Points of convergence and divergence : normative, institutional and operational relationships between R2P and POC

As an international norm, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has gained substantial influence and institutional presence—and created no small controversy—in the ten years since its first conceptualisation. Conversely, the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (PoC) has a longer pedigree and enjoys a less contested reputation. Yet UN Security Council action in Libya in 2011 has thrown into sharp relief the relationship between the two. UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 follow exactly the process envisaged by R2P in response to imminent atrocity crimes, yet the operative paragraphs of the resolutions themselves invoke only PoC. This article argues that, while the agendas of PoC and R2P converge with respect to Security Council action in cases like Libya, outside this narrow context it is important to keep the two norms distinct. Peacekeepers, humanitarian actors, international lawyers, individual states and regional organisations are required to act differently with respect to the separate agendas and contexts covered by R2P and PoC. While overlap between the two does occur in highly visible cases like Libya, neither R2P nor PoC collapses normatively, institutionally or operationally into the other.

Capacity-building workshops on the responsibility to protect (R2P) and the protection of civilians (POC) in armed conflict - Summary Report

In June 2011, a research project team from the Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law (IEGL), Queensland University of Technology, the United Nations University, and the Australian Government’s Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (APCMCOE) held three Capacity-Building Workshops (the Workshops) on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Protection of Civilians (POC) in Armed Conflict in Manila, Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta. The research project is funded by the Australian Responsibility to Protect Fund, with support from APCMCOE. Developments in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire and the actions of the United Nations Security Council have given new significance to the relationship between R2P and POC, providing impetus to the relevance and application of the POC principle recognised in numerous Security Council resolutions, and the R2P principle, which was recognised by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 and, now, by the Security Council. The Workshops considered the relationship between R2P and POC. The project team presented the preliminary findings of their study and sought contributions and feedback from Workshop participants. Prior to the Workshops, members of the project team undertook interviews with UN offices and agencies, international organisations (IOs) and non-government organisations (NGOs) in Geneva and New York as part of the process of mapping the relationship between R2P and POC. Initial findings were considered at an Academic-Practitioner Workshop held at the University of Sydney in November 2010. In addition to an extensive literature review and a series of academic publications, the project team is preparing a practical guidance text (the Guide) on the relationship between R2P and POC to assist the United Nations, governments, regional bodies, IOs and NGOs in considering and applying appropriate protection strategies. It is intended that the Guide be presented to the United Nations Secretariat in New York in early 2012. The primary aim of the Workshops was to test the project’s initial findings among an audience of diplomats, military, police, civilian policy-makers, practitioners, researchers and experts from within the region. Through dialogue and discussion, the project team gathered feedback – comments, questions, critique and suggestions – to help shape the development of practical guidance about when, how and by whom R2P and POC might be implemented.

China and the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) : the implications of the Libyan intervention

The emerging principle of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) presents a direct challenge to China's traditional emphasis on the twin principles of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and non-use of military force. This paper considers the evolution of China‟s relationship with R2P over the past ten years. In particular, it examines how China engaged with R2P during the recent Libyan crisis, and considers what impact this conflict may have first, on Chinese attitudes to R2P, and second, on the future development and implementation of the doctrine itself. This paper argues that China‟s decision to allow the passage of Security Council resolution 1973, authorising force in Libya, was shaped by an unusual set of pragmatic considerations, and should not be viewed as evidence of a dramatic shift in Chinese attitudes towards R2P. More broadly, controversy over the scope of NATO's military action in Libya has raised questions about R2P‟s legitimacy, which has contributed to a lack of timely international action in Syria and Yemen. In the short term at least, this post-Libya backlash against R2P is likely to constrain the Security Council‟s ability to respond decisively to other civilian protection situations.

The BRICS and R2P : contestation, re-interpretation and norm entrepreneurship

The intra-state humanitarian crises in Libya and Syria have led to renewed debate over the content and implementation of pillar three of the responsibility to protect (R2P). This paper examines the BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) current perspectives on R2P and their recent efforts to shape the concept’s evolution. While Brazil’s “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP) proposal has been widely discussed, the central focus here is on the lesser-known, semi-official Chinese idea of “Responsible Protection” (RP). Like RwP, RP proposes decision-making criteria and accountability mechanisms for UN-authorised military intervention under R2P’s third pillar. This paper argues that although RP draws heavily on previous R2P proposals such as the original 2001 ICISS report and Brazil’s RwP, by amalgamating and re-packaging these earlier ideas in a more restrictive form the Chinese initiative represents a new and distinctive interpretation of R2P. However, as it currently stands, some aspects of RP appear to be framed too strictly to provide workable guidelines for determining the permissibility of R2P military intervention, and would, therefore, benefit from clarification and refinement. Of broader significance, China’s RP and Brazil’s RwP initiatives point to the growing willingness of rising, non-Western powers to articulate and promote their own normative preferences on sovereignty, intervention and global governance. This development has potential implications both for R2P’s evolution and for the structure of the international system.

China's "Responsible Protection" concept : re-interpreting the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and military intervention for humanitarian purposes

This article assesses the extent to which the recently formulated Chinese concept of “Responsible Protection” (RP) offers a valuable contribution to the normative debate over R2P’s third pillar following the controversy over military intervention in Libya. While RP draws heavily on previous proposals such as the original 2001 ICISS report and Brazil’s “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP), by amalgamating and re-packaging these earlier ideas in a more restrictive form the initiative represents a new and distinctive interpretation of R2P. However, some aspects of RP are framed too narrowly to provide workable guidelines for determining the permissibility of military intervention for civilian protection purposes, and should therefore be clarified and refined. Nevertheless, the Chinese proposal remains significant because it offers important insights into Beijing’s current stance on R2P. More broadly, China’s RP and Brazil’s RwP initiatives illustrate the growing willingness of rising, non-Western powers to assert their own normative preferences on sovereignty, intervention and global governance.

R2P ten years after the World Summit: Explaining ongoing contestation over Pillar III

This article examines how and why contrasting interpretations of the international community’s role in preventing and responding to mass atrocity crimes continue to exist a decade after the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was unanimously endorsed at the 2005 World Summit. Building on recent critical constructivist insights into the fluid, dynamic nature of norms, it advances two main arguments. The first is that continuing contestation over R2P’s third pillar is a product of a combination of internal and external sources of norm dynamism. R2P’s inherently complex normative structure, coupled with several external factors, including the broader normative environment, norm implementation experiences and a shift in global power towards the BRICS, have contributed to a period of renewed contestation and triggered attempts to re-formulate R2P thorough Brazil’s ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ (RwP) proposal and China’s semi-official ‘Responsible Protection’ concept. The second central argument is that such contestation is affecting R2P’s distinct normative prescriptions in different ways. While resistance to the implementation of coercive pillar III measures is currently impeding the normative progress of that component of the norm, this contestation has not prevented consensual pillar II assistance from becoming more deeply embedded in international practice and discourse.

Libya and the international community’s 'responsibility to protect'

The Libyan regime’s attacks on its own civilian population are a test case for the international community’s commitment to the notion of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P). The UN Security Council’s statement on 22 February 2011 explicitly invoked this concept by calling on “the Government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its population”. Yet, with Muammar Gaddafi encouraging further violence against protesters and threatening to fight “until the last drop of blood” it seems unlikely that the Security Council’s warning will be heeded. Greater pressure from the international community will be needed to bring an end to the atrocities in Libya. The international response to the Libyan crisis represents an opportunity to translate the theory of R2P into practice.

Responsibility to Protect and Sovereignty

The responsibility to protect ('R2P') principle articulates the obligations of the international community to prevent conflict occurring, to intervene in conflicts, and to assist in rebuilding after conflicts. The doctrine is about protecting civilians in armed conflicts from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. This book examines interventions in East Timor, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Kosovo. The chapters explore and question UN debates with respect to the doctrine both before and after its adoption in 2005; contrasting state attitudes to international military intervention; and what takes place after intervention. It also discusses the ability of the Security Council to access reliable information and credible and transparent processes to enable it to make a determination on the occurrence of atrocities in a Member State. Questioning whether there is a need to find a closer operational link between the responsibilities to prevent and react and a normative link between R2P and principles of international law, the contributions examine the effectiveness of the framework of R2P for international decision-making in response to mass atrocity crimes and ask how an international system to deal with threats and mass atrocities can be developed in the absence of a central authority. This book will be valuable to those interested in international law, human rights, and security, peace and conflict studies

China and the "Responsibility to Protect" : the implications of the Libyan intervention

The emerging principle of a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) presents a direct challenge to China’s traditional emphasis on the twin principles of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and non-use of military force. This paper considers the evolution of China’s relationship with R2P over the past ten years. In particular, it examines how China engaged with R2P during the recent Libyan crisis, and considers what impact this conflict may have first, on Chinese attitudes to R2P, and second, on the future development and implementation of the doctrine itself. This paper argues that China’s decision to allow the passage of Security Council resolution 1973, authorising force in Libya, was shaped by an unusual set of political and factual circumstances, and should not be viewed as evidence of a dramatic shift in Chinese attitudes towards R2P. More broadly, controversy over the scope of NATO’s military action in Libya has raised questions about R2P’s legitimacy, which have contributed to a lack of timely international action in Syria. In the short term at least, this post-Libya backlash against R2P is likely to constrain the Security Council’s ability to respond decisively to other civilian protection situations.

The BRICS and the responsibility to protect : lessons from the Libyan and Syrian crises

The emerging ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) principle presents a significant challenge to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) states’ traditional emphasis on a strict Westphalian understanding of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Despite formally endorsing R2P at the 2005 World Summit, each of the BRICS has, to varying degrees, retained misgivings about coercive measures under the doctrine’s third pillar. This paper examines how these rising powers engaged with R2P during the 2011–2012 Libyan and Syrian civilian protection crises. The central finding is that although all five states expressed similar concerns over NATO’s military campaign in Libya, they have been unable to maintain a common BRICS position on R2P in Syria. Instead, the BRICS have splintered into two sub-groups. The first, consisting of Russia and China, remains steadfastly opposed to any coercive measures against Syria. The second, comprising the democratic IBSA states (India, Brazil and South Africa) has displayed softer, more flexible stances towards proposed civilian protection measures in Syria, although these three states also remain cautious about the implementation of R2P’s coercive dimension. This paper identifies a number of factors which help to explain this split, arguing that the failure to maintain a cohesive BRICS position on R2P is unsurprising given the many internal differences and diverging national interests between the BRICS members. Overall, the BRICS’ ongoing resistance to intervention is unlikely to disappear quickly, indicating that further attempts to operationalize R2P’s third pillar may prove difficult.