Are the financial services external complaints resolution schemes subject to judicial review?

In Australia seven schemes (apart from the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal) provide alternative dispute resolution services for complaints brought by consumers against financial services industry members. Recently the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the decisions of one scheme were amenable to judicial review at the suit of a financial services provider member and the Supreme Court of Victoria has since taken a similar approach. This article examines the juristic basis for such a challenge and contends that judicial review is not available, either at common law or under statutory provisions. This is particularly the case since Financial Industry Complaints Service Ltd v Deakin Financial Services Pty Ltd (2006) 157 FCR 229; 60 ACSR 372 decided that the jurisdiction of a scheme is derived from a contract made with its members. The article goes on to contend that the schemes are required to give procedural fairness and that equitable remedies are available if that duty is breached.

The inherent equitable jurisdiction and the plenary power of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to order the winding up of companies

Not all companies in Australia are amenable to a winding up order pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Supreme Court of New South Wales has previously dealt with such winding up applications by apparently focusing on the inherent jurisdiction of the court to consider whether the court has jurisdiction to firstly consider the winding up application. This article proposes an original alternative paradigm: the plenary power provided to the court by s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) can be utilised to initially attract the jurisdiction of the court and subsequently the inherent jurisdiction specifically utilising the equitable “just and equitable” ground is available to the court to consider and make such a winding up order if appropriate. Variation of such a paradigm may also be available to the court when considering the inherent jurisdiction in relation to corporation matters more generally.

Bilski v Kappos : The United States Supreme Court delivers mixed views on patenting non-physical inventions and business methods

The United States Supreme Court has handed down a once in a generation patent law decision that will have important ramifications for the patentability of non-physical methods, both internationally and in Australia. In Bilski v Kappos, the Supreme Court considered whether an invention must either be tied to a machine or apparatus, or transform an article into a different state or thing to be patentable. It also considered for the first time whether business methods are patentable subject matter. The decision will be of particular interest to practitioners who followed the litigation in Grant v Commissioner of Patents, a Federal Court decision in which a Brisbane-based inventor was denied a patent over a method of protecting an asset from the claims of creditors.

Caveat today gone tomorrow : Applying to the Supreme Court to Remove a Caveat

While there are many reasons why a client may seek removal of a caveat (which retains an interest in land or water allocation), the procedures involved require careful adherence.

Civil applications in the Magistrates Court are often set down for hearing by a judicial registrar, but there is now some uncertainty on the limitation of this practice

The decision of the District Court of Queensland in Mark Treherne & Associates -v- Murray David Hopkins [2010] QDC 36 will have particular relevance for early career lawyers. This decision raises questions about the limits of the jurisdiction of judicial registrars in the Magistrates Court.

Supreme Court Decision Results in a Change to Standard Contracts

The decision of Dalton J in Lai v Soineva [2011] QSC 247 has resulted in a change in the latest versions of the Real Estate Institute of Queensland (REIQ) contracts.

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253 – whether refusal to stay execution of costs is an order “as to costs only”

In Virgtel Ltd v Zabusky [2009] QCA 92 the Queensland Court of Appeal considered the scope of an order “as to costs only” within the meaning of s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) (‘the Act”). The Court also declined to accept submissions from one of the parties after oral hearing, and made some useful comments which serve as a reminder to practitioners of their obligations in that regard.

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253 - leave to appeal costs orders - appeal against substantive judgment insufficient - must be arguable case that discretion will be overturned on appeal

The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 262 provides clear direction on the Court���s expectations of a party seeking leave to appeal a costs order.This decision is likely to impact upon common practice in relation to appeals against costs orders. It sends a clear message to trial judges that they should not give leave as of course when giving a judgment in relation to costs, and that parties seeking leave under s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) should make a separate application. The application should be supported by material presenting an arguable case that the trial judge made an error in the exercise of the discretion of the kind described in House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499. A different, and interesting, aspect of this appeal is that it was the first wholly electronic civil appeal. The court-provided technology had been adopted at trial, and the Court of Appeal dispensed with any requirement for hard copy appeal record books.

Supreme Court Act 1995 s48 - Interest on judgment for damages for personal injuries

The case of Flynn v The Maryborough Sugar Factory Limited [2003] QDC 446 the plaintiff had been awarded damages for personal injuries and there was a charge on those damages under a Commonwealth statute, with a provision in the statute that damages could not be satisfied until the Commonwealth had been paid. The Court considered the point of considerable practical significance of whether interest accrued on the judgment under s48 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) before the defendant had obtained clearances under the Commonwealth legislation.

Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment in a patient's best interests : Australian judicial deliberations

•Intractable disputes about withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from adults who lack capacity are rare but challenging. Judicial resolution may be needed in some of these cases. •A central concept for judicial (and clinical) decision making in this area is a patient's “best interests”. Yet what this term means is contested. •There is an emerging Supreme Court jurisprudence that sheds light on when life-sustaining treatment will, or will not, be judged to be in a patient's best interests. •Treatment that is either futile or overly burdensome is not in a patient's best interests. Although courts will consider patient and family wishes, they have generally deferred to the views of medical practitioners about treatment decisions.

Contemporary issues in Australian family law: Do we need a more unified and interventionist judicial model

Recent decisions of the Family Court of Australian reflect concerns over the adversarial nature of the legal process. The processes and procedures of the judicial system militate against a detailed examination of the issues and rights of the parties in dispute. The limitations of the family law framework are particularly demonstrated in disputes over the custody of children where the Court has tended to neglect the rights and interests of the primary carer. An alternative "unified family court" framework will be examined in which the Court pursues a more active and interventionist approach in the determination of family law disputes.

Regulating Multi-National Corporations Through State-Based Laws : Problems with Enforcing Human Rights Under The Alien Tort Statute

Under the Alien Tort Statute United States of America (“America”) Federal Courts have the jurisdiction to hear claims for civil wrongs, committed against non-American citizens, which were perpetrated outside America’s national borders. The operation of this law has confronted American Federal Courts with difficulties on how to manage conflicts between American executive foreign policy and judicial interpretations of international law. Courts began to pass judgment over conduct which was approved by foreign governments. Then in 2005 the American Supreme Court wound back the scope of the Alien Tort Statute. This article will review the problems with the expansion of the Alien Tort Statute and the reasons for its subsequent narrowing.

Termination of a minor’s pregnancy : critical issues for consent and the criminal law

The recent Supreme Court decision of Queensland v B [2008] 2 Qd R 562 has significant implications for the law that governs consent and abortions. The judgment purports to extend the ratio of Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB and SMB (1991) 175 CLR 218 (Marion’s Case) and impose a requirement of court approval for terminations of pregnancy for minors who are not Gillick-competent. This article argues against the imposition of this requirement on the ground that such an approach is an unjustifiable extension of the reasoning in Marion’s Case. The decision, which is the first judicial consideration in Queensland of the position of medical terminations, also reveals systemic problems with the criminal law in that State. In concluding that the traditional legal excuse for abortions will not apply to those which are performed medically, Queensland v B provides further support for calls to reform this area of law.