129 resultados para Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 s 56
em Queensland University of Technology - ePrints Archive
Resumo:
In Amos v Brisbane City Council [2005] QCA 433 the Queensland Court of Appeal was called upon to determine the scope of s56 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002. The decision makes it clear that the section does not provide a complete code governing awards of damages and does not deprive the court of power to award costs against a plaintiff who fails to succeed on liability.
Resumo:
The decision of Atkinson J in Watkins v State of Queensland [2007] QSC 057 on an application for disclosure of documents under s27 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) required determination of a range of issues relating to the disclosure of documents and legal professional privilege.
Resumo:
In Newson v Aust Scan Pty Ltd t/a Ikea Springwood [2010] QSC 223 the Supreme Court examined the discretion under s 32(2) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), to permit a document which has not been disclosed as required by the pre-court procedures under the PIPA to be used in a subsequent court proceeding. This appears to be the first time that the nature and parameters of the discretion have been judicially considered.
Resumo:
In Woolworths Ltd v Graham [2007] QDC 301 Searles DCJ struck out a pre-proceedings application under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld)on the basis that the material before the Court was not sufficient to attract the jurisdiction of the District Court.The decision serves more broadly as a reminder that the District Court is an inferior court of defined and limited jurisdiction and that any proceedings brought in it must be demonstrably within the jurisdiction conferred on that court by legislation.
Resumo:
In Hare v Mount Isa City Council [2009] QDC 39 McGill DCJ examined the scope of s 27(1) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) and its interpretation by the Court of Appeal in Haug v Jupiters Ltd [2008] 1 Qd R 276. The judge expressed a number of concerns about the Act and the Regulation made under it, that are worthy of consideration by the Legislature.
Resumo:
In Huag v Jupiters Limited [2007] QSC 068, Lyons J considered the extent of the obligations imposed upon a respondent under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 to disclose documents and information.
Resumo:
In Huag v Jupiters Limited [2007] QCA 199 the Queensland Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from interlocutory orders made in the trial division of the court and concluded that, although provisions such as s27 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) should be given a broad, remedial construction, this did not mean the words of limitation in the section could be ignored.
Resumo:
In Lamb v State of Queensland [2003] QDC 003 McGill DCJ considered an application under s43 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002. That provision permits the court to give a claimant leave to start a proceeding notwithstanding non-compliance with part 1 of chapter two of the Act, "if the court is satisfied there is an urgent need to start the proceeding."
Resumo:
In Inglis v Connell [2003] QDC 029 the court considered s6(3) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 in relation to the application of the Act. The conclusion reached was that the provision should be interpreted as providing that the requirements of the Act do not apply in respect of personal injury the subject of any proceeding commenced before June 18, 2002.
Resumo:
In Devlin v South Mole Island Resort [2003] QSC 020 the Court concluded the applicant was entitled to pursue a concurrent claim he alleged he had against the respondent under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 in respect of injuries sustained in the course of employment, and also that the Workcover Queensland Act 1996 did not abolish the applicant's right to proceed against the respondent.
Resumo:
The case of Flynn v The Maryborough Sugar Factory Limited [2003] QDC 446 the plaintiff had been awarded damages for personal injuries and there was a charge on those damages under a Commonwealth statute, with a provision in the statute that damages could not be satisfied until the Commonwealth had been paid. The Court considered the point of considerable practical significance of whether interest accrued on the judgment under s48 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) before the defendant had obtained clearances under the Commonwealth legislation.
Resumo:
At common law, a duty of care may be owed to a claimant who suffers nervous shock or pure mental harm due to witnessing, or hearing about, physical injury caused to another due to a defendant’s negligence. “Pure mental harm” is the ‘impairment of a person’s mental condition’ that is not suffered as a consequence of any other kind of personal injury to them. However, as many accidents have the potential to create a wide circle of mental suffering to bystanders, family members or others not physically injured themselves, it has traditionally been ‘thought impolitic that everybody so affected should be able to recover damages from the tortfeasor.’ ‘To allow such extended recovery would stretch liability too far.’ Nevertheless, whilst adopting a restrictive approach to liability, the common law courts have recognised that a defendant might owe a duty in relation to the pure mental harm suffered by one who foreseeably attends an accident scene to rescue another from a situation created by the defendant’s negligence.
Resumo:
The article revises established principles relating to the awarding of damages to the date of judgment and discusses decisions in the High Court and in the Supreme Court of Queensland which have caused significant changes to the manner of assessments of interest. Its purpose is to provide for practitioners involved in personal injuries litigation in Queensland a current set of guidelines as to the manner in which the wide discretion to award interest may be expected to be exercised.
Resumo:
Resolving insurance disputes can focus only on quantum. Where insurers adopt integrative solutions they can enjoy cost savings and higher customer satisfaction. An integratively managed process can expand the negotiation options. The potential inherent in plaintiff’s emotions to resolve matters on an emotional basis, rather than an economic one, is explored. Using research, the author demonstrates how mediations are more likely to obtain integrative outcomes than unmediated conferences. Using a combination of governmental reports, published studies and academic publications, the paper demonstrates how mediation is more likely to foster an environment where the parties communicate and cooperate. Research is employed to demonstrate where mediators can reduce hostilities, in circumstances where negotiating parties alone would likely fail. Generally the paper constructs an argument to support the proposition that mediation can offer insurers an effective mechanism to reduce costs and increase customer satisfaction. INTRODUCTION Mediation can offer insurers an effective mechanism to reduce costs and increase customer satisfaction. This paper will first demonstrate the differences between distributive and integrative outcomes. It is argued insurer’s interest can be far better served through obtaining an integrative solution. The paper explains how the mediator can assist both parties to obtain an integrative outcome. Simultaneously the paper explores the extreme difficulties conference participants face in obtaining an integrative outcome without a mediator in an adversarial climate. The mediator’s ability to assist in the facilitation of integrative information exchange, defuse hostilities and reality check expectations is discussed. The mediator’s ability to facilitate in this area is compared to the inability of conference participants to achieve similar results. This paper concludes, the potential financial benefit offered by integrative solutions, combined with the ability of mediation to deliver such outcomes where unmediated conferences cannot deliver, leads to the recommendation that insurers opt for a mediation to best serve their commercial interests.
Resumo:
The fundamental personal property rule – no one can transfer a better title to property than they had – is subject to exceptions in the Sale of Goods legislation, which aim to protect innocent buyers who are deceived by a seller’s apparent physical possession of property. These exceptions cover a limited range of transactions and are restrictive in their operation. Australia now has national legislation - the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) - which will apply to many transactions outside the scope of the Sale of Goods Act and which includes rules for sales by non-owners which will provide exceptions to the nemo dat quod non habet rule for many common commercial transactions. This article explores the effect of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) on the Sale of Goods exceptions, explains that the new provisions are so wide that there is little continuing relevance for the Sale of Goods Act exceptions, and indicates where they may still apply.