture has important implications. More specifically, collaborations that have explicit, short term time bounds (i.e. what is termed a shorter “shadow of the future”) are more likely to experience opportunism (Axelrod, 1984), are more likely to focus on the immediate present (Bakker, Boros, Kenis & Oerlemans, 2012), and are less likely to develop trust (Parkhe, 1993) than alliances for which time bounds are kept indeterminate. These factors, in turn, have been shown to have important implications for the performance of alliances (e.g. Kale, Singh & Perlmutter, 2000). Thus, there seems to be a strong incentive for organizations to form open-ended strategic alliances. And yet, Reuer & Ariňo (2007), one of few empirical studies that details the prevalence of time-bound and open-ended strategic alliances, found that about half (47%) of the alliances in their sample were time bound, the other half were open-ended. What conditions, then, determine this choice?

Determinants of knowledge transfer and learning in hybrid public private alliances

This paper uses the case study of a hybrid public-private strategic alliance as data to complement and contrast with the traditional views on knowledge transfer and learning between alliance partners. In particular, the paper explores whether the concept of competitive collaboration conceptualized by Hamel (1991) in his seminal work holds true for all forms of strategic alliances. Conceptualizing the knowledge boundaries of organisations in alliances as a ‘collaborative membrane’, we focus attention on the permeability of these boundaries rather than the actual location of the boundaries. In this vein, we present a case study of a major public sector organization that illustrates how these principles have allowed it to start rebuilding its internal capabilities adopting a more collaborative stance and ensuring their knowledge boundaries are highly porous as they move more major projects into hybrid public private alliance contracts.

Rivalry within and between strategic networks : an investigation of the United States Automotive Industry

As a consequence of the increased incidence of collaborative arrangements between firms, the competitive environment characterising many industries has undergone profound change. It is suggested that rivalry is not necessarily enacted by individual firms according to the traditional mechanisms of direct confrontation in factor and product markets, but rather as collaborative orchestration between a number of participants or network members. Strategic networks are recognised as sets of firms within an industry that exhibit denser strategic linkages among themselves than other firms within the same industry. Based on this, strategic networks are determined according to evidence of strategic alliances between firms comprising the industry. As a result, a single strategic network represents a group of firms closely linked according to collaborative ties. Arguably, the collective outcome of these strategic relationships engineered between firms suggest that the collaborative benefits attributed to interorganisational relationships require closer examination in respect to their propensity to influence rivalry in intraindustry environments. Derived in large from the social sciences, network theory allows for the micro and macro examination of the opportunities and constraints inherent in the structure of relationships in strategic networks, establishing a relational approach upon which the conduct and performance of firms can be more fully understood. Research to date has yet to empirically investigate the relationship between strategic networks and rivalry. The limited research that has been completed utilising a network rationale to investigate competitive patterns in contemporary industry environments has been characterised by a failure to directly measure rivalry. Further, this prior research has typically embedded investigation in industry settings dominated by technological or regulatory imperatives, such as the microprocessor and airline industries. These industries, due to the presence of such imperatives, are arguably more inclined to support the realisation of network rivalry, through subscription to prescribed technological standards (eg., microprocessor industry) or by being bound by regulatory constraints dictating operation within particular market segments (airline industry). In order to counter these weaknesses, the proposition guiding research - Are patterns of rivalry predicted by strategic network membership? – is embedded in the United States Light Vehicles Industry, an industry not dominated by technological or regulatory imperatives. Further, rivalry is directly measured and utilised in research, thus distinguishing this investigation from prior research efforts. The timeframe of investigation is 1993 – 1999, with all research data derived from secondary sources. Strategic networks were defined within the United States Light Vehicles Industry based on evidence of horizontal strategic relationships between firms comprising the industry. The measure of rivalry used to directly ascertain the competitive patterns of industry participants was derived from the traditional Herfindahl Index, modified to account for patterns of rivalry observed at the market segment level. Statistical analyses of the strategic network and rivalry constructs found little evidence to support the contention of network rivalry; indeed, greater levels of rivalry were observed between firms comprising the same strategic network than between firms participating in opposing network structures. Based on these results, patterns of rivalry evidenced in the United States Light Vehicle Industry over the period 1993 – 1999 were not found to be predicted by strategic network membership. The findings generated by this research are in contrast to current theorising in the strategic network – rivalry realm. In this respect, these findings are surprising. The relevance of industry type, in conjunction with prevailing network methodology, provides the basis upon which these findings are contemplated. Overall, this study raises some important questions in relation to the relevancy of the network rivalry rationale, establishing a fruitful avenue for further research.

Career implications of multi-layered institutional settings

Project work has grown significantly in volume and recognition in recent decades as projects have ‘become a common form of work organization in all sectors of the economy’ (Lindgren & Packendorff, 2006: 841). This increase in project-based work is just one of the many changes that have been affecting the nature of work, the employment relationship and the associated conceptualization and experience of careers (Baruch, 2004b; Söderlund & Bredin, 2006). A career can be defined as a process of development along a path of work experience and roles in one or more organizations (Baruch & Rosenstein, 1992), and careers involving project-based work take place within multi layered institutional settings. Projects are generally undertaken by small temporary organizations (Ekstedt, Lundin, Söderholm & Wirdenius, 1999; Pettigrew, 2003; Söderlund, 2012) which in turn may form part of larger, permanent entities; involve people drawn from a number of disciplines and organizations; or be formed as partnerships, joint ventures or strategic alliances between two or more organizations (Scott, 2007).

ACE research vignette 026 : Do Entrepreneurs’ Personal Networks Influence Small Firm Performance?

This series of research vignettes is aimed at sharing current and interesting research findings from our team of international Entrepreneurship researchers. This vignette, written by Dr. Rene Bakker, examines the evidence on the effects of a entrepreneurs’ personal networks on small firm performance, and the factors that moderate this relationship.