The inherent equitable jurisdiction and the plenary power of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to order the winding up of companies

Not all companies in Australia are amenable to a winding up order pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Supreme Court of New South Wales has previously dealt with such winding up applications by apparently focusing on the inherent jurisdiction of the court to consider whether the court has jurisdiction to firstly consider the winding up application. This article proposes an original alternative paradigm: the plenary power provided to the court by s 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) can be utilised to initially attract the jurisdiction of the court and subsequently the inherent jurisdiction specifically utilising the equitable “just and equitable” ground is available to the court to consider and make such a winding up order if appropriate. Variation of such a paradigm may also be available to the court when considering the inherent jurisdiction in relation to corporation matters more generally.

Bilski v Kappos : The United States Supreme Court delivers mixed views on patenting non-physical inventions and business methods

The United States Supreme Court has handed down a once in a generation patent law decision that will have important ramifications for the patentability of non-physical methods, both internationally and in Australia. In Bilski v Kappos, the Supreme Court considered whether an invention must either be tied to a machine or apparatus, or transform an article into a different state or thing to be patentable. It also considered for the first time whether business methods are patentable subject matter. The decision will be of particular interest to practitioners who followed the litigation in Grant v Commissioner of Patents, a Federal Court decision in which a Brisbane-based inventor was denied a patent over a method of protecting an asset from the claims of creditors.

Caveat today gone tomorrow : Applying to the Supreme Court to Remove a Caveat

While there are many reasons why a client may seek removal of a caveat (which retains an interest in land or water allocation), the procedures involved require careful adherence.

Supreme Court Decision Results in a Change to Standard Contracts

The decision of Dalton J in Lai v Soineva [2011] QSC 247 has resulted in a change in the latest versions of the Real Estate Institute of Queensland (REIQ) contracts.

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253 – whether refusal to stay execution of costs is an order “as to costs only”

In Virgtel Ltd v Zabusky [2009] QCA 92 the Queensland Court of Appeal considered the scope of an order “as to costs only” within the meaning of s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) (‘the Act”). The Court also declined to accept submissions from one of the parties after oral hearing, and made some useful comments which serve as a reminder to practitioners of their obligations in that regard.

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253 - leave to appeal costs orders - appeal against substantive judgment insufficient - must be arguable case that discretion will be overturned on appeal

The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 262 provides clear direction on the Court’s expectations of a party seeking leave to appeal a costs order.This decision is likely to impact upon common practice in relation to appeals against costs orders. It sends a clear message to trial judges that they should not give leave as of course when giving a judgment in relation to costs, and that parties seeking leave under s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) should make a separate application. The application should be supported by material presenting an arguable case that the trial judge made an error in the exercise of the discretion of the kind described in House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499. A different, and interesting, aspect of this appeal is that it was the first wholly electronic civil appeal. The court-provided technology had been adopted at trial, and the Court of Appeal dispensed with any requirement for hard copy appeal record books.

Supreme Court Act 1995 s48 - Interest on judgment for damages for personal injuries

The case of Flynn v The Maryborough Sugar Factory Limited [2003] QDC 446 the plaintiff had been awarded damages for personal injuries and there was a charge on those damages under a Commonwealth statute, with a provision in the statute that damages could not be satisfied until the Commonwealth had been paid. The Court considered the point of considerable practical significance of whether interest accrued on the judgment under s48 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) before the defendant had obtained clearances under the Commonwealth legislation.

The implication of a term of good faith in commercial leases

Much has been written in the past decade on the subject of the implication of a term of good faith in contracts in Australia, particularly since the judgment Priestley JA in Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. Except for an early article by Rachael Mulheron, 'Good Faith and Commercial Leases: New Opportunities for the Tenant' (1996) 4 APLJ 223, very little else has been written with respect to the possible application of the doctrine to the commercial leases.With the advent of two later New South Wales Supreme Court decisions Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349 and, more recently, Advance Fitness v Bondi Diggers [1999] NSWSC 264, the question of the application of the doctrine in the commercial leasing context has been examined. This article briefly considers the nature and substance of the doctrine against the background of the relationship of lessor and lessee and examines in some depth the Australian decisions on commercial leases where it has been sought, unsuccessfully, to apply the doctrine. The article concludes by suggesting that as a standard commercial lease usually covers the field of agreement between lessor and lessee and as a lessee has a high degree of statutory protection derived from equitable principles, there may be little room for the operation of the doctrine in this legal environment.

Regulating Multi-National Corporations Through State-Based Laws : Problems with Enforcing Human Rights Under The Alien Tort Statute

Under the Alien Tort Statute United States of America (“America”) Federal Courts have the jurisdiction to hear claims for civil wrongs, committed against non-American citizens, which were perpetrated outside America’s national borders. The operation of this law has confronted American Federal Courts with difficulties on how to manage conflicts between American executive foreign policy and judicial interpretations of international law. Courts began to pass judgment over conduct which was approved by foreign governments. Then in 2005 the American Supreme Court wound back the scope of the Alien Tort Statute. This article will review the problems with the expansion of the Alien Tort Statute and the reasons for its subsequent narrowing.

Termination of a minor’s pregnancy : critical issues for consent and the criminal law

The recent Supreme Court decision of Queensland v B [2008] 2 Qd R 562 has significant implications for the law that governs consent and abortions. The judgment purports to extend the ratio of Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB and SMB (1991) 175 CLR 218 (Marion’s Case) and impose a requirement of court approval for terminations of pregnancy for minors who are not Gillick-competent. This article argues against the imposition of this requirement on the ground that such an approach is an unjustifiable extension of the reasoning in Marion’s Case. The decision, which is the first judicial consideration in Queensland of the position of medical terminations, also reveals systemic problems with the criminal law in that State. In concluding that the traditional legal excuse for abortions will not apply to those which are performed medically, Queensland v B provides further support for calls to reform this area of law.

Using Media Technologies in English

English has long been the subject where print text has reigned supreme. Increasingly in our networked and electronically connected world, however, we can be using digital technologies to create and respond to texts studied in English classrooms. The current approach to English includes the concept of ‘multiliteracies,’ which suggests that print texts alone are necessary but not sufficient’ (E.Q, 2000) and that literacy includes the flexible and sustainable mastery of a repertoire of practices. This also includes the decoding and deployment of media technologies (E.Q, 2000). This has become more possible in Australia as secondary students have increasing access to computers and online platforms at home and at school. With the advent of web 2.0., with its interactive platforms and free media making software, teachers and students can use this software to access information and emerging online literature in English covering a range of text types and new forms for authentic audiences and contexts. This chapter is concerned with responding to literary and mediated texts through the use of technologies. If we remain open to trying out new textual forms and see our digital ‘native students’ (Prensky, 2007) as our best resource, we can move beyond technophobia, become digital travellers’ ourselves and embrace new digital forms in our classrooms.

The importance of a new kind of learning in collaborative networks

There is wide agreement that in order to manage the increasingly complex and uncertain tasks of business, government and community, organizations can no longer operate in supreme isolation, but must develop a more networked approach. Networks are not ‘business as usual’. Of particular note is what has been referred to as collaborative networks. Collaborative networks now constitute a significant part of our institutional infrastructure. A key driver for the proliferation of these multiorganizational arrangements is their ability to facilitate the learning and knowledge necessary to survive or to respond to increasingly complex social issues In this regard the emphasis is on the importance of learning in networks. Learning applies to networks in two different ways. These refer to the kinds of learning that occur as part of the interactive processes of networks. This paper looks at the importance of these two kinds of learning in collaborative networks. The first kind of learning relates to networks as learning networks or communities of practice. In learning networks people exchange ideas with each other and bring back this new knowledge for use in their own organizations. The second type of learning is referred to as network learning. Network learning refers to how people in collaborative networks learn new ways of communicating and behaving with each other. Network learning has been described as transformational in terms of leading to major systems changes and innovation. In order to be effective, all networks need to be involved as learning networks; however, collaborative networks must also be involved in network learning to be effective. In addition to these two kinds of learning in collaborative networks this paper also focuses on the importance of how we learn about collaborative networks. Maximizing the benefits of working through collaborative networks is dependent on understanding their unique characteristics and how this impacts on their operation. This requires a new look at how we specifically teach about collaborative networks and how this is similar to and/or different from how we currently teach about interorgnizational relations.

Are the financial services external complaints resolution schemes subject to judicial review?

In Australia seven schemes (apart from the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal) provide alternative dispute resolution services for complaints brought by consumers against financial services industry members. Recently the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the decisions of one scheme were amenable to judicial review at the suit of a financial services provider member and the Supreme Court of Victoria has since taken a similar approach. This article examines the juristic basis for such a challenge and contends that judicial review is not available, either at common law or under statutory provisions. This is particularly the case since Financial Industry Complaints Service Ltd v Deakin Financial Services Pty Ltd (2006) 157 FCR 229; 60 ACSR 372 decided that the jurisdiction of a scheme is derived from a contract made with its members. The article goes on to contend that the schemes are required to give procedural fairness and that equitable remedies are available if that duty is breached.