The constitutional power to make war: domestic legal issues raised by Australia's action in Iraq

The legal power to declare war has traditionally been a part of a prerogative to be exercised solely on advice that passed from the King to the Governor-General no later than 1942. In 2003, the Governor- General was not involved in the decision by the Prime Minister and Cabinet to commit Australian troops to the invasion of Iraq. The authors explore the alternative legal means by which Australia can go to war - means the government in fact used in 2003 - and the constitutional basis of those means. While the prerogative power can be regulated and/or devolved by legislation, and just possibly by practice, there does not seem to be a sound legal basis to assert that the power has been devolved to any other person. It appears that in 2003 the Defence Minister used his legal powers under the Defence Act 1903 (Cth) (as amended in 1975) to give instructions to the service head(s). A powerful argument could be made that the relevant sections of the Defence Act were not intended to be used for the decision to go to war, and that such instructions are for peacetime or in bello decisions. If so, the power to make war remains within the prerogative to be exercised on advice. Interviews with the then Governor-General indicate that Prime Minister Howard had planned to take the matter to the Federal Executive Council 'for noting', but did not do so after the Governor-General sought the views of the then Attorney-General about relevant issues of international law. The exchange raises many issues, but those of interest concern the kinds of questions the Governor-General could and should ask about proposed international action and whether they in any way mirror the assurances that are uncontroversially required for domestic action. In 2003, the Governor-General's scrutiny was the only independent scrutiny available because the legality of the decision to go to war was not a matter that could be determined in the High Court, and the federal government had taken action in March 2002 that effectively prevented the matter coming before the International Court of Justice

The Asian Tsunami Fallout : Can Schools help Troubled Students

What is the responsibility of schools in managing student mental health in the aftermath of global mega-disasters that saturate the media? Here, the focus is on the Asian tsunami but the same question can be asked in relation to other disturbing events, such as September 11, Australian bushfires with local fatalities and the Iraq War.

Review: "Critical Lessons – What our schools should teach"

At a time when debate over critical education is still going on in Australia, Nel Noddings’ book “Critical Lessons, What Our Schools Should Teach” is a timely and important read.Emeritus Professor of Education at Stanford University, Noddings calls us afresh to consider the deeper questions about the purpose of education – teaching adolescents to think clearly, critically and creatively in times when controversial topics (like the Iraq war) are often taboo in school curricula. In the face of what Noddings calls a pervasive neglect of critical and reflective thinking in high schools, teachers and teacher educators are asked to reconsider what we teach and the way we teach it.

The language of neofeudal corporatism and the war on Iraq

In this paper we argue that the term “capitalism” is no longer useful for understanding the current system of political economic relations in which we live. Rather, we argue that the system can be more usefully characterised as neofeudal corporatism. Using examples drawn from a 300,000 word corpus of public utterances by three political leaders from the “coalition of the willing”— George W. Bush, Tony Blair, and John Howard—we show some defining characteristics of this relatively new system and how they are manifest in political language about the invasion of Iraq.

The empire goes to war : News Corporation and Iraq

The three main contributors to the war on Iraq in March 2003 (the United States, United Kingdom and Australia) are also the three most significant countries in which Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation operates. This article examines the degree of editorial conformity (or otherwise) that existed across the news media of News Corporation in six months leading to the invasion. It compares the framing of the arguments for war and finds significant similarities across the three countries, especially in the output of columnists and commentators employed by News Corporation. While generally pro-war, however, News Corporation outlets also displayed local variations in the caution or stridency of their editorial pitch as well as the degree of toleration for debate. The extent and significance of these variations are used in the article to argue for the development of a more complex political economy model in the study of private news media bias.

Journalists at war

Journalism is an especially hazardous profession when it takes the reporter into zones of war and conflict. The Committee to Protect Journalists records that in 2010 44 journalists were killed while carrying out their duties. Some of these were reporting conflict in Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq and elsewhere. Others were on assignments covering crime and corruption in Mexico, Russia, Venezuela*all places where telling truth to power can easily get you killed, beaten or banged up. In the last 20 years some 874 journalists have been killed on the job, and we salute them all. Journalists get criticised a lot by we scholars, and often for good reason. They can be villains, for sure, but they can also be heroes, when they lay down their lives in the pursuit of the truth. As this piece was being edited, photojournalists Tim Hetherington and Chris Hondros were killed in Libya.

"Get new lawyers!"

In James Rubin's account of the Kosovo war, he describes an exchange between Secretary Albright and Robin Cook (the British Foreign Secretary). Cook was explaining that it is difficult for Britain to commit to the war without UN Security Council approval because the legal advice he had received was that such action would be illegal under international law. Albright's response was, simply, "get new lawyers". Rubin "credits" Blair with a "push" that swung the British to "finally agree" that a UN Security Council resolution was "not legally required". Robin Cook later stated in Parliament and that the war was legal. Interestingly, Blair did not. This article does not look at whether or not such an exchange took place; rather look at the ethical issues that such a situation would generate. The article suggests what the ethical obligations of the key legal players in such institutional dramas should be—including governments seeking advice, the lawyers giving it, the ministers reporting it and the opposition in Parliament. The article sets out the particular responsibilities of the lawyers and officials of a Westminster system. It also sets out some of the institutional mechanisms for making it more likely that those obligations are fulfilled—as always through the interaction of obligations by different players that make it more risky for any player to breach his or her ethical obligations. Analogous duties would be faced by the relevant actors in other systems.

More and more lawyers but still no judges

This paper discusses some parallels and contrasts between the legal roads to war and suggest that the case is stronger than ever for adjudication of the matter before an independent tribunal where the competing views can be tested.

Dissenters in dock at injustice of war

Review of 'The Trial of the Catonsville Nine', Brisbane Festival / Brisbane Powerhouse, published in The Australian, 28 September 200.

Air evacuation in war : the role of RAAF nurses undertaking air evacuation of casualties between 1943-1953

Air transportation of Australian casualties in World War II was initially carried out in air ambulances with an accompanying male medical orderly. By late 1943 with the war effort concentrated in the Pacific, Allied military authorities realised that air transport was needed to move the increasing numbers of casualties over longer distances. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) became responsible for air evacuation of Australian casualties and established a formal medical air evacuation system with trained flight teams early in 1944. Specialised Medical Air Evacuation Transport Units (MAETUs) were established whose sole responsibility was undertaking air evacuations of Australian casualties from the forward operational areas back to definitive medical care. Flight teams consisting of a RAAF nursing sister (registered nurse) and a medical orderly carried out the escort duties. These personnel had been specially trained in Australia for their role. Post-WWII, the RAAF Nursing Service was demobilised with a limited number of nurses being retained for the Interim Air Force. Subsequently, those nurses were offered commissions in the Permanent Air Force. Some of the nurses who remained were air evacuation trained and carried out air evacuations both in Australia and as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Australia became responsible for the air evacuation of British Commonwealth casualties from Korea to Japan. With a re-organisation of the Australian forces as part of the British Commonwealth forces, RAAF nurses were posted to undertake air evacuation from Korea and back to Australia from Iwakuni, Japan. By 1952, a specialised casualty staging section was established in Seoul and staffed by RAAF nurses from Iwakuni on a rotation basis. The development of the Australian air evacuation system and the role of the flight nurses are not well documented for the period 1943-1953. The aims of this research are three fold and include documenting the origins and development of the air evacuation system from 1943-1953; analysing and documenting the RAAF nurse’s role and exploring whether any influences or lessons remain valid today. A traditional historical methodology of narrative and then analysis was used to inform the flight nurse’s role within the totality of the social system. Evidence was based on primary data sources mainly held in Defence files, the Australian War Memorial or the National Archives of Australia. Interviews with 12 ex-RAAF nurses from both WWII and the Korean War were conducted to provide information where there were gaps in the primary data and to enable exploration of the flight nurses’ role and their contributions in war of the air evacuation of casualties. Finally, this thesis highlights two lessons that remain valid today. The first is that interoperability of air evacuation systems with other nations is a force multiplier when resources are scarce or limited. Second, the pre-flight assessment of patients was essential and ensured that there were no deaths in-flight.

Making sense of Australia's war memorials

War memorials are an important part of the Australian landscape and culture. This essay suggests five possible explanations for this: a) imperial loyalty, at least initially; b) the warrior cult; c) guilt at the loss of so many young people in a seemingly senseless fashion; d) the demise of formal religion, and; e) the insecure nature of Australian nationalism.